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ivAbstract
This thesis consists of four essays covering two sets of issues linking resources to institutions.
Chapter 1 provides a summary of the thesis.
Chapter 2 provides a general overview of the resource curse literature, emphasising the role of
institutions, the nature of the political regimes in resource-rich countries and the link with civil
con￿icts.
Chapter 3 examines the implications of liberal lending practices of international credit markets
to dictators during resource booms. We show that the combination of institutional weaknesses
such as unaccountable leadership and unsound lending may give autocrats perverse incentives
to loot and destabilise their countries, which impedes economic growth.
Chapter 4 investigates what motivates some dictators in resource-rich countries to invest in
productivity enhancing public goods while others deliberately choose predatory or repressive
policies. We ￿nd that the ruler is more likely invest in public goods when the productivity of
the non-resource sector is high, and when he is relatively ine￿ective in controlling the country’s
resources.
Chapter 5 presents an overview of the literature on intellectual property rights focusing on
the problems raised by sequential innovations for the design of patents and the role of legal
institutions in resolving disputes.
Chapter 6 examines the nature of the North￿South divide in the bioscience industries as a
hold-up problem caused by the lack of coordination between North and South property rights
systems. We develop a model of bargaining in a sequential R&D framework that demonstrates
the mechanism by which underinvestment in maintaining biodiversity and ine￿cient ￿ow of
information occurs.
Chapter 7 assumes that the coordination problem is resolved and investigates the number and
placement of the property rights to provide incentives for e￿cient investment in information
generation. We show that the existence of a property right in the genetic resources is necessary
for the South to share in the rents from the R&D sector. When traditional knowledge is the
South’s private information, it is not necessary to establish a separate property right in it to
appropriate its return.
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xiiChapter 1
Overview of the Thesis
This thesis consists of four essays covering two sets of issues linking resources to institutions.
The ￿rst part of the thesis is concerned with the political dimension of the so-called curse of
natural resources, i.e. the inverse relationship between resource abundance and economic growth
across countries. The second part examines the North/South divide over the issue of intellectual
property rights in the life sciences industries (pharmaceutical and biotechnology).
Part I: Political Dimension of the Resource Curse
Part 1 of the thesis is comprised of three chapters investigating the political dimension of the
curse of natural resources. In particular we explore the conditions under which dictators ruling
resource-rich countries have incentives to undertake productive investment.
Chapter 2: Resource curse and Institutions: Literature Overview Chapter 2 provides
an overview of the resource curse literature, highlighting its evolution as well as the controversy
and disagreement among researchers. We also link the economic literature and political science
literature by speci￿cally pointing to the connection between resource abundance and political
regimes￿in particular dictatorship ( Ross, 2001)￿and civil con￿ict (Collier and Hoe￿er, 1998
and 2004).
This chapter starts by highlighting the in￿uential work by Sachs and Warner (1995) in uncov-
ering the persistent negative statistical relationship between natural resource exports and eco-
nomic growth measured as per capita GDP. In its early days, the resource curse puzzle received
1considerable support based on case studies (Auty, 1994) as well as on statistical analysis￿see
Gylfason (2001) on the role of education and human capital, or Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) on
the unsustainable development path chosen by many resource-rich countries. However, various
authors have cast doubt on the validity of Sachs and Warner’s ￿ndings. First, the relevance of
natural resource exports as a measure of resource abundance rather than a measure of resource
dependence is questioned, along with the endogeneity of this measure. Second, the resource
curse literature does not explain the heterogeneity among resource-rich countries very well, i.e.
why some countries perform badly while others have been highly successful. Third, the devel-
opment of the literature on ￿endogenous institutions￿ points to an indirect e￿ect of resources on
growth through institutions, rather than a direct e￿ect as documented by the early literature.
This chapter goes on to discuss the two other commonly accepted manifestations of the resource
curse. First, we examine the link between resources and dictatorships (Ross, 2001) and the
presumption that the quality of a dictator may determine whether or not a country will su￿er
from the resource curse. Second, we discuss the link between resources and civil con￿icts (civil
wars). In an in￿uential paper, Collier and Hoe￿er (2004) argue that resource wealth enhances
the likelihood of a civil war because of the greed (rather than grievance) of the rebels. This result,
however, is challenged on the basis of its lack of robustness. (Fearon, 2005) Other critiques like
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008b) question the validity of the causal link established by Collier
and Hoe￿er and ￿nd that once endogeneity is controlled for, the probability of the onset of a
civil war decreases with a truly exogenous measure of resource abundance.
The literature on the curse has various facets and tries to pull together insights from both
economics and political science. Despite signi￿cant progress (an emerging consensus on the role
of institutional quality is gaining momentum), the empirical literature of the resource curse
provides many contradicting results and many issues remain unsettled.
Chapter 3: On the Looting of Countries: International Lending, Political Instability
and Economic Growth Comparing the relative performance of Indonesia and Mexico￿
two resource-rich countries￿Usui (1997) points to a striking regularity in international lending
patterns: the fact that resource booms tend to attract international in￿ow of capital in the form
of lax lending and borrowing. In fact, international lending patterns have followed resource
booms and busts remarkably closely over the 30-year period between 1970 to 2000 (see Figure
3.6). Manzano and Rigobon (2001) argue that the explanation of the resource curse puzzle can
2be traced back to this very phenomenon which, according to them, has caused debt overhang
and subsequently led to the resource curse.
Following the idea of ￿resource boom-based lending￿, this chapter investigates how in￿ows of
unsound lending can induce the wrong incentives when resource-rich countries are led by un-
accountable and self-interested leaders. We develop a dynamic discrete choice model of a self-
interested and unchecked ruler making decisions regarding the development of a resource-rich
country. Resource wealth serves as collateral and facilitates the acquisition of loans. The ruler
makes the recursive choice of either staying in power to live o￿ the productivity of the country
while facing the risk of being ousted, or looting the country’s riches by liquefying the natural
assets through external lending. We assume that the risk incurred by staying is reduced by
investing in capital or investing in security (military, police, etc.). We show that unstructured
lending from international credit markets to a resource-rich dictator can enhance his ability
to liquefy assets, and create incentives to loot the country’s wealth. Second, we ￿nd that an
enhanced likelihood of looting reduces tenures (greater political instability), increases indebted-
ness, reduces investment, and diminishes growth. These predictions are tested using a treatment
e￿ects model where instability proxied by leadership turnover is the treatment equation and per
capita GDP growth is the outcome equation. We ￿nd strong empirical evidence that instability
caused by unsound lending to unchecked rulers of resource-rich countries may result in slow
economic growth. This result is robust to a number of changes.
Chapter 4: Resources, Con￿ict and Development ￿ Public Good Provision in
Resource-Rich Economies Many scholars ￿nd it intriguing that some leaders apparently
deliberately choose sub-optimal predatory policies when they could choose developmental poli-
cies that yield higher returns, if only out of sheer self-interest. (Robinson, 2001) However, when
a resource abundant country is led by a self-interested autocrat and when the mere existence of
natural resources increases the threat of a con￿ict (Collier and Hoe￿er, 1998; 2004), then the
question might be rather why would such a ruler implement pro-development policies￿namely
public good provision: provision of health, education, infrastructure￿instead of predatory or
repressive policies? Often, the very public good supplied by a dictator becomes the instrument
of his demise.
We develop a Stackelberg game between a ruler and the population of a resource-rich country, to
analyse the ruler’s decision to provide a public good in the context of a contest over the resource
3wealth. The ruler’s actions are ￿rst, to invest or not in a public good and second, to choose a
level of repression in response to the population’s decision to ￿ght. The population chooses the
allocation of its time between working in the non-resource sector and ￿ghting to appropriate
natural resource rents. We ￿nd that the ruler’s policy choice depends critically on the extent
of the resource wealth; on the productivity of the non-resource sector; and ￿nally on the ruler’s
relative e￿ectiveness to control the resources. In particular, this dictator is likely to invest
in public goods when the non-resource sector is productive enough to raise the population’s
opportunity cost of ￿ghting. On the other hand, he is less likely to invest in public goods to
buy the peace when he is relatively e￿ective in contesting the resources. Depending on these
parameters, di￿erent policy choices are made, resulting in di￿erent public good decisions. We
present empirical evidence consistent with the predictions of the model.
Our contributions in this ￿rst part of the thesis are twofold: ￿rst, we contribute to a better
understanding of the resource curse by providing conditional theories that help explain why
some resource-rich countries are successful while others are not. Second, we test empirically the
proposed theories to assess their relevance. Such attempts are still very rare in the resource
curse literature and we hope that our contributions will demonstrate the value of such exercise.
Part II: The North￿South Sequential Innovation Problem
In the second part of the thesis, we examine the North￿South divide over intellectual property
rights (IPR) within the framework of sequential investment in informational goods.
Chapter 5: Intellectual Property Rights & Sequential Innovation: Literature Overview
This chapter provides a overview of the intellectual property rights literature in industrial organ-
isation, with an application to the North￿South relationship. Intellectual property rights refer
to legal protection conferred to individuals over their creation. An intellectual property rights
system is an incentive mechanism that provides inventors with temporary exclusive ownership
rights so that they engage in innovative and creative works. There are various forms of intellec-
tual property rights: patents, copyrights, trade secrets, trademarks, etc. Among them, patents
are the strongest and most robust form. They are particularly used to protect innovations in
the pharmaceutical sector.
In the course of this review, we discuss in detail the rationale of the IPR system and the
4requirements for patentability as well as the policy questions regarding the optimal design of
patents￿a much debated issue by economists. We look at these issues both for stand-alone
innovations and cumulative and sequential innovations (i.e. when an invention draws directly
from a previous one to make further development). Cumulative innovations are, however, our
main focus. The important ￿nding made by Green and Scotchmer (1995) is that when innovation
is cumulative, the patent life should be longer than with stand-alone innovations, and the scope of
the patent should be broad enough to prevent minor improvements to compete with the original
innovation. Such a policy is necessary to provide the ￿rst innovator enough of an incentive
to invest since, without his investment, no follow-on innovation is possible. This literature,
therefore, clearly points to the protection of the ￿rst innovation. This prescription is at odds
with the practice in the life science industries where a single patent right is placed at the level
of the second innovation.
The North￿South bilateral relationship is presented within the industrial organisation (I/O)
framework of a vertical research and development (R&D) industry where the North￿downstream￿
and the South￿upstream￿are at each end of the industry. The South generates information
originating from natural capital through investment in traditional human capital (traditional
knowledge or TK)1 and land use for the preservation of biological diversity. The North uses this
information as an input in the R&D process to bring new drugs to the market. The summary
of the I/O literature on successive R&D makes clear that the issues relating to patent rights
and claims in these industries are important to the determination of e￿cient ￿ow of information
across the R&D process as well as the division of the rents. When individual entities interact
in the creation of related information and innovations, it is the willingness of states to recognise
these contributions and of courts to enforce these rights that determines the shares that each
innovator receives.
Admittedly, as a statutory right, an IPR has little value if it is not enforced by courts in case
of infringement. We discuss how courts resolve disputes regarding patent cases and highlight
the remedies at their disposal to do so￿injunctions and damages￿as well as their e￿ects on
e￿ciency and distribution.
1In this thesis, traditional knowledge (TK) refers to the accumulated stock of human capital and knowledge
over the centuries about the properties of medicinal plants.
5Chapter 6: North￿South Hold-up Problem in Sequential R&D In this chapter, we
provide an analysis of the nature of the problem faced by the North and the South in terms of
a hold-up problem. It is often argued that the creation of property rights in the primary infor-
mation generated by the South￿genetic resource-based information and associated traditional
knowledge￿is necessary to solve the incentive problem. However, this solution to the property
rights failure overlooks another crucial problem, i.e. a property right is a domestic statutory
right that does not span the boundaries of the jurisdiction conferring it: there is no such thing
as an ’international property right’. Given the nature of the information generated by the South
(naturally-occurring information and traditional knowledge), they are likely to be considered as
mere discoveries or non-novel knowledge and as such are not amenable to intellectual property
rights as de￿ned by the North. Therefore, for the rights conferred in the South to deserve pro-
tection and compensation, there is a need for coordination between the legal systems from both
regions.
The hold-up problem re￿ects the inability of the North and the South to coordinate their
legal systems in order to promote global cooperation for access to genetic resources on a more
equitable basis. We develop a model of North-South bargaining in a sequential R&D framework
to shed light on the mechanism by which underinvestment in maintaining genetic diversity and
an ine￿cient ￿ow of information in bioprospecting occurs. Our main focus in this chapter is
the incentive for e￿cient investment in land use to preserve biodiversity. This investment is
a necessary condition for useful genetic resources to be found and traditional knowledge to be
developed. We show that when the property right in genetic resources conferred in the South
is not enforceable ex ante across jurisdictions (in the North), a hold-up problem may arise and
lead to underinvestment in genetic diversity. We also ￿nd that under certain conditions, a
liability rule imposed ex post by courts in the North can resolve the hold-up problem. In other
words, under speci￿c conditions, when the North is ordered to pay damages to the South for
infringing its rights, ex post enforcement of property rights across jurisdictions helps circumvent
the hold up problem and may encourage socially optimal investments. This happens if courts
can make the South the residual claimant of the surplus created by its investment. Thus, legal
institutions play an essential role by establishing the rules that give the South proper incentive
to undertake optimal investment. However, as we will see, these conditions are not general so
that sub-optimal investment in maintaining diversity is the most likely outcome. This chapter
highlights the role that legal institutions may play in shaping the incentives to invest.
6Chapter 7: Economics of Traditional Knowledge as Private Information This chap-
ter assumes that governments in North and South are able to coordinate their legal systems
and recognise the property rights conferred in the other region. Once the contributions from
the South are protected in the North, the question then becomes which contributions should
be protected by intellectual property rights. That is, we are interested in determining the
number and placement of these rights to achieve e￿ciency. The South provides two di￿erent
informational goods that are often bundled together in the literature: genetic information and
traditional knowledge. To investigate this question, we formalise traditional knowledge as the
South’s private information on the most promising and useful genetic resources for R&D pur-
poses. We show that in the absence of traditional knowledge, the protection of genetic resources
determines the starting point for negotiations by providing the South with an outside option
that is to be reckoned with. Contracting between the primary and secondary stages of R&D
requires a starting point, and this starting point depends upon the South’s outside option.
We demonstrate that whatever the distribution of the bargaining power, contracting yields an
e￿cient outcome. When the North also relies on traditional knowledge￿assumed to be the
South’s private information￿in addition to the genetic resources, the division of the bene￿ts
may improve in favour of the South when the outside option is signi￿cantly a￿ected by the
private information. We show that when the genetic resources are protected, it is not necessary
to assign a separate property right to traditional knowledge for the South to appropriate the
rents derived from the quality of its information.
The second part of the thesis makes two contributions. First, we provide a framework that
formally explains the mechanism of underinvestment in biodiversity and ine￿cient exchange of
genetic resources in the life sciences industries as a more general hold-up problem in sequential
R&D between North and South. Second, we provide a formal economic de￿nition for traditional
knowledge as the South’s private information and we establish that TK may act as a trade secret
and therefore does not require a separate property right for the South to appropriate its bene￿ts
so long as the associated genetic resources duly protected.
7Part I
Political Dimension of the Resource
Curse
8Chapter 2
Resource Curse and Institutions:
Literature Overview
￿...natural resource endowments would enable developing countries to make the transition from
underdevelopment to industrial ’take o￿’...￿ (Rostow)
￿We are in part to blame, but this is the curse of being born with a copper spoon in our mouths.￿
(K. Kaunda, President of Zambia)
2.1 The Resource Curse: Evidence, Manifestation and Critics
2.1.1 What is the Resource Curse? Empirical Evidence
Until the eighties, a general view among economists and political scientists was that a large
endowment of natural resources has a positive impact on a country’s development prospects.
As the geographer Ginsburg put it, ￿the possession of a sizable and diversi￿ed natural resource
base is a major advantage to any country embarking on a period of rapid economic growth.￿ Yet,
over the past forty years, casual observation and statistical studies indicate that natural resources
often fail to deliver the expected economic bene￿ts. On the contrary, resource wealth seems to
impede the economic performance of many countries. In a series of highly in￿uential of papers,
Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001) ￿nd that there exists a strong and negative relationship between
the average per capita GDP growth (1970￿1989) in a cross-section of countries and resource
abundance in 1971 measured by the GDP share of primary export￿agriculture, minerals, and
fuels. A standard deviation increase in the share of primary export (on average 13.5 percent
of GDP) results in a reduction of about 1 percent per year in economic growth. This negative
9relationship does not disappear even after controlling for the main determinants of growth￿
institutional features, trade policy, investment, terms of trade, etc. It also remains robust to a
wide range of alternative measures of primary resource wealth (ratio of mineral production in
GDP, ratio of primary export in total export, land area per per person) and model speci￿cations
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; DeLong and Summers, 1991; Mankiw, et al, 1992; King and
Levine, 1993; Knack and Keefer, 1995).
Figure 2.1: Economic Growth and Natural Capital (Source Gylfason 2001)
Sachs and Warner’s statistical analysis con￿rms the ￿ndings made in earlier case studies doc-
umenting the apparent paradox that the resource boom in the seventies and early eighties did
little to improve the growth prospects of primary commodity exporters (Gelb, 1986; Gelb &
Associates, 1988; and Auty (1993; 1994)). On the contrary, the resource windfall appears to
have resulted in a ￿curse￿1 for many countries, although it ￿is not an iron law, [but] rather it
is a strong recurrent tendency￿ (Auty, 1994). Number of cross-country studies following Sachs
and Warner have found evidence of the resource curse￿Gylfason et al. (1999), Gylfason (2001),
Auty (2001), Leite & Weidmann (2002), Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian (2003), Isham et al.
(2005), Atkinson & Hamilton (2003), Bulte et al. (2005). For the moment, we will discuss here
1Auty 1993 is probably the ￿rst who used this term.
10two di￿erent perspective to the resource curse.
Atkinson & Hamilton (2003) show that the curse may be a manifestation of government’s failure
to manage natural resources in a sustainable manner. They argue that by consuming large
resource revenues instead of investing them in productive projects for the future, many resource
countries have implemented short-sighted policies that resulted in low or even negative rates
of genuine saving￿i.e. net saving adjusted for resource depletion. Those low rates of genuine
saving imply an unsustainable development path with low or even declining welfare, which
translates into slow economic growth.
Gylfason (2001) in contrast, emphasises the role of human capital. He ￿nds empirical evidence
that one transmission mechanism of the curse may be the neglect of investment in education by
resource-rich countries. Resource wealth is negatively associated with education expenditure,
average years of schooling for girls, or gross secondary-school enrolment, and seems to crowd
out human capital, thereby impeding economic development.
Under free disposal, these seemingly robust ￿ndings constitute a puzzle to economists. More
resources provide more options to a country and therefore should make it better o￿ or at least
as well o￿. If it was not the case, the possibility of leaving the resources in the ground is always
an option. It is also a puzzle in light of economic history. Countries such as the United States,
Canada or Australia heavily relied on their large resource endowment and primary commodity
exports at earlier stages of their development. For instance, in the nineteenth century the US
became the richest country, and yet commodity exports constituted more than two thirds of all
US exports (Bairoch, 1993, p. 194￿196). For these countries, resources proved to be a blessing,
lifting them among the richest nations in the world. So, the crucial question is what accounts
for the apparent poor economic performance of rich countries since the seventies?
To the extent that GDP growth is an imperfect measure of economic well-being, one may
question its suitability as an indicator of economic development and welfare. Davis (1995)
compares indicators of well-being￿life expectancy, infant mortality, access to sanitation, hu-
man development index2, etc.￿for mineral and non-mineral exporters and ￿nds no evidence
that mineral exporters perform worse. This question is taken forward by Bulte et al. (2005)
2Human development index or HDI was developed by the United Nations Development Programme as ￿a
measure of people’s ability to live a long and healthy life, to communicate and to participate in the life of
the community and to have su￿cient resources to obtain a decent living￿ (UNDP, 1993, p. 104). It combines
normalised measures of life expectancy, literacy, educational attainment, and GDP per capita for countries
worldwide.
11who, in a cross-country analysis, explore whether resource intensity is associated with economic
underdevelopment and low welfare? They ￿nd that resource wealth is negatively related to de-
velopment indicators when resources are point source as opposed to when they are di￿use. The
former are geographically clustered and easy to control by the elite in power￿e.g. minerals and
fuels￿whereas the latter are geographically spread and di￿cult to control by governments￿e.g.
agriculture.
Various hypotheses have been suggested to explain the resource curse puzzle. Economists have
focused on the Dutch disease and rent seeking, pointing to the direct e￿ect resources may have
on economic growth. Then, with the development of the endogenous institutions literature,
explanations have emphasised the indirect e￿ect of resources through institutional quality.
2.1.2 Traditional Explanations of the Curse
Structuralist Economists’ view. The ￿rst explanations linking resource exports and eco-
nomic growth and development were suggested in the ￿fties by structuralist economists Hans
Singer (1950) and Raul Prebisch (1950). The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis posits that the long
term decline in terms of trade for primary commodity exporters￿mainly developing countries￿
constitute a handicap to the growth prospects and development of resource dependent coun-
tries. Explanations based on ￿uctuations of commodity prices, or lack of linkages between the
resource sector and the rest of the economy (Hirschman, 1958) have also been advanced. Al-
though the existence of the decline in commodity prices has received some support (Brohman,
1996), the structuralist explanations are nowadays regarded with skepticism. There is evidence
that commodity prices that have declined the most were exported either by developed countries
or successful developing countries. (Rosser 2006) According to Ross (1999), these explanations
have not stood the test of closer empirical scrutiny (Behrman, 1987; Cuddington, 1992; Fosu,
1996), although they are relevant for certain resources.
The Dutch Disease. The Dutch disease theory, initially developed in the eighties (Neary and
van Wijnbergen, 1986), sought to explain the disappointing economic performance of resource-
rich countries such as the Netherlands following the discovery of natural gas in the North Sea in
the 1970s. The theory postulates that the rapid growth of primary exports will cause the resource
12sector (non-traded sector) to crowd out the traded sector (manufacturing sector) inducing its
shrinkage. The reason is as follows: a surge in resource exports often leads to an increase in
spending in the non-traded sector, which raises prices in that sector. The equilibrium in the
labour market and the non-traded goods market is restored through the appreciation of the
real exchange rate, which in turn may hurt manufacturing exports and eventually result in the
contraction of the manufacturing sector altogether (￿spending e￿ect￿). In addition to that, high
wages in the resource sector will attract workers away from the traded sector depressing the
manufacturing sector even more (￿resource pull e￿ect￿). However, income growth is negatively
a￿ected only if the e￿ect of the contraction of the manufacturing sector outweighs the positive
growth e￿ect in the resource sector. Matsuyama (1992) and Sachs and Warner (1995) make
such assumption, arguing that only the manufacturing sector can induce a learning-by-doing
process and productivity. Indeed, if the manufacturing sector is the main engine for growth as
opposed to the resource sector, resource dependent countries are bound to su￿er from the curse
due to the shrinkage of the very sector that drives economic growth. However, Stijns (2001)
challenges this view pointing out that the development process of nineteenth century Britain,
Germany and the US demonstrates that this assumption may not be founded. How could we
otherwise explain that some countries￿Norway, Botswana, Malaysia, Chili￿have escaped the
￿curse￿? Besides, even in countries that notoriously su￿er from the curse, little evidence of the
Dutch Disease has been found. (Leite and Weidmann, 2002; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian,
2003) Overall, the Dutch disease explanation does not seem able to explain the curse of natural
resources.
The Rent-Seeking Behaviour. The third explanation is rent seeking behaviour. Lane and
Tornell (1996) have argued that resource-rich countries are prone to extreme forms of rent
seeking behaviour where corrupt o￿cials, and interest groups engage in wasteful activities and
compete to capture resource rents. Tornell and Lane (1999) maintain that the existence of easily
appropriable resource rents make countries prone to corruption especially when vested interests
are not limited by strong legal and institutional barriers. In the absence of strong institutions,
the formal and productive sector becomes subject to predatory behaviour of powerful groups
in society. As a consequence, entrepreneurs shy away from the formal sector and move to the
informal sector which provides relatively lower returns on investment but o￿ers security from
unwarranted predation. The situation is aggravated during periods of resource boom and leads
13to slow economic growth because the ’voracity e￿ect’ outweighs the windfall gains.
Baland and Francois (2000) suggest a di￿erent but complementary perspective to rent seeking
behaviour. They argue that rent seeking arises because of the misallocation of human resources.
Under some conditions, easily appropriable resource rents may lure the talented agents of the
economy into rent seeking, away from productive activities and entrepreneurship. This situation
leads to a loss of human capital (or talent), which in turn adversely a￿ects economic performance.
A widely accepted explanation is that a windfall coming from a terms-of-trade improvement or a
discovery of natural resource deposits can lead to a ‘feeding frenzy’ in which competing factions
￿ght for natural resource rents and end up ine￿ciently exhausting the public good (Lane and
Tornell, 1996).
Despite the merit of these explanations and the interesting directions they point to for un-
derstanding the resource curse, their failure to account for the divergent economic outcomes
experienced among resource-rich countries constitutes a major shortcoming. For instance, while
the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (ex-Zaire) growth performance over the past thirty ￿ve
years has been terrible, Botswana’s record has been a has been an outstanding one. (Acemoglu
et al., 2002) A satisfactory theory must account for the variation in economic performance
among resource-rich countries. There is a need for a conditional theory to understand the re-
source curse. (Dunning, 2005) The growing literature of endogenous institutions has provided
a new impetus to such investigation.
2.1.3 The Role of Institutions
A fast growing literature developed in the past decade has put much emphasis on the importance
of institutions in determining the large di￿erence in economic performance among countries. It
aims to address the question of ￿Why do some countries produce so much more output that
others?￿ (Hall and Jones, 1999) Several in￿uential papers￿Sokolo￿ and Engerman (2000),
Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), and Rodrik, Subramanian and
Trebbi (2004)￿have suggested that di￿erences in institutional quality may cause the di￿erences
observed in economic performance (be it in income levels or in income growth). A major contri-
bution of this literature is in endogenising institutions in order to identify its e￿ect on economic
performance. Institutions are likely to be endogenous because while they may determine eco-
nomic performance, it is also true that rich countries may have better institutions because they
14can a￿ord them. (Acemoglu Johnson and Robinson, 2001)
Lessons from the ￿Endogenous Institutions￿ Literature To address the possible endo-
geneity of institutions, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (AJR, 2001), in an in￿uential paper,
adopt a historical perspective. They use the mortality rate of European settlers￿proxied by the
soldiers, bishops and sailors mortality￿during the colonial era as a source of exogenous variation
in institutions. The idea is that the feasibility of settlement based on the settlers mortality rate
shaped the type and quality of institutions implemented in the European colonies. AJR argue
that in places where settlers faced a high mortality rate extractive economies, aiming mainly at
natural resource exploitation, were implemented. That led to particularly bad institutions based
on rent-seeking, and the absence of checks and balances. Congo under Belgian domination is a
good example. On the other hand, in colonies suitable for settlement (low mortality rate), the
European colonisers tended to implement institutions close to those in Europe as far as private
property rights, and check and balances against expropriation are concerned. Those institutions
were conducive to foster economic growth as in the US, Canada, and Australia. Finally, the
institutions implemented by the European settlers have persisted even after the independence
of the former colonies according to AJR. They ￿nd strong empirical evidence that institutions
have a large e￿ect on economic performance. Furthermore, once institutions are controlled for,
geographic characteristic such as distance to the equator (used by Hall and Jones, 1999) or
the Africa dummy are no longer signi￿cant. This suggests that poor performance in African
countries and more broadly in other area may not be due to geographic or cultural factors but
mainly to a bad sets of institutions. The recent work by Rodrik et al. (2004) con￿rms this
￿nding and suggests the ￿primacy of institutions over geography￿.
Sokolo￿ and Engerman (2000) also underline the historical determinants of institutions by link-
ing institutions to factor endowment, inequality and long term development. Their basic idea is
that certain types of natural resources (such as crops in large plantations) favour institutional
arrangements that exacerbate inequality and impede development. They argue that extractive
colonies in Latin America based on plantation crops (sugar, co￿ee) were established in places
where physical conditions (climate and soil) were suitable for plantation agriculture (bene￿ting
from returns to scale) and where cheap labour was locally available or could be imported (Native
Indians and slaves of African descent). Once in place, institutions based on unequal distribution
of power and income persisted and reproduced inequality over time. In contrast, development
15in North America was based on di￿erent factor endowments: the soil and climate were less
suitable for plantations, and labourers are from European descent with fairly high and similar
human capital. These di￿erent factor endowments favoured the development of small household
farming and created a society with a relatively more equal distribution of wealth and power.
This greater equality a￿ected how policies and institutions were designed in American society.
The main hypothesis is that colonies with di￿use resources developed favourable institutions,
conducive to long-term growth, whereas large inequalities were exacerbated in colonies endowed
with soil, climate and cheap labour conducive to plantation agriculture, which eventually was a
hindrance to economic development.
The ￿ndings made by this literature have shaped the evolution of the resource curse literature
in an interesting manner. There is now a growing consensus about the role of institutions in
determining whether a resource-rich country will experience a curse or a blessing. The economic
performance of a resource-rich country is now traced back to the quality of its institutions.
Countries with good institutions might be the ones that turn resource wealth into a blessing
whereas countries with poor institutions are likely to fail.
Institutions and the Resource Curse The development of the literature on institutions
underlined above has helped renew the theory of the resource curse and provides the basis for a
conditional theory able to understand the various paths experienced by resource-rich countries.
In this respect, Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) made an important contribution to the lit-
erature. They develop a model of rent-seeking which accommodates multiple equilibria￿like
Baland and Francois (2000) and unlike earlier models by Tornell and Lane (1999)￿to explain
both the existence of a curse or a blessing. They model a country in which entrepreneurs can
allocate their talent between a rent-seeking activity (￿grabbing￿ resource rents) and a produc-
tive activity (￿production￿). The choice between these two activities depends on the quality
of institutions, i.e. whether the institutions are grabber friendly (grabbing and production are
then competing activities) or producer friendly (grabbing and production are then complemen-
tary). They show that a production equilibrium emerges when institutional quality is high
whereas a grabber equilibrium emerges when institutional quality is low. Furthermore, higher
natural resources correspond to a blessing in the former equilibrium, and to a curse in the lat-
ter. Interacting resource wealth with institutional quality using Sachs and Warner data, they
￿nd empirical support to their theory. However the major shortcoming of this paper is that
16institutions are taken as given. A more fruitful endeavour is to endogenise institutions.
Leite and Weidmann (2002) are probably the ￿rst authors to point to the role of resources in
shaping institutions. They argue that natural resource abundance is a major determinant of
a country’s level of corruption. Endogenising corruption, they ￿nd no direct negative e￿ect
of natural resource wealth on growth but an indirect e￿ect running through corruption. Like
Leite and Weidmann (2002), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) test the hypothesis that
the negative e￿ect of the resource curse operates through corruption and institutional quality.
Their focus is on Nigeria as a special case of a country su￿ering the curse. They make three
interesting ￿ndings. First aggregate resource wealth has little e￿ect on growth once endogenous
institutional quality is controlled for. In other words, the curse operates indirectly through
the institutional channel: natural resources deteriorate institutional quality￿via corruption
and weak rule of law￿which in turn has a negative impact on growth. Secondly, point source
resources￿oil and mineral￿are mostly detrimental to institutional quality as opposed to di￿use
resources￿not easily appropriated such as food, agriculture. Thirdly, the negative impact of
natural resources on institutional quality￿and presumably on corruption￿is non linear and
increases with resource abundance.
Isham et al. (2005) con￿rm some of these conclusions, using a di￿erent approach. Based on
Sokolo￿ and Engerman’s (2000) idea of ￿entrenched inequality￿ linking institutions to factor
endowments, inequality and long term development, they argue that export composition a￿ects
growth through institutions. That is, the composition of natural resource exports is key to un-
derstand the di￿erences in growth performance among resource countries. They ￿nd that ￿point
source￿ resources￿resources that are geographically clustered and easily controlled by the state,
i.e. oil and minerals￿ and crops from plantations￿co￿ee and cocoa￿do have a negative e￿ect
on the quality of institutions unlike di￿use resources. The poor quality of institutions in turn
impedes economic growth. Using an instrumental variable strategy where various institutional
indicators (rule of law, political instability, government e￿ectiveness, control of corruption, reg-
ulatory framework and property rights and rule-based governance) are instrumented using the
share of English and European speakers, latitude and predicted trade share, they ￿nd strong
evidence (in the cross section of countries) in support of their hypothesis. These results are
con￿rmed by Bulte et al. (2005) using development indicators instead of growth rates. They
￿nd that 1) that intensity in point resources tends to undermine institutional quality; and 2)
17after controlling for institutional quality, resource intensity (whether point source or di￿use) has
no direct e￿ect on development indicators.
2.1.4 The Resource curse, a Red Herring?
Despite the support described in the previous sections, Sachs and Warner’s puzzling result has
also generated many critics that all revolve around the issue of the endogeneity of the variable
chosen as a proxy for resource abundance. These critics can be classi￿ed into three categories:
￿rst, the robustness to a change in econometrics methods (￿xed e￿ects versus cross-section),
second the inadequacy of the choice of resource dependence (ratio of primary exports over
GDP) as a measure of resource abundance, and third the issue of reverse causality.
Resources and Debt Overhang. Manzano and Rigobon (2001) question the robustness of
the results to a panel data with ￿xed e￿ects. They show that the negative e￿ect of the primary
exports variable disappears when a panel data analysis with ￿xed e￿ects is used instead of a
cross-section. This suggests that resource abundance may be correlated with unobserved char-
acteristics captured by the ￿xed e￿ects. This endogeneity problem results in biased estimates so
that Sachs and Warner’s results may not be reliable. Furthermore, they demonstrate that even
within a cross-section analysis, the negative relationship between resource and growth rates
disappears once countries’ external indebtedness (Debt/GNP ratio in 1981) is controlled for.
They suggest that the debt overhang experienced by many resource-rich countries in the eight-
ies may be the cause of what appears to be a puzzle. The argument goes as follows: with the
￿boom￿ in resource prices in the seventies (oil, coal, copper, iron ore, etc.), high prices acted as
an implicit collateral for the loan contracted by resource-rich countries from international com-
mercial banks. However, when commodity prices collapsed during the eighties, international
credit became scarce and the payment of the debt turned out to be problematic. The situa-
tion deteriorated even more with the rise in the interest rates and the dollar. To complete the
picture, structural adjustment policies were carried out to re-establish macroeconomic balances
harming further growth prospects. Manzano and Rigobon’s intuition is based on the observa-
tion that international lending patterns have followed resource booms and busts. Chapter 3 will
suggest a theoretical model backed by empirical evidence based on the observation of ￿resource
boom-based borrowing￿. (Usui, 1997)
18Resource Abundance or Resource Dependence? Second, the use of primary exports
as an appropriate measure of resource abundance is questioned. According to Stijns (2001),
and Norman (2004) natural resource reserves (physical stocks) constitute a better indicator of
resource abundance than resource exports favoured by Sachs and Warner. Indeed, the reserves
capture the actual endowment whereas the ￿ow of export is a choice variable measuring in fact
resource dependence. However, the data on measured reserves of fuels and minerals back to 1970
is scarce. In addition, measured reserves may cause some concern because they partly re￿ect
the ￿technological and geological expertise, costs, ￿nancial and government structures and the
product price￿ (Norman, 2004), inducing an endogeneity problem. This type of endogeneity,
however, is likely to be less acute than the one generated by the use of a choice variable (resource
export) as a right hand side variable. Using physical reserves as a measure of resource abundance,
Stijns ￿nds no evidence of the curse. He conjectures that natural resources may a￿ect growth
through both positive and negative channels, and not in the deterministic manner assumed by
Sachs and Warner (1995). Nevertheless, Norman in turn challenges the results found by Stijns.
Reverse Causality. The third and most re￿ned critique comes from Brunnschweiler and
Bulte (2008a). They cast doubt on the validity of the commonly accepted causal link that
resource abundance undermines institutions, which in turn impede growth. Like Stijns (2001)
and Norman (2004), they question the relevance of the primary export share of GDP (resource
dependence indicator) used by Sachs and Warner (1995) and the subsequent literature, as a
measure of resource abundance. Instrumenting resource dependence and institutional quality,
and controlling for the stock of natural capital as their exogenous measure of resource abun-
dance, they show that: 1) resource dependence is determined by institutional quality; and 2)
endogenous resource dependence has no explanatory power in the growth equation after control-
ling for resource abundance (stock of natural capital). Rather, resource abundance is positively
associated with economic growth. Contrary to the general consensus in this literature, their
conclusions imply that bad institutions lead to resource dependence but resource dependence
has no e￿ect on growth, while resource abundance is a blessing rather than a curse. Arezki and
van der Ploeg (2007) ￿nd similar results also controlling for endogeneity.
It seems as if the fate of the resource curse is sealed and one may wonder if there is a curse after
all. This question is even more relevant as Rodriguez and Sachs (1999) but also Bravo-Ortega
and de Gregorio (2005) ￿nd a positive correlation between resources and income levels. This
19￿nding, however, is challenged by Arezki and van der Ploeg (2007) who suggest that even though
economic growth was not negatively related to resources, income levels are negatively associated
with resources. As Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008a) put it the resource curse is a red herring!
Despite the mixed results produced by the empirical economic literature on the causal relation
between resource abundance and economic growth, it is fair to recognise that the economic
performance of many resource-rich countries has been disappointing; that they are often led by
autocratic regimes (Ross, 1999 and 2001) and prone to civil con￿ict (Collier and Hoe￿er, 1998
and 2004). In the next sections we present a brief overview of the literature linking resources
to dictatorship on the one hand, and the literature linking resources with con￿icts on the other
hand. These issues will relate directly to chapter 3 and chapter 4 where we explore the political
dimension of the resource curse, in particular how the policy choices made by autocrats will
impact upon economic outcome.
2.2 Resources, Leaders & Policy Choice
Typology of dictators. Wintrobe (1990) develops a simple economic theory of dictatorship
that sheds light on some important aspects of how political scientists and political economists
model autocratic regimes. He describes the behaviour of a ￿tinpot dictator￿ and a ￿totalitarian
dictator￿ who are facing some uncertainty about their tenure. The former is only interested in
remaining in power to enjoy ￿palaces, Mercedes-Benz, Swiss banks accounts￿ while the latter
primarily aims at maximising his power over the population. For our purpose, dictators in
resource-rich countries are more likely to belong to the ￿tinpot￿ category. The dictator is a
self-interested agent who only cares about his own bene￿t. In maximising his utility, he can use
two instruments or policies to increase his power: he can invest in loyalty to ensure the support
of interest groups through patronage; or invest in repression to prevent the occurrence of a
viable opposition that potentially would overthrow them. These features (or similar features)
are common to most models of dictatorship in political economy.
Objective of dictators. Because the dictator pursues his self interest, one would expect his
objective to con￿ict with the population’s objective. McGuire and Olson (1996) contend that
when an autocrat has an ￿encompassing interest￿ in the country he rules (and enjoys a secure
tenure) he will stop behaving as a bandit leader stealing from the people through extortionary
20taxes and will act as a ruler whose interest is best served by taking care of his subjects’ interests.
In order to increase the share of revenue he can tax (in a reasonable manner), the autocrat will
be provide productivity enhancing public goods and security so that the population can increase
its productive capability. Thus, when the autocrat values the future and has long term horizon
(e.g. when the probability of survival is high), an ￿invisible hand￿ makes his interest consistent
with the interest of society in general.
The discussion above makes clear that dictators use three major instruments or policies to
reach their objective. First the dictator may undertake developmental policies that encourage
productive capacity, and promote investment and growth. (Acemoglu et al., 2003; McGuire
and Olson, 1996). Second he may carry out predatory policies: wasteful policies that hamper
investment and economic development: expropriatory taxation, investment in white elephants 3,
bribery, patronage. (Robinson and Torvik, 2006; Lane and Tornell, 1999) Third, he may resort
to repressive policies to keep the population quiet and thwart any willingness to change the
political status quo.
Rentier states and repressive states. The political science literature addresses the question
of the curse by exploring the link between resource abundance and political regimes. One of the
most popular ideas in this regard is the notion of ￿rentier states￿ (Ross, 2001). The hypothesis
of the rentier state was developed by Middle-East experts to analyse the political economy
of petro-states, and in particular, their lack of democracy. Rentier states refer to states that
receive ￿substantial rents from foreign individuals, concerns or governments￿ (Mahdavi, 1970).
According to Beblawi (1987) these rents are paid by foreign actors and accrue directly to the
state and ￿only a few [citizens] are engaged in the generation of this rent, the majority being only
involved in the distribution or utilization of it.￿ The origin and magnitude of the windfall￿e.g.
large oil rent￿make it easier for authoritarian regimes in oil-rich countries to consolidate their
power and escape public scrutiny through a policy of low taxation, and spending on patronage.
(Ross, 2001; Lam and Wantchekon, 2003) The assumption here is that citizens will demand
more accountability if they pay taxes. In addition to this, large rents enable autocrats to invest
heavily in security and defence to ensure the stability of their regimes and thwart political
3Often, resource-rich dictators devotes vast amount of ￿nancial resources in inappropriate or wasteful invest-
ment projects that yield very low returns (Robinson and Torvik, 2005).
21opposition through repression if necessary. (Ross, 2001; and Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004)
Testing this theory, Ross (2001) sheds light on the relation between resources and democracy. He
￿nds strong evidence of a negative correlation between oil and mineral wealth and democratic
regimes. His results are consistent both with the rentier state hypothesis and the repression
e￿ect. Thus, another manifestation of the natural resource curse is that resources may hinder
democracy. However, this negative e￿ect tends to fade away the richer the oil-rich country is
(e.g. US and Norway).
This ￿nding is potentially important. As a result, economic outcomes might also di￿er in a
signi￿cant manner. Before we analyse the e￿ect of dictators’ policy decisions on the economic
outcome of resource-rich countries in chapter 3 and chapter 4, we provide here a basic introduc-
tion to the theory and evidence of dictatorships and economic outcomes.
Dictators, Policy choices and Economic Performance Since resources hinder democracy,
it is tempting to attribute the curse to the fact that autocracies may have a poorer growth
record than democracies. Given dictators are generally not accountable to voters, their policy
choices may di￿er from democratically elected leaders who regularly face poll verdict. However,
Przeworski and Limongi (1993) show that the correlation between political regime and economic
performance is mixed at best. There is a presumption, that given unaccountability, the quality
of the autocrats may be determinant.4 In this regard, Jones and Olken (2005) provide some
interesting insight. Their research explores whether leaders do have an impact on their countries’
economic performance. In particular they ￿investigate whether changes in national leaders are
systematically associated with changes in growth￿. However, changes in leadership are most often
likely to be non-random, e.g. they may be caused by economic outcomes. To circumvent the
selection problem, Jones and Olken focus on leaders who died in o￿ce either by natural causes
or by accidents using a sample on leaders transition for 130 countries over the period 1945-2000.
Their identifying assumption is that the timing of the leaders death is unrelated to underlying
economic conditions, i.e. death has to be random. They make two important ￿ndings. First
leaders do matter in determining economic performance: they ￿nd that a standard deviation
increase in leader quality￿average growth in the years before the leader’s death￿increases
growth rates by at least 1.5 percentage points per year, which is a very large e￿ect. Secondly,
autocratic leaders have a signi￿cant impact on growth while democratic leaders do not.
4Compare for example the outcome achieved by the leaders in Botswana to Mobutu in Zaire.
22These results suggest how important the quality of autocrats￿for this matter the quality of their
policy choices￿in shaping the performance of national economies. Using a theoretical model,
Overland et al. (2005) also show how policy decisions in dictatorships may a￿ect economic
growth. In particular, they analyse the consequences of a dictator’s investment on growth given
an insecure tenure. The insecurity of tenure decreases with capital accumulation. The dictator
is self-interested and seeks to maximise his life time utility by appropriating a rent from the
nation’s wealth. They show that the dictator will plunder the economy when the initial capital
is low enough while he will follow a growth path when initial conditions are favourable. In event
of high initial conditions, the economy grows faster than under the social planner, which allows
the dictator to buy o￿ peace to ensure a secure and stable tenure. This theory is reminiscent of
McGuire and Olson’s (1996) ￿encompassing￿ autocrat.
This paper has interesting features that will be used in chapter 3, namely the assumption that
capital stock stabilises the dictator’s tenure. In fact, many authors assume that the policy
choices endogenously a￿ect the dictator’s survival probability. However, there is no agreement
on how a particular policy a￿ects this probability. The literature can be divided between those
like Overland et al. (2005) who believe that the quality of the economic policy will extend the
status quo because the dictator can bribe the population and keep it quiet. This assumption
relies on the empirical evidence that violent con￿icts generally occur during recession periods.
For example, it has been found that coups are more likely during periods of recessions (Fair,
1978) and less likely during periods of high growth (Londregan and Poole, 1990). A di￿erent
view is that a developmental policy is a potentially risky endeavour for the current elite because
of what Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) call the replacement e￿ect. That is, good policies in
a non-democratic regime may lead the elite to lose its political power and its economic rent.
Therefore the elite becomes reluctant to diversify the economy because pro-development policies
would favour competing groups that are willing to take its place. Similarly, in Robinson (2001) it
is assumed that a developmental policy (i.e. investment in public good) decreases the probability
of remaining in power. So long as the cost of predation is not too high, the elite may intentionally
choose ine￿cient and predatory policies to ensure its survival. This occurs when the ruler/elite
fears for its tenure.
232.3 Linking Resources and Civil Con￿icts
The strand of the literature linking resources to civil con￿ict is fairly new and combines con-
tributions from both economics and political science. The economists’ perspective ￿ts into the
rational choice paradigm￿Collier and Hoe￿er (1998, 2004); Robinson (2001), Caselli (2006)￿
which explains con￿icts as the non-cooperative behaviour of agents (e.g. elite/ruler versus rebels)
who compete for the same prize. In this approach, the presence of easily appropriable natural
resources has a destabilising e￿ect in that it raises the stakes of ￿grabbing￿ power and remaining
in power. (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2002; and Robinson, 2001) This situation is likely to ex-
acerbate power contest and violent con￿icts. As a consequence, the elite in autocratic regimes
has a strong incentive to adopt repressive policies when its dominant position is under threat.
As Caselli (2006) illustrates, the appropriation of large oil rent is almost surely the root cause
of the continuing power struggle and political instability experienced by Nigeria over the past
forty years. Nigeria has experienced not less than eight successful coups (and countless failed
coups) and a civil war because seizing power gives an implicit property right on the resources
and therefore guarantees large personal gains to the ruler and his supporters. Hence, natural
resources can trigger con￿icts and even civil wars (Collier and Hoe￿er, 1998 and 2004).
However, little is known about the causal link between resources and con￿icts. In a series of
highly in￿uential and controversial papers, Collier and Hoe￿er (1998 and 2004) attempt to
uncover the determinants of the onset of civil war. They compare the relative merit of two
competing explanations of the onset of civil wars. One is the grievance hypothesis which is
popular among political scientists. The second explanation is the greed hypothesis, consistent
with economic theory of con￿icts (Grossman, 1991; Hirschleifer, 1995). The former says in
essence that civil con￿ict arises once the grievance of some sections of society (ethnic, religious,
or social discrimination or inequality) is su￿ciently acute. The explanation based on greed
motives asserts that rebels engage in rebellion to reap personal gains and not to end injustices
or to pursue ideological goals. In this perspective rebels are no di￿erent from organised criminals
or rational predators. Analysing 79 civil wars over the period 1960￿1999, Collier and Hoe￿er
(2004) ￿nd little support for the grievance hypothesis while the greed story fairs pretty well.
Their results suggest that resource dependence measured as the ratio of primary commodity
over GDP (which includes fuels, mineral and agricultural products) increases the likelihood of
a civil war non-monotonically. The relationship peaks at 33% and becomes negative indicating
24that extreme resource dependence deters civil war. These ￿ndings have spurred intense debates
and many political scientists challenge the validity of the relationship between resource exports
and con￿ict. Using a di￿erent data source, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) conclude that the
evidence supporting Collier and Hoe￿er’s conclusion is mixed, while Fearon and Laitin (2003)
￿nd no ground for these conclusions and contend that: ￿neither the share of primary commodity
exports in GDP nor its square are remotely signi￿cant￿. However, they do ￿nd that the presence
of oil (oil dummy) is associated with the onset of con￿ict, which is consistent with De Soysa
(2002).
Ross (2004) contends that the relationship between resource dependence and violent con￿ict
stated by Collier and Hoe￿er does not withstand closer empirical inspection because of its very
general form. Research has shown that both the type of resource and the type of con￿ict are
determinant. In this respect, there seems to three robust regularities. First, oil and other non-
fuel minerals are associated with the onset of civil war, especially secessionist con￿icts (Ross,
2006; Lujala et al., 2005; Fearon, 2005). Resource-rich regions might want to separate from the
rest of the economy to control the resource rents and enjoy the bene￿ts of foreign investment. In
addition to this greed motive, grievances also may play a role. With respect to non-secessionist
wars, the e￿ect is not so clear, as resource rents may encourage rebels to attempt and grab
part of the riches, but also enables the government to defend itself against any insurgency
(de Soysa and Neumayer, 2007). The second regularity is that so-called ￿lootable￿ resources￿
gemstones, drugs and timber￿lengthen the duration of con￿ict. (Snyder and Bhavani, 2005)
These resources allow the weaker party to raise funds so that they are able to prolong the
duration of a war. (De Soysa and Neumayer, 2007) Third, agricultural goods and other ￿di￿use
resources￿ are associated with neither the onset nor the duration of violent con￿ict.
Finally, the conclusions drawn by Collier and Hoe￿er can be misleading and erroneous if the
onset of a civil war and resource dependence are endogenous. Similar observations have been
made by De Soysa (2002), Dunning (2005), Lujala (2005), Lujala et al. (2005), Ross (2006),
and Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2007). There may be reverse causality in the sense that a civil
war might deter foreign investment and destroy local industries and thus makes the economy
even more dependent on the resource sector whose share becomes disproportionately important.
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008b) explore this route to sort out the direction of causality be-
tween resources and con￿ict. Controlling for endogeneity they ￿nd that resource dependence no
25longer determines the onset of civil war. In addition, they ￿nd a signi￿cant negative relationship
between resource abundance (measured by the stock of natural resources) and the onset of civil
war.
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34Chapter 3
On the Looting of Nations:
International Lending, Political
Instability and Economic Growth1
￿Countries don’t go out of business....The infrastructure doesn’t go away, the productivity of the
people doesn’t go away, the natural resources don’t go away. And so their assets always exceed
their liabilities, which is the technical reason for bankruptcy. And that’s very di￿erent from a
company.￿ Walter Wriston (Citicorp Chairman, 1970-1984)
3.1 Introduction
An extensive literature documents that resource wealth appears to be a curse rather than a
blessing for many countries. There are at least three di￿erent explanations for this so-called
resource curse. Resource wealth is seen to be associated with (i) slow growth (Sachs and Warner
1995), (ii) domestic con￿ict and political instability (Collier and Hoe￿er, 2004), and with (iii)
autocratic regimes and poor institutions (Ross 2001; Isham et al., 2004). Traditionally, analysts
attempted to explain these phenomena with mono-disciplinary models and perspectives. For
example, economists advanced Dutch disease models and rent seeking to analyze slow growth,
and political scientists employed ￿rentier-state￿ models and ￿weak state￿ arguments to explain
institutional failure and con￿ict. Increasingly, the inter-relations between the three dimensions
of the curse are recognized, and the search is on for uni￿ed models that capture the various
salient features in one coherent framework.
1This chapter is a joint work with Erwin Bulte of Wageningen University, Chris Meissner of University
California Davis, and Tim Swanson at University College London.
35This paper contributes to that ambitious objective, and aims to pull together the political
and economic domain insofar as this is relevant for the relationship between resource wealth
and underdevelopment. It starts from the premise that many resource-rich countries hold these
resources as national assets (rather than under systems of private property rights). This presents
a situation where the ruling party or person taking political control ￿nds itself immediately
endowed with substantial resource wealth. Where unchecked, these rulers are often a￿orded
the option of looting their country’s riches, rather than investing in the development of the
nation. For example, the disastrous economic and political performance of countries such as
Nigeria or the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) can be easily traced to the predatory
behavior of their autocratic regimes. A long list of this sort of resource-inspired looting-type
behaviour is cited by Jayachandran and Kremer (2006). But resources do not have to be a
curse. There are of course countries where the leaders implement sound development policies
from a base of resource-richness. After contrasting the diverging trajectories of countries such
as Botswana, DRC, and Indonesia, Dunning (2005) stresses the need for conditional theories of
the resource curse. The main challenge is to unravel the conditions under which resource wealth
results in development, and those conditions conducive to looting.
We develop the argument here that there is a speci￿c set of institutional failures that combine
to present the opportunity for looting: a) relatively undeveloped democratic institutions (an ab-
sence of checks on the current ruler); b) nationally held resource rights (centralised economies);
and c) relatively unstructured lending (unconditional conferment of liquidity). We are not the
￿rst to point to the importance of institutions in the explanation of the curse. There is plenty
of evidence suggesting that institutional quality is one of the main drivers of economic devel-
opment in general (Acemoglu et al. 2001, Rodrik et al., 2004), and it has been argued that
the fates of resource-rich economies in particular are in￿uenced by the quality of their institu-
tions (Robinson et al., 2006; Mehlum et al., 2005). Our point is more subtle. We demonstrate
here that it can be a particular sort of interaction between domestic institutional weaknesses
(centralised governance and unchecked autocratic decision making) and international institu-
tional weaknesses (unstructured lending conditions) that might explain looting behaviour and
contributes to a better understanding of the resource curse.
The international capital market plays a crucial role in our story. We wish to examine in
particular how and why excessive resource-based lending by external ￿nancial institutions can
36induce default, departure and debt in developing countries. This sort of moral hazard in the
￿nancial markets leading to excessive lending to sovereigns has been previously noted. (Bulow,
2002) We also are not the ￿rst to highlight the roles of international loans and debts in reduced
growth. Manzano and Rigobon (2001) ￿nd that the resource curse vanishes when controlling
for indebtedness. Their argument is that large credit o￿ered on resource-based collateral in
periods of commodity boom resulted in substantial debt overhang when commodity prices fell
in the 1980’s.2 The importance of these ￿ndings is reinforced by the observation that 12 of the
world’s most mineral-dependent countries and six of the world most oil-dependent countries are
currently classi￿ed as highly indebted poor countries (Weinthal and Luong, 2006). 3
We agree with this analysis, and develop ours to elaborate and expound upon the mechanisms
by which resource-based lending goes bad. The most fundamental cause in our story is moral
hazard: the international ￿nancial institutions perceive no downside risk to lending on the basis
of resource-based collateral. This is because lenders see little reason to exercise restraint in
lending to resource-rich states, since the resources remain behind even when the regime changes
(see the quote above). (Bulow, 2002) This means that lenders have little reason to be concerned
about the incentives their loans generate. According to Ra￿er and Singer (2001 p. 161), the
policy of ￿liberal lending by commercial banks opened a bonanza for corrupt regimes. After
amassing huge debts and ￿lling their pockets, military juntas (...) simply handed power and the
debt problem over to civilians.￿ We demonstrate in our model precisely how such unstructured
lending generates the incentives for the combined events of debt and departure, instability and
indebtedness.
To analyse the multi-faceted relations between indebtedness, political stability and growth, we
develop a model of a resource-rich economy governed by a self-interested ruler with unchecked
property rights in national resources who cares only about his own consumption. The crucial
and discrete choice made by the ruler is whether to stay and invest, or to exit and loot. In spirit,
2In the 1970s and early 1980s international banks (such as Citicorp and Chase Manhattan) lent vast amounts
of money to developing nations based on their natural resources endowment, virtually irrespective of their ability
to repay such debts (Sampson, 1982). It is now seen that the boom in resource prices in the 1970s increased
the value of in situ resources, aiding the ability of resource-rich economies to attract foreign loans and run up
debts. The absence of productive investment by these resource-rich nations meant that there was signi￿cant
indebtedness with little demonstratively positive impact upon growth.
3Usui (1997) provides a case study on two oil-rich countries Indonesia and Mexico, that supports this argument.
He ￿nds that both Indonesia (in 1975) and Mexico (in 1978-1982) became attractive customers in the credit
market, and took advantage of the drastic improvement of the borrowing capacity during the periods of the boom
of their resource sector. This unsound lending and borrowing - also called ￿boom based borrowing capacity￿￿
resulted in the Pertamina crisis in 1975 in Indonesia and to Mexico’s debt crisis in 1982.
37the model is close to Overland et al. (2005) who explore what determines a dictator to initiate
growth or ￿plunder his country￿ when he faces a potentially insecure tenure. However, our model
di￿ers because our focus is on the role of ￿nancial markets in liquefying sunk capital, especially
in regard to natural resources. To the extent that external ￿nance facilitates the conversion
of sunk capital into liquid capital￿enabling the leader to make immediate access to wealth
that usually requires time and investment￿it a￿ects the tradeo￿ between staying (re-investing
in the economy and consuming by maintaining control) or looting (taking the extant liquidity
and exiting). This combination of resource wealth and excessive external lending gives rise to
endogenous political instability, lack of investment and indebtedness.
Our story is closely related to the literature on ￿odious debt￿. (Jayachandran and Kremer, 2006)
Odious debt results when lending to autocrats results in little for the country concerned other
than debt. We demonstrate how resource-based lending generates this result. Our story is also
related to the literature on e￿cient contracts for sovereign lending. (Bulow, 2002; Kletzer and
Wright, 2005) We argue that resource-based lending is the antithesis of e￿cient sovereign loan
contracting, and we demonstrate how odious debts result from such unstructured lending. Our
point here is that the indebtedness and poor performance of these resource-rich economies is
as much a result of the poor contracting by the ￿nancial sector as it is the unchecked power
and poor institutions within the debtor regimes. It takes negligence or malfeasance by both the
parties to make a bad contract. These bad contracts, together with the weak institutions in
the resource-rich nations, create the environment within which non-investment, instability, and
debt are generated￿hence the resource curse.
Our main results are as follows. We ￿rst demonstrate in a simple model how a dictator tak-
ing control of a nation’s resources might decide between three distinctly di￿erent paths: (1)
immediate looting of the country’s resource wealth; (2) transitory investment in the country’s
capital base to build up additional liquidity for looting in the medium term; or (3) long term
investment in the economy (and possibly in shared consumption or political repression) in an
attempt to secure tenure and to consume from the economy. Second, we demonstrate the main
factors a￿ecting the dictator’s choice between these various paths, being: a) the level of external
￿nance available for liquefying resource wealth; b) the indebtedness of the economy; and ￿nally
c) the productivity of investments within the economy. After the modelling of the dictator’s
problem, we provide simulations of the optimal path for such an economy which, under spe-
38ci￿c conditions (low productivity and high liquidity), is one of recurrent looting￿resulting in
political instability, low growth and substantial indebtedness. We demonstrate that the same
dictator (with lower liquidity or higher security) will pursue a path of optimal investment and
high growth￿acting more as an owner and less as a looter of the economy. Finally, we provide
empirical evidence that corroborates the predictions from our theoretical framework. We ￿nd
that the combination of resource wealth and lending in autocratic states are correlated with
instability, which in turn is negatively associated with economic growth. This ￿nding suggests
that the model points to a channel through which the resource curse may arise.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we present the stylized growth model of a
resource-rich nation with an unchecked ruler who has access to foreign lending. In section 3.3,
we simulate the resource-relevant choices of such an autocrat, and demonstrate the economic
outcomes for the nation over a signi￿cant range of parameters. In section 3.4, we initiate our
empirical analysis of resource-rich states, outlining our empirical strategy and introducing our
data. In section 3.5, we present regression results - looking at the relationship in these states
between: a) resources and lending; and b) political instability and economic growth. Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 The model
We develop a model in which we investigate the e￿ects of natural resource abundance, poor
governance and unsound lending on political stability and ultimately on economic performance.
Poor governance is present in the form of an unchecked ruler with implicit property rights in the
resources of the state. We are interested in how such an autocrat will elect to achieve a payout
on these property rights and, in particular, the impact of lending market imperfections upon
the dictator’s choice between staying and looting. Staying involves the dictator’s commitment
to acquiring a return through holding power and investing in the economy. Looting involves
electing a short term ￿hit and run￿ strategy of maximum loan, minimal investment, and imme-
diate departure. Before we examine the model, we will ￿rst de￿ne the primary actors existing
within the framework.
39Autocratic Resource-Rich States. The states concerned hold their ￿xed natural resource
stocks directly as sovereign assets; there are no intermediate entities (corporations, individuals)
holding rights in these resources. Once in power, the leader of the state has the unchecked
authority to mine the resources or to enter into contracts on behalf of the state in regard to the
natural resource assets. These natural resources are sunk assets, but are assumed to be capable
of providing a constant stream of revenues into the inde￿nite future.
Consider such an autocratic resource-rich state, a small open economy producing output yt
according to the function yt = f(kt) + Z, where f is a strictly increasing, strictly concave,
continuously di￿erentiable function of capital kt and Z is the ￿ow of resource rents deriving
from the state’s sunk resource wealth Z. We will assume here that the ￿ow of rents from
resources remains constant throughout the program, while the productivity of the economy may
be enhanced by means of investment in capital. The capital stock kt evolves according to the
transition equation kt+1 = (1   )kt + it, where it and  represent the current gross investment
and the depreciation rate. Because of the natural resource endowment, this country quali￿es
for loans lt from international commercial banks at the beginning of each period so that it faces
the following budget constraint: ct + it + rdt = yt + lt, where r is the interest rate paid on
accumulated debt, dt. The country’s stock of debt evolves according to the following transition
equation:
dt+1 = dt + lt
The interest on the debt must be paid each period for the banks to accept lending in the next
period. So, the cost of servicing the debt rdt is incurred each period that the state is not in
default.
External ￿nancial institutions. Foreign ￿nancial institutions make liquidity available to
the resource-rich states in recognition of the expected future ￿ows of value from the resource
base. These institutions (primarily the commercial banking sector) recognise the authority of
rulers of autocratic resource-rich states to enter into contracts on behalf of the states in regard
to these resources, and any contracts entered into by a ruler continue as obligations of that state
beyond the individual tenure of that ruler. The commercial banking sector o￿ers liquidity to the
current leader contingent upon the state not currently being in default. The amount of liquidity
is constrained by an aggregate debt ceiling proportionate to the total resources available.
We are assuming here that international lenders are relying primarily on the anticipated ￿ows
40from natural resource stocks as implicit collateral for their loans. Natural resources (more
speci￿cally the so-called ￿point source￿ resources such as oil and minerals) di￿er from other
forms of capital such as physical infrastructure, hospitals, schools or factories in that they can
be more readily lique￿ed by means of bank lending. We capture this notion by assuming that
the liquidity parameter z for the natural resource is larger than for other forms of capital, k,
i.e. z > k 0.
Banks recognise that adverse selection can result from price-based lending and so limit lending
levels instead. (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) Credit rationing here is limited by both the immediate
and aggregate ￿ows from the resource base available for repayment. (Bulow and Rogo￿, 1989)
This means that, so long as the state is not in default (i.e. prior debt is serviced), the lenders are
willing to provide a maximum loan amount in any given period in proportion to the total amount
of longer term resources available. The ￿rst point indicates that there is a certain proportion of
resource-based capital and physical capital that is lique￿able in any given period, i.e. zZ+kkt
(lt  zZ +kkt). The second point captures the idea of a credit ceiling. (Eaton and Gersovitz,
1981) We assume that the aggregate debt level is limited to the amount serviceable by the
present value of the stream of liquidity derivable from all natural resources.
dt+1 
(1 + r)
r
(zZ + kkt) (3.1)
The Dictator. The ruler of the state concerned is a dictator in that he has unchecked power
over the resource wealth and other assets of the state for the duration of his tenure. His problem
is to determine how best to appropriate maximum utility from his period of tenure over these
resources. These resources are sunk, in that there is only a ￿xed proportion of the resources
realisable in any given period of his tenure. These ￿ows may then be consumed immediately
or invested in the productive capacity of the economy which makes them available for future
consumption. The ruler can a￿ect the length of his tenure by means of investments in soci-
etal betterment (shared consumption) but there remains uncertainty in each period concerning
whether the regime will end at that time. With international lending, the ruler has the option
of liquefying some additional proportion of the state’s resource wealth in any given period, at
the cost of an increase in the state’s debt at the beginning of the next period.
41The Dictator’s Problem. These three assumptions are su￿cient for establishing the struc-
ture of our autocrat’s choice problem, which is built upon the premise that the ruler is pursuing
his own agenda after assuming control of the state. (Acemoglu et al., 2004) We assume that the
self-interested dictator is faced with the problem of maximising his own life-time utility largely
by means of making the decision concerning his optimal length of tenure.
V (kt;dt;"t) = max
t2fstay;lootg
Et
2
4
1 X
j=0
jU(kt+j;dt+j;"t+j;t+j)
3
5 (3.2)
s.t. t  t 1
where t is the dictator’s binary choice between staying (t = 0) and looting (t = 1); and "t
is an unobservable state variable for the analyst.4 Time is discrete and the dictator faces an
in￿nite time horizon.
In each period, the incumbent dictator decides whether to stay in power or to loot the country
and leave immediately. His choice resembles that of the manager of a ￿rm who is strategically
choosing the point in time of the liquidation of a limited liability corporation. (Mason and
Swanson, 1996) The basic decision comes down to whether to abscond with maximum liquidity
today, or whether to stay and invest in tenure and productivity in order acquire a return from
holding control over the productive capacities of the enterprise in the future.
Here we model the problem recursively. If the dictator decides to stay, he captures part of the
bene￿ts from production, and then faces the decision regarding looting again in the next period.
By staying, the dictator faces the possibility that he will be ousted, and lose everything along
with his loss of control. The decision whether to stay one more period or to loot is a recursive
discrete choice problem described by the following equation:
V (kt;dt;"t) = max
t2fstay;lootg
[v(kt;dt) + "t(t)] (3.3)
This equation relies on the assumption of additive separability (AS) of the utility function
between observed and unobserved state variables. We will also assume that 1) "t follows an
extreme value distribution; and 2) "t+1 and "t are independent conditional on the observed
4The state variables kt and dt are observable unlike "t.
42state variables kt and dt. These assumptions follow Rust (1987 and 1994) and greatly simplify
this complex problem.
The Decision to Retain Control. Given a decision to stay and maintain control, the dictator
will choose current period consumption ct, capital level kt+1, debt level dt+1 and repression level
st to secure his rule. He enjoys an instantaneous utility u(ct) where u > 0, u0 > 0 and u00 < 0,
and expected stream of future utilities should he remain in power. He decides the investment
level in productive capital each period by choosing kt+1 according to the following law of motion:
kt+1 = f(kt) + Z + (1   )kt   ct   rdt + lt   cost(st) (3.4)
where st measures the repression level chosen by the dictator (e.g. expenditures on secret
services, police and army) and cost(st) are the associated costs.
Within each period t, the dictator experiences the realisation of a discrete random variable
t = f0;1g, where t = 1 indicates that the dictator is toppled, and t = 0 indicates that the
dictator remains in power. We assume that the realisation of the shock depends both on the
choice of next period’s capital stock and repression level. This speci￿cation captures the idea
that both consumption-sharing and military-spending are strategies for maintaining control over
the economy. Let (kt+1;st) = (t = 1 j kt+1;st) denote the probability of the dictator being
deposed next period given he was in power this period; (kt+1;st) is assumed to be strictly
decreasing and strictly convex in both arguments￿see Overland et al. (2005) for a similar idea.
That is, increased kt+1 and st decrease the probability of being toppled at a decreasing rate. The
idea here is that the dictator may invest in repression to secure his tenure and may also attempt
to buy o￿ peace by sharing some of the output with the population (kt+1). This dilemma has
also been analyzed by Azam (1995).
43The recursive problem faced by the dictator does not depend on time per se, so that the pro-
gramme is written as:
vstay(k;d) = max
c;k0;d0;s2 (k;d)
 
1   (k0;s)

u(c) + E"0V (k0;d0)

(3.5)
s.t.  (k;d) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
k0 = f(k) + Z + (1   )k   c   (1 + r)d + d0   cost(s)
d0 = d + l
d0 
(1 + r)
r
(zZ + kk)
l  zZ + kk
c  0;
k  0; d  0
k(0) = k0; d(0) = d0
(3.6)
where  is the discount factor, and k0, d0 and "0 represent next period’s state variables.
The Decision to Loot. The dictator also has the choice to loot the economy’s riches and
exit. Conditional on looting, the dictator leaves with the maximum loan amount he can contract
and the share of non-sunk capital w0 = zZ +kk representing the current value of the lique￿ed
natural and physical capital assets. It is assumed that the dictator absconds with this maximum
amount of liquidity, without making any e￿ort at retaining power, paying debts or investing in
the economy. On departure, he invests the looted sum to live o￿ a constant ￿ow of consumption
cloot. The value of looting is then given by:
vloot(k;d) =
u(cloot)
1   
where cloot =
rw0
1 + r
=
r
1 + r
(zZ + kk) (3.7)
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Figure 3.1: Dictator’s Decision Tree
Results. Obviously the dictator compares the payo￿s from the two distinct options and
chooses the strategy with the highest payo￿. Hence, the optimal solution solves:
(k;d;") = argmax
h
vstay(k;d) + "(0); vloot(k;d) + "(1)
i
(3.8)
where the value of staying vstay(k;d) and the value of looting vloot(k;d) are de￿ned above. This
amounts to an optimal stopping problem, where the decision to loot is an absorbing state.
As mentioned, if the decision is to loot, the optimal choice for the dictator is to set the level of
loan at its maximum, invest nothing in the retention of tenure, and to depart immediately in
pursuit of a lifetime of consumption (from looted lending). Given the decision to stay, however,
the dictator’s optimal choice for the next period’s capital k0, consumption cstay and next period’s
debt d0 is given by the following ￿rst order conditions:
 
1   (k0;s)

u0(cstay) = 
 
1   (k0;s)
 
1   (k00;s0)
 
f0(k0) + (1   )

u0(c0stay)Pr( = 0jk0;d0)
+
rk
1 + r
u0(c0loot)
1   
Pr( = 1jk0;d0)

 
@
@k0
 
u(cstay) + EV (k0;d0)

(3.9)
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 
1   (k00;s0)

(1 + r)u0(c0stay)Pr( = 0jk0;d0) (3.10)
 
1   (k0;s)

cost0 (s)u0(cstay) =  
@
@s
 
u(cstay) + EV (k0;d0)

(3.11)
Equation (3.9) says that the dictator faces a trade-o￿ when increasing capital stock: decreased
consumption today versus an increased probability of remaining in power next period together
with increased consumption tomorrow if power is retained or increased liquidity from capital
in case of exit. The next condition (3.10) conveys the idea that the dictator chooses d0 in or-
der to balance increased consumption today against decreased consumption tomorrow due to
debt servicing (if he stays the following period). Finally, equation (3.11) re￿ects the fact that
by choosing s the dictator will trade-o￿ the utility loss from expending resources on retaining
power against the bene￿t from an enhanced security of tenure. These conditions are su￿cient
to allow us to establish the basic comparative statics of the dictator’s choice.
Proposition 1: De￿ne V (k;d)  vstay(k;d)   vloot(k;d) to be the net gain from staying
relative to looting in any given period. For any given pair (k;d), the dictator’s optimal choice is
to stay if V (k;d) > 0 and to loot if V (k;d) < 0.
The value function V (k;d) is increasing in k, Z, z and k, and is decreasing in d.
The gain from staying V is decreasing in d, z and k, and non-monotonic with respect to k
and Z .
These results are derived formally in Appendix A.1. The intuition for most of the ￿ndings is
straightforward. A￿ording higher liquidity to the dictator (increasing parameters z and k)
increases the opportunity cost of retaining power. The level of indebtedness reduces the relative
returns to staying, since payment (by the dictator) is not required after looting. Increased
security of tenure (reduced hazards) increases the relative returns to staying.
The non-monotonicity of V with respect to k is determined by the relative productivity of
capital versus the returns from liquefying capital.5 If the marginal product of capital (discounted
5We have established in the proof in the appendix that:
@V (k;d)
@k
=
 
1   (k
0;s)
 
f
0(k) + (1   )

u
0(c
stay)  
rk
1 + r
u
0(c
loot)
1   
46by the probability of preventing a coup) is greater than marginal liquidity of capital (in utility
terms), i.e.
 
1   (k0;s)
 
f0(k) + (1   )

u0(cstay) >
rk
1 + r
u0(cloot)
1   
, then the relative gain of
staying increases with the level of capital. If not, then the relative gain of staying decreases
with k.
The reason for the non-monotonicity of V with respect to Z depends on the relative impact
of resources on production (terms 1 of equation (3.21) in Appendix A.1) and on the liquidity of
resources provided by the banks (term 2 of equation (3.21)). If the return to liquidity is higher,
then the gains from staying decrease, giving the the dictator more incentives to loot. On the
other hand if the return of resources in the productive activities is relatively high, then the
dictator has an incentive to stay.
As indicated in Proposition 1, the sign of V , that is whether vstay is above or below vloot, de-
pends on many of the parameters in the model (debt, liquidity, security). We wish to focus here
on how the level of resource-based liquidity a￿orded to the dictator (z) a￿ects the autocrat’s
incentives to loot or to stay and invest in the economy. We commence by de￿ning the critical
values of collateral-based liquidity (z) in terms of their impacts upon the dictator’s incentives.
De￿nition:
1) For a given k, de￿ne z : vloot(z) =
ru(zZ + kk)
(1 + r)(1   )
, represented by the line tangent to vstay
at k in Figure 3.2 such that f0(k) + (1   ) =
rku0(zZ + kk)
(1 + r)(1   )
and vloot(k;d) = vstay(k;d).
2) For a given k, de￿ne z : vloot(z) =
ru(zZ + kk)
(1 + r)(1   )
, represented by the line parallel to
vloot(z) in Figure 3.2 such that vloot(k = 0;d;z) = vstay(k = 0;d), with z < z.
Note that vloot(z) is the line passing the point at which the marginal product of capital and
the marginal liquidity of capital are equal for a given k. Also, vloot(z) is parallel to vloot(z)
and passes through the minimum of vstay at k = 0. In e￿ect, the vloot iso-cline shifts upwards
with increasing z and the critical values de￿ne where it lies in relation to the vstay curve. This
de￿nition allows us to state our main result.
47Proposition 2: Value of looting as a function of liquidity
1) If vloot(z) > vloot(z) for a given d and k, then the dictator always loots irrespective of the
level of k.
2) If vloot(z) < vloot(z) < vloot(z) for a given d and k, there are two capital levels ~ k1 and ~ k2
(with ~ k1 < ~ k2) such that the dictator stays for any k 2 (~ k1;~ k2) and loots otherwise.
3) If vloot(z) < vloot(z) for a given d and k, then there exists a unique ~ k3 such that vstay(~ k3;d) =
vloot(~ k3;d). The dictator loots for any capital level above ~ k3 and stays otherwise.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
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Figure 3.2: Looting and Staying Regions as function of z
In Figure 3.2 we illustrate the results stated in Proposition 2. For a given set of parameters
(debt level, security of tenure), the level of resource-based liquidity will determine the incentives
of the dictator to stay and invest, or to loot the economy.6 Speci￿cally, the level of resource-
based liquidity a￿orded must be such that the dictator ￿nds itself in the region where the vstay
curve lies above the vloot curve in order to have any incentives to stay and invest in the economy;
otherwise, the optimal choice is to take any pro￿ered liquidity and ￿to loot￿ the economy. Our
6 Of course, the other parameters also play a role. Reductions in the values for the parameters for debt ( d)
and security of tenure () increases the value of staying (shifts the v
stay curve upwards). We investigate this
further in the simulations in section 3.3.
48main result is that increased liquidity will unambiguously increase the prospects for political
instability and looting in a given state. That is, increases in the value of the parameter for
resource-based liquidity (z) raises the value of looting (shifts the vloot curve upwards).7
If the two curves potentially intersect, then the two values z and z separate the space into
three regions: 1) Region I, for values of z located above z where looting is always optimal; 2)
Region II for values of z between z and z where staying and investing is optimal within a
speci￿ed (intermediate) range of capital levels; and 3) Region III for values of z below z where
looting is optimal only for the highest values of k. This interaction between liquidity, capital
and the incentives for looting provides the structure of the dynamics of the incentive system,
and is investigated in the simulations in section 3.3.
The fundamental trade-o￿ from the perspective of the dictator concerns the amounts currently
appropriable from the economy (via liquidity and looting) and the amounts potentially pro-
ducible (via investment and security of tenure). Any new dictator must turn down pro￿ered
liquidity in order to decide to stay and invest in the economy. This points to the fact that al-
most any resource-rich country can be rendered politically unstable by a￿ording su￿cient levels
of liquidity. This has been demonstrated by others, in their demonstration of the nature of
self-enforcing sovereign debt contracts. (Bulow and Rogo￿, 1989; Kletzer and Wright, 2005) In
all of these models of enforceable sovereign loan agreements, excess liquidity in any given period
is su￿cient to generate the choice of default. Our model is a counter-part to those, illustrating
how an ine￿cient sovereign debt contract is capable of inducing political instability and default,
and what is ￿excessive￿ liquidity in the context of a resource-rich but autocratic state.
3.3 Simulation of the model ￿ Liquidity and the Looting Econ-
omy
The previous section demonstrated how the o￿er of resource-based liquidity provides an incentive
system for the dictator, determining whether he will choose to loot, or invest in, the economy.
The results of Proposition 2 indicate that the incentives are dependent upon the level of capital
stock available within the economy (k), since this will determine both the expected productivity
7It is of course possible that, for particular parameter values, the two curves do not intersect anywhere in
(v;k) space. This would be the case if either debt levels or security levels were so extreme as to render ￿nancial
contracting unimportant. In this instance we term the issue of ￿nancial contracting non-critical, and we leave
this case aside. Examples of such states might be the highly indebted states of sub-Saharan Africa or the
extremely secure states of Arabia.
49of additional increments to the capital stock as well as the capital for liquidation. For this
reason, the system of incentives for looting may evolve along a particular development path,
given a particular level of pro￿ered liquidity. In particular, an economy commencing within
Region II (in Figure 3.2) will initially commence with incentives for investment, but may evolve
into a situation where the incentives are for looting. In these circumstances the time of departure
is endogenous, and a function of both liquidity and capital stock within the economy.
In this section we simulate the evolution of such an economy, given both low liquidity and
high liquidity, to illustrate how a dictator will choose its date of departure by reference to the
evolving system of incentives to loot. Initially the dictator will perceive high returns to initial
investments in capital, and so stay and invest, but as successive increments to the capital stock
reduce returns, the relative returns to looting may come to dominate.
Speci￿cation of the Model. To illustrate the dynamics of a resource-rich economy with
optional liquidity-based looting, we simulate the model using the following functional forms:
utility is speci￿ed as a CES function u(c) =
c1 
1   
, and the probability of losing power is an ex-
ponential function of the form (k0) = exp( k0), where  represents the dictator’s e￿ectiveness
in preventing his demise. The production function takes the form f(k) = Ys  
Ys
1 + k
, where
f0 < 0 and f00 < 0. In the limit, output will tend to Ys. The value of staying and looting are
then given by:8
vstay(k;d) = max
c;k0;d02 (k;d)
 
1   exp( k0)

c1 
1   
+ E"0V (k0;d0)

(3.12)
s.t.  (k;d) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
k0 = f(k) + Z + (1   )k   c   (1 + r)d + d0
d0 = d + l
d0 
(1 + r)
r
(zZ + kk)
l  zZ + kk
c  0;
k  0; d  0
k(0) = k0; d(0) = d0
(3.13)
8For the sake of simplicity, we omit the role of repression s in the simulation. An analysis of the e￿ect of
repression on a dictator’s incentives to invest is performed in the next chapter.
50vloot(k;d) =
u(cloot)
1   
where cloot =
r
1 + r
(zZ + kk) (3.14)
Parametrisation of the Model. The following parameters are established as baselines, and
will remain constant throughout all of the simulations:  = 0:95;  = 0:9;  = 0:1; r = 0:12.
Simulation of Growth. In Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 we illustrate the impact of incentives
for looting generated by ￿rst low liquidity and then high liquidity in resource-based lending.
Figure 3.3 demonstrates how, for low enough values of z, the incentives for investment inhere.
Here the dictator views the productivity of the economy as his primary asset. Debt is exercised
to its limit, but the dictator uses it for investment and in-place consumption. The regime
does not change and capital levels reach the steady state optimum. In e￿ect, the autocrat is
acting as ￿owner￿ of the entire economy, and lending simply serves its purpose as a mechanism
for shifting consumption across time. However, when z is high enough (doubled to 0.4 Z as
in Figure 3.4), the dictator uses debt to pursue a ￿hit and run￿ strategy with regard to the
economy. He accumulates capital to a point, but then loots as much of the capital and liquidity
as is possible. This decision to loot is based on the dictator’s comparison of the relative returns
to further capital investments versus liquidity-based looting, which ￿ip the incentives for the
autocrat in the third period. This change in incentives for the dictator makes a big di￿erence for
the economy concerned. A comparison of the two simulations reveals that capital in the looted
economy moves to levels approximately 25% below that which occurs under the investment
scenario (comparing Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 at period t3).
More importantly, the dynamics of the simulations reveal that the second economy never recovers
from this initial looting. The fact that the new dictator (in t4) takes over an economy with
higher debt levels means that the value of staying commences at a much reduced level. Looting
becomes the optimal choice for this economy from then on. A series of incoming autocrats
immediately loot the country’s riches until debt reaches the ceiling, at which point banks are no
longer willing to provide further liquidity. (see Figure 3.4 in periods t4   t14) This economy is
now caught in a ￿debt trap￿ of political instability and low growth, with its origins in the level
of resource-based liquidity pro￿ered to the incoming autocrats.
51These simulations demonstrate that an incoming autocrat may act as an ￿owner￿ or as a ￿thief￿
in regard to the economy, depending upon the level of liquidity on o￿er. Low levels of liquidity
maintain the incentives to stay and to invest as the owner of the economy. The returns from
control are secured by staying on the scene, maintaining control and securing the ￿ow of returns
from earlier investments. On the other hand, high levels of liquidity act as a prize to the
winner of the contest for control, and create incentives for an ongoing system of hit and runs.
The returns from control in this case are secured simply by winning the contest for control
of the economy￿then the banks pay the prize and the contest winner exits the stage. This
may be illustrated by comparing the incentives of a relatively secure dictator (low hazard of
displacement) in Figure 3.3 with those inhering under the conditions of an insecure ruler (high
hazard rate) in Figure 3.5. What is the impact of ￿security of tenure￿ on the incentive system
facing the dictator?9 If the dictator is able to secure his tenure (relatively high  in Figure
3.3) then he has incentives to stay and invest in productive capital as ￿owner￿. By contrast, if
he is unable to secure his tenure (low  in Figure 3.5), then the incentives are to loot. Since
insecurity and lending have the same impact on incentives, it is apparent that both have the
capacity to turn an owner-ruler into a thief.
Case of low liquidity
 = 0:95;  = 0:9; r = 0:12;  = 0:1; z = 0:2; k = 0:1;  = 0:15;  = 0:1; NR = 5; Ys = 13; dmax = 37
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Period  Capital  Output  Debt  Consumption  Number 
Regimes 
t1  7.4 11.5 1.5 0.7  1
t2  21.8 12.4 6.0 9.8  1
t3  26.0 12.5 10.6 13.1  1
t4  26.0 12.5 15.1 12.6  1
t5  26.0 12.5 19.6 12.1  1
t6  26.0 12.5 24.2 11.5  1
t7  26.0 12.5 28.7 11.0  1
t8  26.0 12.5 33.2 10.2  1
t9  26.0 12.5 37.0 6.0  1
t10  26.0 12.5 37.0 6.0  1
t11  26.0 12.5 37.0 6.0  1
t12  26.0 12.5 37.0 6.0  1
t13  26.0 12.5 37.0 6.0  1
t14  26.0 12.5 37.0 6.0  1
t15  26.0 12.5 37.0 6.0  1
Figure 3.3: Optimal capital over time with low z
9Comparing Figures 3.3 and 3.5 demonstrates the point of McGuire & Olson (1996). Their argument is that
when an autocrat is secure about his tenure, he will stop behaving as a bandit leader and instead act as a ruler
whose interest is aligned with the people’s. When the probability of survival is high and the autocrat values the
future, an ￿invisible hand￿ makes his interest consistent with the interests of society at large.
52Case of high liquidity
 = 0:95;  = 0:9; r = 0:12;  = 0:1; z = 0:4; k = 0:1;  = 0:15;  = 0:1; NR = 5; Ys = 13; dmax = 47
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Time to Loot Period  Capital  Output  Debt  Consumption  VLoot  Number 
Regimes 
t1  7.4  11.5  1.9 1.1    1
t2  22.3  12.4  7.7 11.1    1
t3  20.1  12.4  11.7    183.8  1
t4  18.1  12.3  15.7    182.8  2
t5  16.2  12.2  19.7    182.0  3
t6  14.6  12.2  23.7    181.1  4
t7  13.2  12.1  26.7    180.3  5
t8  11.8  12.0  29.7    179.6  6
t9  10.7  11.9  32.7    178.9  7
t10  9.6  11.8  35.7    178.3  8
t11  8.6  11.7  38.7    177.7  9
t12  7.8  11.5  41.7    177.2  10
t13  7.0  11.4  44.7    176.7  11
t14  6.3  11.2  47    176.2  12
Figure 3.4: Optimal capital over time with high z
Case of high hazard
 = 0:95;  = 0:9; r = 0:12;  = 0:1; z = 0:2; k = 0:1;  = 0:13;  = 0:1; NR = 5; Ys = 13; dmax = 37
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Period  Capital  Output  Debt  Consumption  ConsoLoot  VLoot  Number 
Regimes 
t1  7.4  11.5  1.5 0.71       1
t2  6.7  11.3  3.5    0.18 168.37  1
t3  6.0  11.1  5.5    0.17 167.68  2
t4  5.4  11.0  7.5    0.17 167.04  3
t5  4.9  10.8  9.5    0.16 166.44  4
t6  4.4  10.6  10.5    0.15 165.89  5
t7  3.9  10.4  11.5    0.15 165.38  6
t8  3.6  10.1  12.5    0.15 164.90  7
t9  3.2  9.9  13.5    0.14 164.47  8
t10  2.9  9.6  14.5    0.14 164.06  9
t11  2.6  9.4  15.5    0.13 163.69  10
t12  2.3  9.1  16.5    0.13 163.35  11
t13  2.1  8.8  17.5    0.13 163.04  12
t14  1.9  8.5  18.5    0.13 162.76  13
t15  1.7  8.2  19.5    0.13 162.50  14
Figure 3.5: Optimal Capital over time with High Hazard (low )
These simulations translate our basic model of autocratic choice into empirically observable
outcomes regarding lending, political instability, and economic growth. We have demonstrated
that excessive resource-based lending may be seen to induce political instability and result in
poorly performing economies. We turn now to an empirical examination of these claims.
533.4 Empirical Model and Data
The key prediction of our model is that lending combined with resources contributes to looting
and political instability and this in turn results in reduced economic growth.
Our model suggests that the following claims might be supported, which we intend to explore
here:
Claim 1) Lending based upon natural resource wealth will result in higher political instability.
Looting will increase when resource-richness is combined with high levels of liquidity. This
instability will in turn adversely a￿ect economic growth in the autocratic resource-rich state.
Claim 2) Lending-induced political instability will depend upon the level of the nation’s pro-
duction. Looting should be reduced with income but, beyond some threshold, larger incomes
should result in a greater incidence of looting.
Our primary objective in this section is to test these claims in regard to country-level data on
lending, political and economic performance. We specify the econometric model as follows:
log(GDPcap)it = 0 + 1Turnoverit + 2X1it + "it (3.15)
Turnoverit =
8
<
:
1 if Turnover
it > 0
0 otherwise
(3.16)
Turnover
it = 0 + 1Resourcesit + 2Lendingit + 3Resourcesit  Lendingit
+ 4log(GDPcap)it + 5log(GDPcap)2
it + 6X2it + it
Following the literature on instability and growth (Ozler and Tabellini, 1991 and Alesina et
al., 1996), political instability is de￿ned as ￿the propensity to observe government changes, be
it constitutional or unconstitutional￿.10 Consistent with model predictions, political instability
10The main di￿culty in estimating the structural model developed in section 3.2 is that looting decisions as
modelled in this paper are virtually unobservable to the analyst. For example, the occurrence of a leader’s
turnover may be a poor approximation for the looting decision as turnover often takes place for reasons inde-
pendent of leaders’ decision to leave power. Given the lack of data for our dependent variable to perform a
structural estimation, we opt for a more modest approach, and test the predictions of the model using reduced
form estimations.
54(or turnover) is determined by resource rents, lending and their interaction. The interaction
between these two variables is particularly important because it substantiates the impact of
credit markets lending practices on political instability in resource-rich countries. The model
also predicts political instability for low and high levels of capital in Region II. We test this
prediction by including per capita GDP and its square in the speci￿cation of the turnover equa-
tion. Finally, in the vector X2, we include numerous controls to circumvent omitted variables
bias. Our speci￿cations also control for ethnic fractionalization (an exogenous source of polit-
ical instability), institutional features (proxied by the proportion of the population speaking a
European language at birth as suggested by Hall and Jones, 1999), regional dummies and time
dummies to account for macroeconomic e￿ects that impact all countries in a given year.
Following the growth literature, the growth equation incorporates lagged GDP per capita to
control for convergence (Islam, 1995), a proxy for human capital accumulation (number of years
of schooling), population growth, investment as a percentage of GDP, the in￿ation rate, trade
openness. In addition to these variables, vector X1 includes numerous controls to circumvent
omitted variables bias. Our speci￿cations control among others for institutional features, re-
gional dummies or country dummies, and time dummies. The standard growth equation is
augmented with leadership turnover as a measure of instability. 11 We are interested in the
indirect e￿ect of resources and lending on growth due to political instability, that is:
@E(log(GDPcap)itjLendingit)
@Lendingit
= 1
@Pr(Turnover = 1jLendingit)
@Lendingit
(3.17)
We estimate equations (3.15) and (3.16) jointly by Full Information Maximum Likelihood
(FIML) using a treatment regression approach. This allows for correlation between the error
terms which are assumed to be joint normally distributed. The treatment (turnover regression)
and outcome (growth equation) are estimated jointly by maximizing the bivariate normal likeli-
hood function. This is a fully e￿cient estimation method which takes account of the possibility
that omitted forces drive both growth and turnover by incorporating a correlation between
the error terms in the treatment and outcome equations into the model. Identi￿cation in this
11To check for robustness, we will use later the occurrence of a coup, and the turnover of veto players as
alternative measures of instability.
55framework may come from the non-linear functional form and in principle does not require an
exclusion restriction assumption. However, identi￿cation by functional form may be particularly
weak (Arellano, 2006). To improve the identi￿cation of the model, we impose an exclusion re-
striction. In particular we assume that ethnic fractionalization a￿ects the probability of turnover
but is excluded from the growth equation. The prior is that higher ethnic fractionalization may
lead to more instability. This is consistent with Easterly and Levine (1997) who argue that
ethnic diversity may a￿ect economic growth through political instability.
Our data set runs from 1970 to 2000 and contains 61 countries that have been led by an author-
itarian regime at some point since 1970 (see Table 3.1).12 We are mainly constrained by the
availability of data on external ￿nance. The sample excludes six Arab Gulf countries (Bahrain,
Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) due to lack of data on lending. It
also excludes Western countries and the former Soviet bloc. We use the variable polity2 from
Polity IV dataset to indicate whether a regime is authoritarian. For any given year, a country
with a polity2 score below 0 is considered authoritarian.
As our ￿rst dependent variable, we use the turnover of political leadership as the measure of
political instability. This information comes from Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2003). Comple-
mentary data is available from Archigos, a database of political leaders developed by Gleditsch
and Chiozza (2006, version July 2006). Archigos is particularly comprehensive and detailed so
that we relied on it whenever there was a discrepancy with Bueno de Mesquita et al. Our second
dependent variable measures the growth of PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita and comes from
the Penn World Tables 6.2 (PWT 6.2, 2006).
As independent variables, data on resources and in￿ows of lending are of particular interest.
Our measure of resource wealth is the resource rent provided by K. Hamilton and G. Ruta from
the World Bank. It includes mineral, coal, oil and gas rent and spans the period 1970 to 2000. It
is measured as the product of the quantity of resources extracted and the di￿erence between the
resource price and the unit cost of extraction. Lending (i.e., disbursements) by private creditors
comes from the World Bank Global Development Finance (GDF, 2006). The main limitation
of this dataset is that the major Gulf countries are not available. We take real PPP-adjusted
12For robustness check, we also use a set of 9 countries that have always been democratic since 1970.
56real GDP ( and real GDP per capita) from PWT 6.2 (2006).
A casual look at the data con￿rms some basic ￿ndings highlighted in the literature. Figure
3.6 shows the evolution of average lending and resource rents between 1970 and 2000. The
lending curve mirrors the resource rents curve. This supports earlier claims that international
￿nancial markets lend money during commodity ￿booms￿ and restrict liquidity during ￿busts￿.
The evolution of these two indicators until the early eighties is clearly indicative of the ￿boom-
based borrowing capacity￿ highlighted by Usui (1997), and Manzano and Rigobon (2001).
Finally, we proxy for institutional quality with the fraction of people speaking a European
language at birth introduced by Hall and Jones (1999).
3.5 Estimation Results
This section reports our estimation results and analyses the determinants of political instability
and growth using full information maximum likelihood estimation. Our basic speci￿cations
are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.2. Panel A represents growth equation (3.15)
and Panel B presents the results from turnover equation (3.16). In column (2) of the growth
equation, we control for country ￿xed e￿ects. Note that in both speci￿cations, the treatment
equations (turnover equations) control only for regional dummies because ￿xed e￿ects probit
would produce inconsistent estimates.
Two main ￿ndings are apparent from our basic speci￿cations. First, in Panel B columns (1)-(2),
the treatment equations show that the interaction term of resources and lending is associated
with a higher likelihood of turnover and its coe￿cient is highly signi￿cant. This result indicates
that greater lending to resource-rich countries is associated with higher political instability. This
￿nding is consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model that dictators of resource-rich
countries with easy access to external capital may choose to loot rather than invest, which leads
to increased instability. Besides, the fact that the coe￿cient of resource rents (main e￿ect) is
signi￿cantly negative suggests that resources per se are not to blame for political instability.
Our second ￿nding is that political instability is detrimental to growth consistent with Alesina
et al. (1996) ￿ see columns (1) and (2) in Panel A. The e￿ect of political instability on growth
is particularly large, negative and it is statistically signi￿cant. In investigating the e￿ect of
instability on growth, we are typically interested in the indirect e￿ect of lending on growth
57through instability. This indirect e￿ect is the product of the coe￿cient of instability in the
growth equation (1) with the partial e￿ect of lending on the probability of turnover. For
expositional purposes, we choose to vary lending by one standard deviation from its mean
(respectively L and L + StdDev). All the other variables are set at their mean level. However,
the value of the resource rent, ethnic diversity, per capita GDP are those of Nigeria ￿ a country
with a high resource base. Equation (3.17) is then re-written as:
E(log(GDPcap)itjL + StdDev)   E(log(GDPcap)itjL)
= 1
 
Pr(Turnover = 1jL + StdDev)   Pr(Turnover = 1jL)

We ￿nd in Table 3.3 that the e￿ect of a one standard deviation increase in lending results in a
decrease in economic growth by 0.68 and 0.82 percentage point for speci￿cations (1) and (2).
Together these two main results provide a strong evidence to support our theory. Lending to
resource-rich dictators raises the chance of political instability, leading to low growth.
The e￿ect of the other explanatory variables will now be analysed. We ￿nd that the per capita
income tends to reduce instability (it has a negative and signi￿cant e￿ect both in columns (1)
and (2)), while its square is positively correlated with instability. This suggests that beyond
a certain level per capita GDP induces more instability. Finally, ethnic fractionalization is
positively correlated with instability as expected.
We now turn to the e￿ect of the control variables on growth. Investment is the main determinant
of growth once ￿xed e￿ects are controlled for. A rise in the investment rate by 1 percentage
point causes growth to increase by 0.10 and 0.18 percentage point. The in￿ation rate is also an
important predictor for growth: it is negative and signi￿cant although its magnitude is fairly
small. However, the e￿ect of trade on growth is surprisingly negative. 13 This may be due to
the fact that in our sample African countries, which experience the lowest growth performance,
have also the highest GDP share of trade.
Finally, a Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that the error term of the instability equation
is uncorrelated with the error term of the growth equation. For example, in our basic speci￿ca-
13Evidence on the relationship between trade and growth is generally mixed (cf. Yanikaya, 2003; and Edwards,
1998). According to Rodrik and Rodriguez (2000), the only systematic relationship is ￿that countries reduce their
trade barriers as they get richer.￿
58tions, we obtain 2(1) = 73:79 without ￿xed e￿ects in column (1) and 2(1) = 78:64 with ￿xed
e￿ects in columns (2). This implies that the joint estimation of the treatment and outcome
equations is required to generate unbiased estimates.
We now perform several checks to ensure the robustness of our ￿ndings. First, there is a poten-
tial endogeneity bias for our main explanatory variables￿lending and resource rent since both
variables may be determined by political instability. We instrument them and their interaction
with commodity price indices, US interest rates proxied by yields on 10 years bond, and the
interaction of these variables. These variables are correlated with the endogenous explanatory
variables and are assumed to a￿ect political instability only via those variables and not directly.
We will use a control function approach which enables us to test directly the exogeneity of these
variables in the political instability equation. The control function consists in a two-step pro-
cedure. In the ￿rst step, we estimate the residuals of the reduced-form equation for resources,
lending and their interaction on the excluded instruments and the other covariates. The sec-
ond step is the estimation of the political instability equation with the reduced-form residuals
included as additional explanatory variables. The joint signi￿cance of the coe￿cients of the
residuals in the second stage equation will be indicative of endogeneity. (Smith and Blundell,
1986)
In the ￿rst stage, we perform a heteroskedasticity-robust exogeneity test and ￿nd that the set
of instruments used for lending, resources and their interaction is jointly signi￿cant in all three
reduced form equations. Then, in the second stage we test the joint signi￿cance of the residuals
derived in the ￿rst stage (see Table 3.4). The residuals are jointly insigni￿cant as we obtain
2(3) = 1:98 with p < 0:58. This ￿nding shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
these variables are exogenous.
As a second robustness check, we analyse the subsample of countries that have continuously
been democratic since 1970 (see columns (3)-(4) of Table 3.2). We ￿nd that the marginal ef-
fect of lending, although positive, is not statistically signi￿cant. This suggests that the adverse
relationship between lending and political instability is not present in democracies. There is
however, a strong negative association between growth and leaders’ turnover. A careful anal-
ysis of the data reveals that this is mostly due to the fact that in democracies, bad economic
performance tend to be sanctioned during elections by the dismissal of the leader.
59The third robustness check consists in using two alternative measures of political instability. In
particular, we construct a dummy variable which indicates the propensity for a coup to occur. 14
The basic data comes from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks, 2001). We
also use the turnover of all the veto players introduced by Beck et al. (Database of Political
Institutions, 2004 update).15 The results are presented in Table 3.5 and are consistent with our
earlier ￿ndings using turnover.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper attempts to unravel a mechanism through which the much-discussed resource curse
operates. Our main contribution is to show how credit market imperfections impact upon the
choices of dictators in resource-rich countries, which in turn leads to instability and slow growth.
In our model, a dictator makes a choice between staying and looting. Looting is facilitated when
international banks are willing to turn natural capital into loans. The incentives for staying,
on the other hand, result from the opportunity for taking advantage of the country’s potential
productivity while remaining in power. Key to the choice made by the dictator is his ability to
prevent his own removal by political events such as coups or revolutions.
Our model suggests that the dictator will be fundamentally in￿uenced in this choice by the
level of lending a￿orded by external banking institutions. The opportunity cost to staying and
investing in the economy increases directly with any increase in the liquidity being a￿orded.
The importance of restricting short term liquidity to aid the enforceability of loan agreements
has been long-noted (Bulow and Rogo￿, 1989) as has been the tendency of banks to ignore
such advice. (Bulow, 2002) The problem is argued to be one of moral hazard in the ￿nancial
markets, where banks fail to internalise the risks of default because of the belief that sovereign
debts will ultimately be ￿worked out￿ and particularly those with large amounts of natural
14Coups d’etat and revolutions are de￿ned in Banks (2001) as follows:
Coup d’etat: The number of extraconstitutional or forced changes in the top government elite and/or its
e￿ective control of the nation’s power structure in a given year. The term "coup" includes, but is not exhausted
by, the term "successful revolution". Unsuccessful coups are not counted.
Revolution: Any illegal or forced change in the top governmental elite, any attempt at such a change, or any
successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government.
15Instead of the turnover of the leader only, this database records the percentage turnover of veto players. In
presidential systems, veto players are de￿ned as the president and the largest party in the legislature, and in
parliamentary systems, the veto players are de￿ned as the PM and the three largest government parties.
60resources underlying them. The failure of the ￿nancial sector to internalise these risks places
these costs upon the peoples of the countries concerned.
We ￿nd strong evidence to support our main prediction that unsound lending to dictators in
resources rich countries results in instability, and ultimately in slower economic growth. Here,
resources become a curse when imperfect domestic and international institutions (political and
￿nancial markets) interact to produce political instability, which in turn impedes economic
growth. Poor lending practices is one channel to the resource curse.
There are many approaches advocated to deal with this sort of moral hazard. Bulow (2002)
believes that the problem is sourced fundamentally in the intervention of external institutions
in rescuing commercial banks from defaults. Banks engage in moral hazard in these lending
practices on account of a fundamental failure of belief in the possibility of default. He recom-
mends that banks should be made to execute loan agreements under domestic laws, enforceable
only in domestic courts, in order to ensure that the debtor state’s interests are taken into con-
sideration. It is argued by some that advance due diligence in lending should be a requirement
for the enforceability of the resulting debt. (Jayachandran, Kremer and Schafter, 2006) One
possibility is to require that any loans be more structured obligations, relying on speci￿ed in-
vestments rather than general assets. This would ensure that banks required investments as
a result of loans, and that these investments were of a sort that could generate returns to the
bank. Finally, it may be more appropriate to encourage FDI rather than sovereign debt, again
rendering recourse to domestic institutions necessary. All of these approaches may reduce the
availability of debt in general, but our analysis indicates that this may be a good thing.
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68Table 3.1: List of Countries in the dictatorships sample
List of Countries 
Algeria Madagascar
Angola Malaysia
Argentina Mali
Bangladesh Mauritania
Benin Mexico
Bolivia Morocco
Botswana Mozambique
Brazil Nepal
Burkina Faso Nicaragua
Burundi Niger
Cameroon Nigeria
Central African Republic Oman
Chile Pakistan
China Peru
Congo Brazzaville Philippines
Cote d'Ivoire Rwanda
Ecuador Senegal
Egypt Sierra Leone
El Salvador South Africa
Gabon Sri Lanka
Gambia Sudan
Ghana Syria
Guatemala Tanzania
Guinea Thailand
Honduras Togo
Indonesia Tunisia
Iran Turkey
Jordan Uganda
Kenya Zaire
Liberia Zambia
Zimbabwe
69Table 3.2: Growth and Political Instability Regressions - Leadership Turnover
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A: Growth Equation
Dependent Variable: Real per Capita GDP Growth
Turnover -9.4246*** -9.0502*** -8.3808** -8.1232**
[0.8965] [0.8528] [3.6474] [3.5514]
Lag Real per capita GDP (in logs) -1.4529* -4.5679*** -4.3171 -11.8040*
[0.8168] [1.2386] [2.9035] [6.1173]
Population Growth 0.0257 0.1622 1.2462 -0.0258
[0.2548] [0.1946] [1.4768] [2.1873]
Average Years of Schooling 0.2094 0.1716 1.2187 1.6582
[0.1988] [0.4868] [0.8942] [1.8184]
Inflation -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0892*** -0.0842***
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0204] [0.0227]
Investment (% GDP) 0.1033** 0.1820** -0.1293* 0.1953**
[0.0507] [0.0767] [0.0726] [0.0844]
Trade (% GDP) -0.0006 -0.0213** 0.034 -0.0104
[0.0069] [0.0098] [0.0396] [0.0548]
Native European Language (%) 2.0594 6.1090** 44.3181
[2.1523] [2.7040] [30.2721]
Sub-Saharan Africa -4.0168*** -21.7309
[1.0436] [16.5169]
Middle East and North Africa -1.5368
[1.1137]
Latin America -2.6361 -41.1146
[1.7807] [28.5909]
Constant 15.6031** 34.1214*** 30.7012* 93.3770*
[6.4242] [8.3124] [15.7838] [50.0483]
Country Dummies No Yes No Yes
Region Dummies Yes No Yes No
PANEL B: Instability Probit Equation
Dependent Variable: Leaders' Turnover
Resource Rent (% GDP) -0.0214*** -0.0300** 0.0011 -0.0061
[0.0079] [0.0118] [0.0101] [0.0111]
Private Lending (% GDP) -0.0427** -0.0597*** 0.0379* 0.0269
[0.0205] [0.0194] [0.0205] [0.0260]
Resource*Lending 0.0040*** 0.0058*** 0.0007 0.0016
[0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0008] [0.0011]
Real per capita GDP (in logs) -2.9857*** -3.2480** -4.4147 -3.9943
[1.0530] [1.3966] [5.1703] [5.7546]
Real per capita GDP^2 (in logs) 0.1694*** 0.1867** 0.2245 0.2097
[0.0645] [0.0837] [0.3145] [0.3432]
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.8293*** 0.6226** -0.4859 -0.5412
[0.1999] [0.2483] [0.6911] [0.6747]
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test of indep eq- Chi2(1) 73.79*** 78.64*** 6.97*** 5.85**
Log Pseudo Likelihood -4252.75 -4184.15 -782.81 -777.66
Number of Clusters (Countries) 49 49 8 8
Observations 1218 1218 227 227
Clustered standard errors in brackets.*** indicates 1% significance; ** 5%; and * 10%.
All equations control for Institutions (proxied by % population speaking a European Language at birth) and time dummies 
Turnover - Leaders in Dictatorships Turnover - Leaders in Democracies
70Figure 3.7: Marginal E￿ect of Lending on Political Instability - Column (1)-(2) Table 3.2
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The dotted lines represent the con￿dence interval at 5% level
71Table 3.3: E￿ects of Lending on Growth
Effect of Lending on Growth Growth
(1)
Growth
(2)
Coefficient Turnover -9.425 -9.050
Pr(Turnover=1|MeanLending+Std Dev) 0.274 0.250
Pr(Turnover=1|MeanLending) 0.202 0.160
Increase in Probability of Turnover 0.072 0.091
Total -0.68 -0.82
Variables are set at mean level ( average country) except for Resource levels (30% GDP), 
Log GDP per capita, and its square are set as in Nigeria
Effect of Lending on Growth
Growth
(1)
Growth
(2)
Coefficient Turnover -9.425 -9.050
Pr(Turnover=1|MeanLending+Std Dev) 0.139 0.136
Pr(Turnover=1|MeanLending) 0.093 0.075
Increase in Probability of Turnover 0.046 0.061
Total -0.43 -0.55
All variables are set at mean level except Ethnic Diversity at median and Resource=30%
as in Nigeria
72Table 3.4: Second Stage Instrumental Variables - Probit for Turnover Equation
Second Stage IV - Exogeneity Test in the Probit Regression
Turnover with residuals Turnover without residuals
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: Leaders' Turnover
Resource Rent (% GDP) -0.121 -0.0407***
[0.1497] [0.0150]
Private Lending (% GDP) 0.0791 -0.0980***
[0.1536] [0.0240]
Resource*Lending -0.0067 0.0081***
[0.0172] [0.0016]
Real per capita GDP (in logs) 0.0504 -1.0469
[0.2147] [1.4051]
Real per capita GDP^2 (in logs) 0.0681
[0.0892]
Ethnic Fractionalization 1.6504 0.7850***
[1.2389] [0.3034]
Residuals Resource Rent 0.0803
[0.1510]
Residuals Lending -0.1778
[0.1510]
Residuals Resource*Lending 0.0148
[0.0168]
Test All Residuals = 0 - Chi2 (3)  1.98 -
P-Value 0.58 -
Number of Clusters (Countries) 49 49
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -439.71 -439.71
Pseudo R-square 0.0868 0.0868
Observations 1171 1171
F-test first stage - Resource Equation 4.15*** 4.15***
F-test first stage - Lending Equation 2439.58*** 2439.58***
F-test first stage - Resource*Lending Equation 12.40*** 12.40***
Clustered standard errors in brackets.*** indicates 1% significance; ** 5%; and * 10%. Sample: Dictatorships
All equations control for Institutions (proxied by % population speaking a European Language at birth) and time dummies 
73Table 3.5: Growth and Political Instability Regressions - Alternative Instability Measures
Turnover - All Veto Players Occurrence of Coups d'Etat 
(3) (4) (1) (2)
PANEL A: Growth Equation
Dependent Variable: Real per Capita GDP Growth
Instability -8.9676*** -8.7869*** -5.6415* -6.0876*
[1.4543] [1.4703] [3.0197] [3.4949]
Lag Real per capita GDP (in logs) -1.2919* -5.7725*** -1.2380* -4.8675***
[0.7700] [1.1262] [0.7198] [1.2235]
Population Growth -0.0091 0.1438 -0.023 0.1656
[0.2677] [0.2034] [0.2684] [0.1890]
Average Years of Schooling 0.1548 0.9695 0.1788 0.4839
[0.2132] [0.7552] [0.2134] [0.4625]
Inflation -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0006*** -0.0005***
[0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Investment (% GDP) 0.0776 0.1981** 0.0864 0.1861**
[0.0629] [0.0905] [0.0590] [0.0838]
Trade (% GDP) -0.0008 -0.0272** 0.0005 -0.0241**
[0.0083] [0.0137] [0.0077] [0.0113]
Country Dummies No Yes No Yes
Region Dummies Yes No Yes No
PANEL B: Instability Probit Equation
Dependent Variable: Coups and Revolutions (Columns (1)-(2)); Turnover Veto Players (Columns (3)-(4))
Resource Rent (% GDP) -0.0231** -0.0349** -0.1123*** -0.1199***
[0.0115] [0.0139] [0.0342] [0.0382]
Private Lending (% GDP) -0.0312 -0.0372 -0.0953** -0.1001**
[0.0277] [0.0253] [0.0457] [0.0442]
Resource*Lending 0.0030** 0.0048*** 0.0138*** 0.0146***
[0.0015] [0.0013] [0.0039] [0.0038]
Real per capita GDP (in logs) -3.8808*** -5.0758*** -8.9147*** -9.6694***
[1.3029] [1.4392] [1.6426] [1.8088]
Real per capita GDP^2 (in logs) 0.2095** 0.2796*** 0.5266*** 0.5712***
[0.0828] [0.0896] [0.0990] [0.1078]
Ethnic Fractionalization 1.2363*** 1.0779*** 0.4003 0.4211
[0.2873] [0.3768] [0.4226] [0.4494]
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test of indep eq- Chi2(1) 27.63*** 25.98*** 3.71* 2.83*
Log Pseudo Likelihood -3483.40 -3411.07 -3830.58 -3761.44
Number of Clusters (Countries) 49 49 49 49
Observations 1040 1040 1171 1171
Clustered standard errors in brackets.*** indicates 1% significance; ** 5%; and * 10%.  Sample: Dictatorships
All equations control for Institutions (proxied by % population speaking a European Language at birth), time dummies 
743.7 Appendix A.1: Proof of Proposition 1 - Comparative Statics
Comparative Statics V (k;d)
From the Envelope Theorem we can derive the marginal changes of vstay and vloot with respect
to k and d:
V (k;d) is strictly increasing in k as:
@vstay(k;d)
@k
=
 
1   (k0;s)
 
f0(k) + (1   )

u0(cstay) > 0; and
@vloot(k;d)
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=
rk
1 + r
u0(cloot)
1   
>
0
V (k;d) is decreasing in d as:
@vstay(k;d)
@d
=  (1 + r)
 
1   (k0;s)

u0(cstay) < 0; and
@vloot(k;d)
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=0
Monotonicity of V (k;d) with respect to z, k and Z
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We now need to determine the sign of
@EV
@z
,
@EV
@k
and
@EV
@Z
. We know that EV (k0;d0) is the
unique ￿xed point of a contraction mapping  (see Rust 1988 and 1994) such that when " has
an extreme value distribution, we have:
EV = (EV ) = log

exp
 
vstay(k0;d0)

+ exp
 
vloot(k0;d0)

So we have H(EV ;z;Z)  EV   (EV ) = (I   )(EV ) = 0. By the implicit function
theorem:
@EV
@z
=
 
I   0(EV )
 1 @(EV )
@z
Now by di￿erentiating  with respect to EV , we obtain 0(EV ) =  (1   (k00;s0))Pr( = 0jk0;d0)
so that:
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In addition we can show that:
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Hence we obtain:
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 (1   (k00;s0))Pr( = 0jk0;d0)
rZ
1 + r
u0  
c0loot
1   
> 0
Similarly we determine:
@EV
@k
=
Pr( = 1jk0;d0)
1    (1   (k00;s0))Pr( = 0jk0;d0)
rk
1 + r
u0  
c0loot
1   
> 0
@EV
@Z
(k0;d0) =
u0(c0stay)Pr( = 0jk0;d0) +
rz
1 + r
u0  
c0loot
1   
Pr( = 1jk0;d0)
1    (1   (k00;s0))Pr( = 0jk0;d0)
> 0
Given that
@EV
@z
,
@EV
@k
and
@EV
@Z
are all strictly positive, it follows that V is strictly increasing
in z, k and Z.
Comparative statics of V (k;d)
Comparative statics of V (k;d) with respect to k and d
@V (k;d)
@k
=
 
1   (k0;s)
 
f0(k) + (1   )

u0(cstay)  
rk
1 + r
u0(cloot)
1   
(3.18)
@V (k;d)
@d
=  (1 + r)
 
1   (k0;s)

u0(cstay) < 0
76Comparative static of @V (k;d) with respect to z, k and Z
@V (k;d)
@z
= 
 
1   (k0;s)
 @EV
@z
(k0;d0)  
rZ
1 + r
u0(cloot)
1   
Replacing
@EV
@z
by its expression and given cloot is constant by assumption, u0  
cloot
= u0  
c0loot
;
we obtain:
@V (k;d)
@z
=
rZu0  
cloot
(1 + r)(1   )
 (1   (k0;s))Pr( = 1jk0;d0) +  (1   (k00;s0))Pr( = 0jk0;d0)   1
1    (1   (k00;s0))Pr( = 0jk0;d0)
< 0
(3.19)
Now it is clear that  (1   (k0;s))Pr( = 1jk0;d0) +  (1   (k00;s0))Pr( = 0jk0;d0) < 1. It
follows that the
@V (k;d)
@z
< 0. That is the return to staying decreases as z increases.
Similarly we can calculate
@V (k;d)
@k
:
@V (k;d)
@k
=
rku0  
cloot
(1 + r)(1   )
 (1   (k0;s))Pr( = 1jk0;d0) +  (1   (k00;s0))Pr( = 0jk0;d0)   1
1    (1   (k00;s0))Pr( = 0jk0;d0)
< 0
(3.20)
That is the return to staying decreases as k increases.
Computation of
@V (k;d)
@Z
@V (k;d)
@Z
= (1   (k0;s))

u0  
cstay
+ 
@EV (k0;d0)
@Z

 
rz
1 + r
u0(cloot)
1   
@V (k;d)
@Z
=
 (1   (k0;s))u0(c0stay)[1 +  (1   (k00;s0))Pr( = 0jk0;d0)]
1    (1   (k00;s0))Pr( = 0jk0;d0)
+
rzu0  
cloot
[ (1   (k0;s))Pr( = 1jk0;d0) +  (1   (k00;s0))Pr( = 0jk0;d0)   1]
(1 + r)(1   )(1    (1   (k00;s0))Pr( = 0jk0;d0))
(3.21)
The ￿rst term is positive while the second term is negative since the expression into the square
brackets is negative as we have argued above. It follows that the e￿ect of resources on the
relative returns to staying is non monotonic. It depends on the relative impact of resources on
the productive activity (term 1) and on the liquidity of resources provided by the banks (term
2). If the returns to liquidity is higher, then the gains from staying decreases, giving the the
77dictator more incentives to loot. On the other hand if the return of resources in the productive
activities is higher, then the dictator has an incentive to stay. 
3.8 Appendix A.2: Proof of Proposition 2
Case 1: vloot(k;d) > vloot(k;d) for a given d and k
By de￿nition of vloot, vloot(k;d) > vloot(k;d) implies that for any value of capital k, vstay(k;d) <
vloot(k;d). Looting is always optimal independently of k.
k
loot v
sta y v
,
stay loot v v
Figure 3.8: Case 1: Dictator Always Loots
Case 2: vloot(k;d) < vloot(k;d) < vloot(k;d) for a given d and k
Given that 1) vloot(k;d) < vloot(k;d) < vloot(k;d) for some d and k; 2) both vloot and vstay
are continuous in k and strictly increasing; and 3) the value of staying has decreasing returns
to capital while the value of looting has constant returns to capital, there exist two points of
intersection between vstay and vloot. The value vstay has increased fast enough (we assume for
low k, vstay faster than vloot) to intersect vloot from below at ~ k1. As k increases the combination
of point 2 and 3 results in vstay intersecting vloot from above at ~ k2. Formally, there exist two
capital levels ~ k1 and ~ k2 such that for ~ k1 < ~ k2:
1. vstay(~ k1;d) = vloot(~ k1;d) and
@vstay
@k
(~ k1;d) >
@vloot
@k
(~ k1;d)
782. vstay(~ k2;d) = vloot(~ k2;d) and
@vstay
@k
(~ k2;d) <
@vloot
@k
(~ k2;d)
3. vstay(k;d) < vloot(k;d) for k < ~ k1 and k > ~ k2; and vstay(k;d) > vloot(k;d) for ~ k1 < k < ~ k2
k2
k
loot v
sta y v
k1
,
stay loot v v
Figure 3.9: Case 2: Dictator Loots for Low and High k
Case 3: vloot(k;d) < vloot(k;d) for a given d and k
Given that 1) vloot(k;d) < vloot(k;d) for some debt level d; 2) both vloot and vstay are continuous
in k and strictly increasing; and 3) the value of staying has decreasing returns to capital while
the value of looting has constant returns to capital, it follows that there exists a unique ~ k3 such
that
vstay(~ k3;d) = vloot(~ k3;d) and
@vstay
@k
(~ k3;d) <
@vloot
@k
(~ k3;d) for some d
The inequality is necessary because as vloot is initially below vstay, it has to grow faster than vstay
to catch up. For any k < ~ k3, vstay(k;d) > vloot(k;d). For any k > ~ k3, vstay(k;d) < vloot(k;d).
To summarise, if vloot(k;d) < vloot(k;d) for some debt level d, then there exists a unique ~ k3 such
that vstay(~ k3;d) = vloot(~ k3;d) and
 
1   (k0;s)

f0(~ k3) + (1   )

u0(cstay) <
rk
1 + r
u0(cloot)
1   
.
The dictator loots for any capital level above ~ k3 and stays otherwise.
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Figure 3.10: Case 3: Dictator Loots only for High k
Comparative static of ~ ki (i = 1;2;3) with respect to z and k
Using
@EV
@k
and
@EV
@z
determined in Appendix A and the implicit function theorem, we obtain:
@~ ki
@k
=
rku0(cloot)
(1 + r)(1   )

(1   (k0;s))Pr( = 1jk0;d0) +  (1   (k00;s0))Pr( = 0jk0;d0)   1
1    (1   (k00;s0))Pr( = 0jk0;d0)

(1   (k0;s))(f0(k) + (1   ))u0(cstay)  
rk
(1 + r)(1   )
u0(cloot)
@~ ki
@z
=
rZu0(cloot)
(1 + r)(1   )

(1   (k0;s))Pr( = 1jk0;d0) +  (1   (k00;s0))Pr( = 0jk0;d0)   1
1    (1   (k00;s0))Pr( = 0jk0;d0)

(1   (k0;s))(f0(k) + (1   ))u0(cstay)  
rk
(1 + r)(1   )
u0(cloot)
We established in Appendix A.1 that the numerator is negative so that the signs of these ratios
depend on the sign of the denominator. When the marginal liquidity of capital is larger than
the marginal product of capital, then the denominator is negative and ~ ki increases with both k
and z. In particular, we can infer from the proof above that the denominator is negative at ~ k2
and ~ k3 (see Case 2 and Case 3) and positive at ~ k1 (see Case 2). Therefore, it follows that ~ k1 is
decreasing in k and z while ~ k2 and ~ k3 are increasing with these parameters.
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Resources, Con￿ict and Development ￿
Public Good Provision in
Resource-Rich Economies1
4.1 Introduction
Recent studies in political economy have found that the quality of leaders, particularly in au-
thoritarian regimes, is a key determinant of economic outcome (Jones and Olken, 2005). If true,
the fate of resource-rich countries, often ruled by non-democratic or authoritarian regimes (Ross,
2001) is shaped by the policy choices made by these regimes.2 Robinson (2001) has analysed
some of the key policy choices made in dictatorships. In particular, he investigates what drives
non-democratic countries to choose predatory policies while pro-development policies￿in the
form of public good investment￿are more e￿cient. He shows that the threat of political replace-
ment consecutive to developmental policies may deter public investment. In this context, he
argues that the presence of natural resources￿easily appropriable by incumbent elites￿creates
an even greater disincentive to invest in necessary public goods.
Under this backdrop, the propensity of resources to generate civil con￿icts (Collier and Ho-
e￿er, 1998 and 2004), or political replacement, may explain that some autocrats see under-
development and repression as optimal policies as they prevent potential contenders from threat-
ening their hold on the country’s riches. For instance, Zaire under Mobutu’s reign saw its road
1This chapter draws from a joint work with Katharina Wick of Tilburg University.
2Our work focuses on dictatorships and does not explain why countries like Norway, the US, Canada or
Australia have escaped the so-called curse. Nor does it say much about the evidence of the resource curse among
regions of the same country￿see Michaels (2006) for evidence in American states.
81network literally ￿disintegrate￿; out of the 90,000 miles of road at independence in 1960, only
6,000 miles were left by 1980. Robinson (2001) Under-investment in essential infrastructure was
so common that some observers view it as a deliberate strategy of underdevelopment to maintain
his position and thwart potential opposition. (Callaghy, 1984; Robinson, 2001; and Acemoglu
et al., 2004) Similarly, in the nineties under authoritarian regimes, child immunisation against
DPT (diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus) and measles fell in Nigeria from 54% to 26% and from
54% to 35% respectively.
However, the major shortcoming of these papers is their failure to explain the substantial dis-
parity in the provision of productive public goods among resource-rich countries. Malaysia for
instance has consistently invested in physical and social infrastructure. Over the 1990s, measles
immunisation progressed by 18 percentage points (from 70% to 88%), while secondary school
enrollment increased from 56% to 69%. Power generation also almost doubled between 1990
and 1995 from 282 to 520 kWh per capita. Given the importance of social and physical infras-
tructure as a determinant of growth and development (Calderon and Serven, 2004), these large
variations in public good provision may contribute to explain the large variations in economic
performance among resource-rich countries.
Such heterogeneity calls for a conditional theory. (Dunning 2005) Why do resource-rich coun-
tries vary considerably in providing essential and productive public goods to their populations?
For instance, why did Botswana consistently invest the revenues from diamonds in productive
infrastructure, education and health (Acemoglu et al., 2003) while Nigeria (Barro and Subra-
manian, 2003) and many others did not? This chapter tries to provide some answers to this
question.
In this chapter, we investigate what determines the decision of a self-interested ruling elite
(represented by an autocrat), in a resource-rich country, to invest in productivity enhancing
public goods3 given the looming threat of con￿ict. In particular, we examine the conditions
under which an autocrat ￿nds it optimal to buy the peace by creating incentives for the people
to allocate their e￿ort to productive activities (which both can bene￿t from) rather than to
￿ght over the control of the resources. We develop a Stackelberg game to analyse the strategic
interaction between a ruler and its population, where potential con￿ict over natural resources
3The idea that it makes rational sense for an autocratic ruler to invest in public goods as they increase
production which in turn accrues (at least in part) to the ruler is discussed for example in McGuire and Olson
(1996).
82drives the optimal policy choice made by the ruler. In particular, we are concerned with the
extent to which the ruler’s decision to provide a public good is a￿ected by the potential con￿ict
over natural resources.
In this model, the ruler has two instruments to keep the population from contesting the re-
sources. One is to try to lure the people into production by increasing productivity (by means
of public good provision), the other is to simply militarily oppress them. The people, by con-
trast, choose the allocation of their time between working in the non-resource sector and ￿ghting
to appropriate resources. We show that the ruler’s policy choice depends critically on 1) the
investment worthiness of the non-resource sector; 2) the extent of the resource wealth; and 3)
the ruler’s and the people’s relative e￿ectiveness in ￿ghting over the resource. The dictator
is likely to invest in public goods when the non-resource sector is productive enough. He is
less likely to do so if he is relatively e￿ective in appropriating the resources￿compared to the
people. If, on the other hand, the ruler is relatively ine￿ective in controlling the resources, he
is more likely to invest in development of the economy.
We provide empirical evidence that gives support to the predictions of our theoretical framework
using data on physical infrastructure (power generating capacity, and road network) and social
infrastructure (education and health) as proxies for public goods provision. We use a panel
with and without country ￿xed e￿ects to estimate both the e￿ect of resources and the e￿ect
of the ruler’s e￿ectiveness in controlling resources on public good provision. We ￿nd that the
combination of resource wealth and the ruler’s e￿ectiveness in controlling resources is negatively
associated with public good levels. This ￿nding corroborates our theory and points to a channel
through which leaders’ choices in resource-rich countries may impede or encourage investment
in public goods.
The paper follows the tradition of con￿ict models in economics. Like Grossman (1994) and
Azam (1995), we assume the people might rebel and ￿ght against the ruling elite. The dilemma
between repressing the people or buying the peace is also analysed within this literature by Azam
(1995) and Wick (2008). Our paper also relates to the empirical literature on resources and
con￿ict. Seminal contributions by Collier and Hoe￿er (1998, 2004) present empirical evidence
that resource wealth triggers con￿icts and civil war. Their work provides support for two
assumptions we make: 1) that agents in resource-rich countries have a strong incentive to
engage in appropriation rather than productive activities; 2) that the outbreak of a con￿ict is
83more likely when earnings foregone from rebellion are low.
This chapter makes two contributions to the current literature. First, it o￿ers a conditional
theory that accounts for the diverging policy choices among resource-rich countries and therefore
contributes to a better understanding of the resource curse. Second, our predictions are tested
empirically. To the best of our knowledge only Mehlum et al. (2006) make such contributions
to the resource curse literature.
The chapter is organised as follows: In section 4.2, we lay out the fundamentals of the model
and explain our assumptions in detail. We then turn to a concrete speci￿cation of the model.
In section 4.3, we discuss the ruler’s decision to invest and ￿nd the determinants of his policy
choice. Based on this we derive in some testable predictions of the theoretical model. Section
4.4 provides an empirical analysis. Finally, section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 The model
Consider a resource-rich country populated by two groups, the ruling elite represented by a self-
interested and authoritarian ruler and the population.4 The economy consists of two sectors,
a resource sector which generates a resource rent Z and a non-resource sector (agriculture or
manufacturing). Both sectors are potential sources of income for both groups. Following Caselli
(2006), the non-resource sector output is divided between the two groups according to some
exogenous parameter . On the other hand, the ruling elite considers the resource stock and
the associated earnings Z as its own property. The division of the resource rent may create a
con￿ict between the ruling elite and the population and depends on their respective e￿orts to
appropriate it.
The ruler and the population have two possible actions at their disposal. The population
allocates its time endowment (T) between working in the non-resource sector (W) and ￿ghting
(E) the ruler in an attempt to capture part of the resource earnings. By contrast, the ruler can
initiate a development policy by investing in a productivity enhancing public good . He can
also use force and repress (R) the population to deter it from contesting the resource rent.
4Following Robinson (2001), our model only applies to authoritarian regimes, where a ruling group takes deci-
sions purely motivated by self-interest. This captures the situation in many (developing) resource-rich countries.
844.2.1 Fundamentals of the model
The non-resource sector produces according to the production function (1 + A)f(;W), where
A is productivity,  = f0;1g is the binary investment decision (1 represents investment, and 0
means no investment).5
Assumptions PF6:
@f
@
> 0,
@f
@W
> 0,
@2f
@W2  0 and
@2f
@@E
< 0
We assume that production increases with investment and work e￿ort, and exhibits non-increasing
returns to labour. Moreover, a marginal rise in the ￿ghting e￿ort causes production to decrease
at an increasing rate when investment is undertaken. In other words, the marginal cost in terms
of lost production increases with .
The population allocates its time T between working W and ￿ghting E so that T  W +E. Its
e￿ort in contesting the ruler’s control over the resource rent has an adverse e￿ect on the level of
output produced in the non-resource sector.7 However, it gives the population the opportunity
to appropriate or grab a share of the resource rent according to a so-called grabbing function
G(E;R). Consequently, a share of the resource (1   G()) accrues to the government.
Assumptions GF:
@G
@E
> 0,
@G
@R
< 0,
@2G
@E2 < 0,
@2G
@R2 > 0, and
@2G
@R@E
< 0
We assume that the share of resources grabbed by the population increases with their ￿ghting
e￿ort E and decreases with the ruler’s repression R. The grabbing function is also assumed to
have decreasing returns in E and is convex in R. In other words, both the marginal bene￿t
to the people from ￿ghting
@G
@E
, and the marginal bene￿t to the ruler from repressing

 

@G
@R

 

decrease respectively in E and R. In addition, a marginal increase in E causes grabbing to
increase at a decreasing rate as R increases, that is the marginal bene￿t to the population from
grabbing decreases with R.
5See for example Dunning (2005) who also models public good investment as a binary choice variable.
6Since  is a discrete variable strictly speaking the partial derivative with respect to  is not de￿ned as such.
For expositional purposes, and notational ease, we however use it throughout this paper.
7Because the endowment constraint of the people is binding in the equilibrium, an increase in ￿ghting e￿ort
results necessarily in a decrease in working e￿ort (
@W
@E   1), leading to a lower level of output in the non-resource
sector.
85The ruler chooses two actions. First, he can invest in a productivity enhancing public good.
This investment (e.g. road network, a hospital or a school) comes at investment cost I. The
payo￿ from investing in a public good increases with the level of productivity A. We investigate
when￿i.e. at which levels of productivity A￿a self-interested ruling elite chooses to invest in
a public good. Second, the ruler chooses the repression e￿ort R to prevent the people from
grabbing resources and incurs some costs c(R;).
Assumptions CF:
@c
@
> 0,
@c
@R
> 0,
@2c
@R2 = 0, and
@2c(R;)
@R@
> 0
The total cost of repression is assumed to increase with the amount of repression R and with
public good provision. In addition, the marginal cost of repression increases with . Because
investment in public goods results in better educated and healthier people, running a repressive
dictatorship then becomes more costly to the ruler. This follows Robinson’s (2001) argument
that many authoritarian rulers are unwilling to construct or maintain socially productive infras-
tructure because providing such public goods may ￿reduce the cost of contesting elite control￿.
As an example we may reasonably assume that it is harder to repress well educated people
because they have more interest in public a￿airs and demand more accountability from the gov-
ernment.8 A similar assumption is also found in Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) and Dunning
(2005).
To sum up, the interaction between the two agents takes place according to the following timing:
1. For a given A, the ruler decides whether to invest:  = f0; 1g
Then the subgame   starts:
2. Stage 1 of the subgame  : Population reacts choosing a ￿ghting e￿ort E (where the
working e￿ort W is determined simultaneously)
8Formally correct would be the following speci￿cation. We assume that the ￿ow variable  increases the stock
of human capital in the economy, that is H = h(), with
@h
@ > 0. As just discussed, we further assume that
people with higher human capital are harder to repress, that is repression costs are higher. Formally this means
repression costs c = c(H) with
@c
@H > 0. One can now readily verify that
@c
@ > 0. As a shortcut we include 
directly into the repression cost function.
863. Stage 2 of the subgame  : Ruler chooses a repression level R in response to E
4. Con￿ict is settled with each contender grabbing a share of the available natural resources
according to his equilibrium strategy. Output in the non-resource sector is produced and
divided between the two groups according to the parameter .
First, the ruler chooses whether or not to invest in the public good. Conditional on the invest-
ment decision observed by the population, a contest over the resources takes place in subgame
  where the players decide sequentially their appropriative e￿orts. This subgame features a
Stackelberg contest where the population has the ￿rst move. The ruler reacts by an appropriate
repression level. With this timing, we take the view that the lack of the ruler’s provision of nec-
essary public goods will fuel discontent among the population and lead to rebellion. We have
nonetheless tried a di￿erent time sequence where the ruler is the ￿rst mover in the subgame.
We found that the results are qualitatively similar: the order has no impact on the comparative
statics although it a￿ects the equilibrium levels of ￿ghting and repression. We chose the timing
laid out above because it provides simpler expressions for the equilibrium levels and the com-
parative statics that are fairly easy to interpret. By backwards induction, we ￿rst solve for the
equilibrium outcome in the subgame   and later analyze the investment decision of the ruler.
4.2.2 Speci￿cation of the model
In this section we derive the results of the model using a speci￿c functional form. We specify
the total production of the economy, given inputs (A;;W) as:
(1 + A)f(;W) = (1 + A)(1 + )(1 + W) (4.1)
It is easily veri￿ed that for  = 0 the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
If  = 1 on the other hand we ￿nd that the production function exhibits decreasing returns if
and only if W < 1
, where  is the scaling factor of inputs.9
The repression costs are speci￿ed as:
c(;R) = c(1 + )R (4.2)
9Traditionally returns to scale are increasing i￿ f(;W) > f(;W).
87Resource earnings are split between the two parties according to the so-called "grabbing func-
tion". This is given by:
G(E;R) = min

E
R ;1

; (4.3)
where G denotes the share of the resource grabbed by the rebels and 0 <  < 1 and 0 <  < 1.
These conditions ensure that G is well behaved. The two parameters  and  capture the elas-
ticity of the grabbing function with respect to the respective ￿ghting inputs, E and R. If  < ,
a one percent increase in the ￿ghting input by the government has more e￿ect on the grabbing
outcome than a similar increase in the rebels’ ￿ghting. Thus the di￿erence     re￿ects the
relative e￿ectiveness of the opponents in the contest. If  < , the ruler is more e￿ective in
keeping control of the resources whereas if  > , the population is more e￿ective in grabbing
resources. Said di￿erently, if  <  the same e￿ort level of both groups is translated in more
e￿ective ￿ghting power of the government as compared to the people’s. The two parameters 
and  play a crucial role in determining the outcome of the model.
We are now ready to solve the subgame   by backward induction. Note that we will focus on
interior solutions.10 In the second stage of the subgame, the ruler’s problem is:
max
R
(1 + A)(1 + )(1 + W) +

1  
E
R

Z   c(1 + )R   I (4.4)
The ruler’s reaction function is:
R(E) =

Z
c(1 + )
1=(+1)
E=(+1) (4.5)
In the ￿rst stage of the subgame  , the people maximize their own payo￿ taking into account
the ruler’s reaction:
max
E
(1   )(1 + A)(1 + )(1 + W) +

Z
c(1 + )
 =(+1)
E=(+1)Z (4.6)
s:t: E + W  T (4.7)
Note that the endowment constraint is always binding. If that was not the case then at the opti-
10Formally this means we assume (1 + A)(1 + )
 
 >

(+1)(1 )

c

 
 Z
 
 .
88mum, we could slightly increase E and R, satisfy the constraint while increasing the population’s
payo￿. This is a contradiction of the optimum.
The subgame perfect equilibrium of   is given by (E;R):
E = K1

Z
1 + 
 1
+1 
(1 + A)
 
+1
+1  where K1 =


( + 1)(1   )
 +1
+1  
c

 
+1 
(4.8)
R = K2

Z
1 + 
 1
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+1 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+1 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1 + 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+1 
(1 + A)
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

( + 1)(1   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 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 
c
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+1 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Proposition 1
1) The population’s ￿ghting e￿ort decreases with investment and higher productivity, but in-
creases with resource wealth.
2) The ruler’s repression level decreases with investment and higher productivity, but increases
with resource wealth.
3) Grabbing decreases with higher productivity. It is ambiguous with respect to investment and
resource wealth, and depends on the opponents e￿ectiveness in the contest.
Proof: derive the partial derivatives.
This proposition suggests three important results. First, investment in the public good reduces
both the population’s ￿ghting e￿ort E and the ruler’s repression R. Indeed, the people ￿ght
less as a result of an investment in  since the increase in marginal cost of ￿ghting in terms
of lost production is greater than the increase in marginal bene￿t of ￿ghting. In other words,
by investing in , the ruler raises the population’s opportunity cost of ￿ghting so that ￿ghting
89becomes less pro￿table than engaging in the productive activity. Moreover, because investment
increases the marginal costs of R by Assumption CF, the provision of a public good leads to a
lower level of R for each level of E.
Second, more ￿ghting leads to more repression because an increase in E raises the marginal
bene￿t of repressing (i.e. R has more e￿ect on the grabbing outcome if E is high by Assumption
GF) without a￿ecting the marginal costs of repressing. A consequence of these two results is
that E and R change in the same direction, which implies that the e￿ect of  and Z on the
grabbing function is a priori ambiguous. In particular, the e￿ect depends on the sign of    .
Grabbing increases in  when  <  and decreases in  when  > . Indeed, the provision of a
public good causes E and R to decrease proportionately so that the ratio E
R is independent of
.11 When  >  the decrease in the ￿ghting e￿ort E has a larger impact on grabbing than the
decrease in repression R so that the ruler can control more resources and G(:) decreases. This
is because the loss of an e￿ective unit of E is more detrimental to the population when  > 
than the loss of a (less e￿ective) unit of R is to the ruler. When  < , the opposite is true.
Third, an increase in resource wealth raises the stakes of controlling the resources and therefore
intensi￿es con￿icts (more ￿ghting and more repression). Both opponents increase their e￿ort
in contesting the resource. Thus, the e￿ect on grabbing is ambiguous and depends on the
e￿ectiveness in ￿ghting: the most e￿ective party will have the advantage.
In contrast, by increasing the people’s opportunity cost of ￿ghting, a more productive non
resource sector (i.e. a higher value of A) is conducive to a less con￿ict-prone environment. The
population reduces its ￿ghting e￿ort E. This in turn leads to a lower level of repression R. It
also results in a decrease in grabbing G(:), because a higher A decreases E more than R.
4.3 Ruler’s investment decision
4.3.1 Characterisation of the decision
In order to understand when a self-interested ruler in a resource-rich country ￿nds it optimal to
invest, we now consider his investment decision given the subgame perfect equilibrium discussed
above. In the previous section we laid out the players’ responses to a public good investment.
11 E

R =
c


(1 + )(1   )
1
(1 + A)
is independent of . Independence depends on the assumption that both the
production function and the cost of repression are linear in 1 + .
90Under certain conditions, the provision of a public good might bring about an undesirable
outcome from the point of view of the ruler (through the e￿ect of public good provision on the
con￿ict outcome), since￿as we just saw￿the sign of the change in grabbing as a result of public
good provision is ambiguous. If those conditions occur, they discourage public good investment.
Given the equilibrium strategy in subgame  , the ruler’s investment decision depends solely on
the productivity level A. The objective of the present section is to ￿nd the productivity levels
A for which the ruler ￿nds it in his best interest to invest.
The ruler solves the following problem:
max

(G(A; = 1)   I;G(A; = 0)) (4.11)
He chooses the strategy (investment or no investment) that gives him the highest payo￿. In-
vestment is optimal if and only if the relative bene￿t of investing exceeds the cost ( I) :
G  G(A; = 1)   G(A; = 0)  I (4.12)
Before solving this problem, we ￿rst carry out a discussion of the relative value of investing
G. A formal analysis of the properties of G is undertaken in Appendix A.1.
G = (1 + A)(1 + T) +
(i)
z }| {
(1 + A)[E( = 0)   2E( = 1)]
  [G( = 1)   G( = 0)]
| {z }
(ii)
Z   c[2R( = 1)   R( = 0)]
| {z }
(iii)
(4.13)
The relative value of investing G is equal to the increase in output resulting from investment
plus additional e￿ects captured by three additional components: (i) represents the impact of
the people’s ￿ghting e￿ort on the non-resource output when a public good is provided; (ii) is
the di￿erence in grabbing due to investment; and (iii) re￿ects the di￿erence in repression costs
triggered by investment. This can be written as:
G = (1 + A)(1 + T) + [P1   cP2   P3]Z
1
+1 (1 + A)
  
+1 
| {z }
additional e￿ects
(4.14)
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+1 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1
2
 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+1 
  1
#
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1
2
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+1 
  1
#
K3.
These e￿ects re￿ect the impact of public good provision on the contest in resource-rich countries.
Their direction and magnitude depend on the sign of    . When  < , slightly less e￿ort
is devoted to resource appropriation (E and R decrease slightly) as a consequence of public
good investment. This has the positive e￿ect of raising the output. However this positive e￿ect
is outweighed by two negative e￿ects. First, the population grabs more of the resources because
the decrease in E and R has a detrimental e￿ect on the resource appropriation of the more
e￿ective contender (the ruler in this case). This ￿nding was discussed in section 4.2. Second,
public good provision results in higher total costs of repression because the increased unit cost
of repression o￿sets the decrease in R. Thus the sum of the additional e￿ects of public good
investment is negative if  < .
On the other hand, public good investment causes both the people and the ruler to decrease
substantially their appropriation e￿ort when  > . This has three positive e￿ects on the
ruler’s payo￿: First, the output from the non-resource sector increases as the people provide
signi￿cantly more working e￿ort. Second, the people grab less of the resource, and therefore
more of the resource is left for the ruler.12 Third, total repression costs decline since the increase
in unit costs of repression is o￿set by the dramatic fall in the ruler’s repression level.
We can now shed light on our main question as to when an authoritarian ruler ￿nds it optimal
to invest in public goods rather than carry out predatory policies.
Lemma:
1) For any  and , if G(A = 0) < I, then there exists a unique A such that investment is
optimal for any A  A. A is de￿ned as G(A) = I
2) For any  and , if minA [G(A)] > I, then investment is optimal for any A.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
12As explained in the discussion following proposition 1, a proportionate decrease in E
 and R
 has a detri-
mental e￿ect on the resource appropriation of the more e￿ective contender (in this case the people).
92Intuitively, only su￿ciently high productivity levels in the non-resource sector give the ruler the
incentive to invest in the economy. In other words, there is a productivity threshold A above
which investment becomes optimal. The level of the threshold is informative of the likelihood
of the ruler to undertake an investment in public goods. The higher the productivity threshold,
the less likely investment will be; inversely, a lower threshold makes investment more likely.
The productivity threshold A solves G(A) = I so that:
(1 + A)(1 + T) + (P1   P2   P3)Z
1
+1 (1 + A)
 
+1    I = 0 (4.15)
Resource wealth a￿ects the threshold A and the direction of their relationship is determined
by the sign of    .
Proposition 2:
In a resource-rich country the ruler’s investment decision is characterized by:
1) If  >  then
@A
@Z
< 0
2) If  <  then
@A
@Z
> 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
This proposition says that increased resource wealth provides a disincentive to invest in produc-
tive public goods if the ruler is relatively more e￿ective in contesting the resource. In addition,
increased resource wealth provides an incentive to invest in productive public goods if the people
are relatively more e￿ective in grabbing the resource. A corollary of this proposition is stated
as follows.
Corollary:
A
> < A
<, that is in a resource-rich country the provision of public goods requires a lower
productivity when  >  than when  < .
93Proof: See Appendix A.4.
The model accounts for the di￿ering investment behaviour of rulers in resource-rich countries ac-
cording to the respective e￿ectiveness of the population and the ruler in contesting the resource
rent. A ruler who can secure the control over resources easily will tend to invest less in public
goods than a ruler whose population is e￿ective in contesting the resource rent. By investing
in a productive public good, the ruler provides an incentive to work in the non-resource sector
rather than ￿ght over the resource riches. Providing such incentive is obviously more pressing
when the ruler faces a population e￿ective in ￿ghting and appropriating the resources.
4.3.2 Testable predictions
The key prediction of the model is that the e￿ect of the resource rent on the investment decision
depends on the e￿ectiveness of the two parties in contesting resources. We test this prediction
by estimating the following econometric speci￿cation:
PGit = 0 + 1Resourcesit + 2Strongit + 3Resourcesit  Strongit + 4X1it + "it (4.16)
where PGit denotes country i’s level of the public good at time t; Resourcesit is the amount
of resource rent; Strongit = 1 indicates that the ruler is more e￿ective than the people in ap-
propriating resources (that is in terms of the theoretical model the case where  < ); X1it
denotes all the other control variables. We are interested in coe￿cients 1 and 3: 1 repre-
sents the marginal e￿ect of resources on the public good provision when Strongit = 0; while 3
indicates how the e￿ect of resource rent di￿ers between an e￿ective ruler (Strongit = 1) and
an ine￿ective one (Strongit = 0). Finally, the sum 1 + 3 re￿ects the e￿ect of resource rent
when Strongit = 1. The model predicts that 1 > 0 and (1 + 3) < 0, implying that while an
ine￿ective ruler has an incentive to provide more public goods as resource rent increases, public
good supply decreases with the resource rent in the presence of an e￿ective ruler. This happens
if the negative interaction e￿ect outweighs the positive direct e￿ect, i.e. if 1 > 0, 3 < 0 and
j3j > 1.
Second, we test the prediction that, ceteris paribus, public good investment is (i) less likely
94when the ruler is e￿ective in controlling the resources; and (ii) more likely when he is not
e￿ective in doing so. This prediction is tested using speci￿cation (4.16). We predict that
2 + 3Resourcesit < 0 as the resource level increases.
4.4 Empirical Analysis
4.4.1 Data
Our data set runs from 1970 to 2000 and contains 67 countries that have been led by an
authoritarian regime at some point since 1970. We use the variable polity2 from Polity IV
dataset to indicate whether a regime is authoritarian. For any given year, a country with a
polity2 score less than or equal to 0 is considered authoritarian.
Dependent variables Following the literature on the determinants of provision of public
goods, we de￿ne public goods as ￿goods or services enjoyed by all or a large share of a jurisdic-
tion￿.13 As the dependent variable, we use physical infrastructure￿power generating capacity
and road network￿and social infrastructure￿education and health indicators. These variables
are used as a proxy for public good provision. We believe that the provision of these public
goods by the state is indicative of the state’s commitment to development policies. Although
the model treats the decision of providing a public good as discrete, the empirical analysis will
be concerned with public goods as continuous variables. Empirically, it is more meaningful to
think of the supply of public goods in terms of levels and not as a binary decision. For instance,
whether a country extends its road network by 1 km or 100 km is the same binary decision
while it is certainly di￿erent if we consider the potential contribution of 1km and 100 km to
development.
The data on the stock of physical infrastructure includes 1) electricity generating capacity
measured as the number of kWh available per capita in log (from Canning, 1998) and spans the
period 1970￿1995; 2) the road network in km per square km expressed in log (from Canning
and the World Development Indicators, 2006) and covers the period 1970￿2000.
The data on illiteracy rate comes from the World Development Indicators and covers the years
1970￿1999. For clarity, this variable has been transformed into literacy rate (where literacy rate
13See for example Lake and Baum (2001), Deacon (2003), and Deacon and Saha (2006) for a review of the
literature.
95is 100 minus illiteracy rate).
The public health data measures the percentage of children aged 12-23 months who have been
immunised against DPT and Measles. The immunisation series come from the World Develop-
ment Indicators (1980￿2000).
Key Independent Variables In the theoretical model, we have established that the ruler’s
relative e￿ectiveness in appropriating the resource crucially determines public good provision.
We hypothesise that such e￿ectiveness is derived from the form of the political power. In
particular, we assume that the elite is e￿ective in appropriating and keeping the resources for
its own bene￿t whenever the state is controlled by the most autocratic regimes. Here, we capture
such regimes as those ruled by leaders who have no ￿nite term constraint. 14 When they face
popular discontent, these strong regimes are able to successfully contain civil strife through
repression (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Hegre et al., 2001; and Muller and Weede, 1990), and
are therefore considered to be relatively e￿ective in controlling resource rents. We construct a
dummy variable Strongit (with value 1 when the ruler has no ￿nite term) from the Database
of Political Institutions compiled by Beck et al. (2004 update). This series covers the period
1975￿2000.
We use resource rents as the measure of contestable resource endowment. The data is provided
by K. Hamilton and G. Ruta from the World Bank and covers the period 1970￿2000. Resource
rent is measured as the product of the quantity of resources extracted by the di￿erence between
the resource price and the average extraction cost. It is expressed as a percentage of the GDP. 15
Descriptive Evidence Table 4.1 below displays the mean and standard deviation of our main
variables broken down into two sub-samples: rulers with ￿nite term constraint and rulers without
￿nite term. Casual observation suggests that the countries governed by rulers with no constraint
on their term provide less public goods on average. These countries are also substantially more
dictatorial (with a average polity score of -6.18 vs. -0.88 for their constrained counterparts) and
more resource abundant (18% of GDP as opposed to 7.6%).
14Note that the average polity score for such countries is -6.19 so that these regimes qualify to Fearon and
Laitin’s de￿nition of full autocracy. As an illustration, Malaysia has been ruled by autocrats with a ￿nite term
constraint, while was Nigeria led by dictators with no constraints on their terms.
15This measure includes coal, oil, natural gas, and ten di￿erent minerals￿bauxite, copper, gold, iron, lead,
nickel, phosphate, silver, tin, zinc.
96Table 4.1: Descriptive Evidence of Key Variables
Sample (1975 - 2000)
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Power Generation (kWh per capita in log) 1363 4.60 1.53
Phone Lines (per 1000 people in log) 1326 2.46 1.56
Literacy Rate in % 1542 59.79 23.00
Immunization DPT in % 1284 62.72 26.37
Immunization MSL in % 1257 63.38 25.10
Polity Score 1704 -2.75 6.16
Resource Rent in % GDP 1565 11.04 16.11
Sub-Sample: Rulers with Finite Term
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Power Generation (kWh per capita in log) 843 4.65 1.35
Phone Lines (per 1000 people in log) 829 2.59 1.49
Literacy Rate in % 985 64.57 22.25
Immunization DPT in % 885 65.68 23.42
Immunization MSL in % 869 66.53 22.55
Polity Score 1105 -0.88 6.31
Resource Rent in % GDP 1041 7.56 10.53
Sub-Sample: Rulers without Finite Term
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Power Generation (kWh per capita in log) 520 4.51 1.78
Phone Lines (per 1000 people in log) 497 2.26 1.65
Literacy Rate in % 557 51.34 21.85
Immunization DPT in % 399 56.15 30.98
Immunization MSL in % 388 56.32 28.82
Polity Score 599 -6.19 4.02
Resource Rent in % GDP 524 17.96 21.99
4.4.2 Estimation Results
The ￿ve public good equations will be estimated individually in this panel. We suspect that
these equations may not be independent as the values of the variables are collected from the
same set of observations (same countries). The simultaneous estimation of these equations
using a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) method may be warranted to control for this
correlation to avoid ine￿cient estimates. However, this is not an issue here. Because all public
good equations have the same regressors, there is no e￿ciency gain using a SUR estimation.
(Greene 2000, p. 616-617)
Following the work by Lake and Baum (2001), and Canning (1995) on public good provision,
we control for geographic variables such as population and urbanization. In addition, we control
for productivity, proxied by the real GDP per capita. As the real GDP per capita might be
endogenous￿reverse causality￿we instrument it by its three-year lag to avoid serial correlation.
We also include time dummies to control for aggregate e￿ects that impact on all countries in a
given year and country ￿xed e￿ects.
97Table 4.3 presents the estimation results for prediction 1. We investigate whether the e￿ect of
the level of resources on public good provision depends on the relative e￿ectiveness to control
resources.
We ￿rst analyse the ￿nding for the physical infrastructure. The e￿ect of resource rents on
public good provision when the regime is not e￿ective in controlling the resources is positive
and but not statistically signi￿cant for power generation. One standard deviation increase in
resource rent (16.1) raises power generation by 3.2% (16*0.002). For road network, resources
have an unexpected negative e￿ect signi￿cant at the 10% level (one standard deviation increase
of resources results in 4.8% decrease in the road network). However, the ruler’s choice di￿ers
signi￿cantly when he is e￿ective in controlling the resources. The negative and statistically
signi￿cant e￿ect of the interaction term indicates that, all else equal, an e￿ective ruler will
provides less of both public goods. Furthermore, the magnitude of the di￿ering behaviour is so
large that the negative interaction e￿ect outweighs the positive main e￿ect for power generation
(-16%) and reinforces the negative main e￿ect for road network (-9.7%). Thus, the total e￿ect￿
i.e. the e￿ect of resources when an e￿ective ruler is in power￿is negative and signi￿cant as
predicted. One standard deviation increase in resources causes power generation to decrease by
almost 13% and road network by 14.5%.
Concerning literacy rate and immunisation against DPT and measles, the results are qualita-
tively very much in line with power generation. The main e￿ect of resources is positive but not
signi￿cant, while the total e￿ect is negative and statistically signi￿cant. Our result suggests
that an increase in resources by one standard deviation reduces immunisation against DPT and
measles by 5.8 and 7.2 percentage points, and literacy rate by 0.7 percentage point.
The overall conclusion is that there is little relationship between public good levels and resources
when the ruler is ine￿ective in controlling the resources￿although it is positive as predicted￿but
this relationship becomes negative and statistically signi￿cant with a ￿strong￿ ruler. Moreover
the magnitude of the e￿ect is sizable except for literacy.
From Table 4.3, we also test the prediction that, a ruler relatively e￿ective in ￿ghting over
resources provides comparatively lower levels of public goods. The interest lies in the sign of
2 + 3Resourcesit. The coe￿cient 2 of the variable ￿No ￿nite term￿ tests whether the two
98types of rulers signi￿cantly di￿er in their public good provision when the resource rent is equal
to 0. Most importantly, the interaction e￿ect 3Resourcesit indicates that the di￿erence in
public good provision between the two types of rulers depends on the level of the rent, for all
types of infrastructure. At higher resource levels, the gap widens, making the strong or e￿ective
dictator less likely to invest.
For illustration purposes, Table 4.4 shows the e￿ect of an e￿ective or strong ruler on public
good provision, when the resource rent is equal to 0, 11% (sample mean) and 30% (case of a
resource-rich country like Nigeria). As the resource level increases, the e￿ect of a strong dictator
becomes more negative and signi￿cant. For a country with a sizable resource base (e.g. 30%),
a strong ruler is an obstacle to the provision of public goods. The e￿ect is generally large and
signi￿cant except for literacy: -19% for power generation, -19.4% for road network, -15.4 and
-16 percentage points for immunisation against DPT and measles. Finally, Figures 4.1 to 4.3
illustrate how the di￿erential e￿ect deepens with the level of resource rent for the various types
of public good.
Overall, the empirical evidence is consistent with the main results of the model, namely that 1)
the e￿ect of resources on the provision of public goods hinges generally on the ruler’s relative
e￿ectiveness in ￿ghting; and 2) a ruler who is relatively more e￿ective in controlling the resource
endowment￿i.e. when  <  according to our model￿tends to provide less public good. Fi-
nally, although we ￿nd that an ine￿ective ruler has a positive e￿ect on public good provision,
this e￿ect is not signi￿cant.
As a robustness check, we also perform an estimation without country ￿xed e￿ects but control-
ling for regional dummies. To mitigate the problem of omitted variables bias, we control for
institutional features (proxied by the percentage of the population speaking a European lan-
guage as in Hall and Jones, 1999), ethnic diversity (measure of ethnic fractionalization), former
colonial power (French and British), and the size of the country. The results, presented in Table
4.5, do not di￿er from those reported above using country ￿xed e￿ects, except for road network.
In that equation, the coe￿cient of resource rent is negative and the interaction e￿ect is positive,
which is the exact opposite to what we expect and to our result with the ￿xed e￿ect estimation.
This may suggest the presence of omitted variables in the road network equation.
Our results are robust to the range of public goods considered, whether they are physical or
99social. They are also robust to the use of an alternative proxy for the e￿ectiveness in controlling
resources. We create a dummy variable denoted ￿Strong Executive￿ which indicates whether the
executive is controlled by a monarch or a military regime (see Table 4.6 and 4.7). Monarchies
tend to bene￿t from long lasting and established systems that enable e￿ective appropriation of
the resource rent, while military regime have the power to control and defend the rent. We ￿nd
similar results to the one presented above. Besides, our ￿ndings using this alternative proxy
are consistent with the evidence of the poor record of military dictatorships in providing public
goods. (Lake and Baum, 2001)
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper we follow an idea that has gained much support in recent years, namely the role of
policy choices in producing resource curse outcomes. As the term "policy choice" suggests such
outcomes are by no means deterministic, and thus our model is one of the few that attempts to
provide a conditional theory of the resource curse.
In particular, we follow the idea that easily appropriable resource rents may lead (among other
things) to distortions in public policy (Bulte et al., 2005). Recognising the inherent threat
of con￿ict in resource-rich countries, we present a model in which the ruler’s policy choice, is
entirely driven by economic motives. Our model points to reasons why some resource abundant
countries have performed poorly whereas others have proved highly successful. We suggest
that the stark di￿erence in policy decisions regarding public good provision among resource-
rich countries is a plausible reason. This di￿erence results from various factors￿the degree of
resource wealth, the investment worthiness of the economy and most importantly the ruler’s
relative e￿ectiveness in controlling the resource￿which determine whether developmental or
repressive policies are carried out. Testing our model empirically, we ￿nd evidence that 1) the
e￿ect of resource wealth crucially depends on the ruler’s relative strength; and 2) a relatively
strong leader who can control e￿ectively resources tends to invest less in public good.
Along with Mehlum et al. (2006) who point to the di￿ering e￿ect of institutions on economic
outcome in resource-rich countries, this paper demonstrates that a better understanding of the
resource curse puzzle requires conditional rather than uni-dimensional theories.
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105Table 4.2: List of Countries in the Sample
Algeria Madagascar
Angola Malaysia
Argentina Mauritania
Bahrain Mexico
Bangladesh Morocco
Benin Mozambique
Bolivia Nepal
Brazil Nicaragua
Burkina Faso Niger
Burundi Nigeria
Cameroon Oman
Central African Republic Pakistan
Chile Peru
China Philippines
Congo Brazzaville Qatar
Cote d'Ivoire Rwanda
Ecuador Saudi Arabia
Egypt Senegal
El Salvador Sierra Leone
Gabon Singapore
Ghana South Africa
Guatemala Sri Lanka
Guyana Sudan
Haiti Suriname
Honduras Syria
Indonesia Thailand
Iran Togo
Iraq Tunisia
Jordan Turkey
Kenya UAE
Korea South Uganda
Kuwait Zaire
Liberia Zambia
Zimbabwe
List of Countries
106Table 4.3: E￿ect of Resource Rent on Public Good Provision with Fixed E￿ects
Dependent Variable: Provision of Public Good
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Power Generation 
Capacity per Cap
Density Road 
Network
Literacy Immunization DPT
Immunization
Measles
Resources  0.002 -0.003* 0.02 0.056 0.02
[0.002] [0.001] [0.019] [0.108] [0.124]
No Finite Term 0.125*** -0.02 1.154*** -2.556 -1.476
[0.025] [0.031] [0.270] [1.586] [1.748]
Resources*No Finite Term -0.010*** -0.006*** -0.063** -0.414*** -0.468***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.025] [0.136] [0.156]
Real GDP in log 0.840*** 0.458*** 1.904*** 1.837 14.992***
[0.064] [0.048] [0.613] [3.201] [4.142]
Population in log 1.377*** 1.185*** 34.191*** 7.696 15.189
[0.310] [0.193] [1.941] [11.738] [12.353]
Urban Population in % 0.021*** -0.002 0.173*** 0.155 0.162
[0.003] [0.002] [0.031] [0.173] [0.208]
Constant -30.569*** -30.023*** -657.128*** -127.08 -379.183
[6.520] [4.135] [42.982] [257.978] [268.620]
Resources + Resources*No Finite Term -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.043* -0.358*** -0.449***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.022] [0.118] [0.144]
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1104 1102 1250 1036 1011
R-square 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.83 0.79
Number of Countries 57 45 54 56 56
Time Period 1975 - 1995 1975 - 2000 1975 - 1999 1980 - 2000 1980 - 2000
Robust standard errors. Control for Population, Urban population, Country fixed effect and Year dummies.
 *** indicates 1% significance; ** 5%; and * 10%.
107Table 4.4: Di￿erence in Public Good Provision with a ￿strong￿ ruler
       
Variables 
Differential Provision 
Rent = 0 
Differential Provision
Rent = 11% (mean) 
Differential Provision 
Rent = 30%  
Power Generation in log  0.125***  0.013  -0.189*** 
Road Network in log  -0.02  -0.082***  -0.194*** 
Literacy Rate in %  1.154***  0.459  -0.739 
Immunization DPT in %  -2.556  -7.104***  -15.375*** 
Immunization MSL in %  -1.476  -6.629***  -15.998*** 
           
       
This table is obtained from Table 4.3 by setting Rent to 0, 11% (mean) and 30% (Nigeria) using country 
fixed effects 
108Table 4.5: E￿ect of Resource Rent on Public Good Provision without Fixed E￿ects
Dependent Variable: Provision of Public Good
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Power Generation 
Capacity per Cap
Density Road 
Network
Literacy Immunization DPT
Immunization
Measles
Resources  0.012*** -0.016*** 0.371*** 0.037 0.091
[0.003] [0.003] [0.060] [0.084] [0.089]
No Finite Term -0.101* -0.253*** -0.302 -7.591*** -7.005***
[0.057] [0.049] [1.162] [1.725] [1.716]
Resources*No Finite Term -0.019*** 0.010*** -0.729*** -0.332*** -0.335***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.071] [0.099] [0.105]
Real GDP in log 0.600*** 0.308*** 7.241*** 6.491*** 5.781***
[0.050] [0.033] [0.861] [1.213] [1.228]
Population in log 0.004 0.515*** -0.809* -2.008*** -1.450**
[0.024] [0.023] [0.427] [0.684] [0.689]
Urban Population in % 0.030*** 0.003*** 0.323*** 0.007 0.066
[0.002] [0.001] [0.034] [0.044] [0.044]
Constant -3.088*** -5.243*** 16.754* 39.920*** 20.854
[0.585] [0.401] [8.888] [14.474] [14.445]
Resources + Resources*No Finite Term -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.358*** -0.295*** -0.244***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.037] [0.054] [0.061]
Controls
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnic Diversity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coloniser (British and French) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institutional Feature Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Area Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1084 1102 1250 1015 990
R-square 0.79 0.82 0.70 0.69 0.68
Number of Countries 56 45 54 55 55
Time Period 1975 - 1995 1975 - 2000 1975 - 1999 1980 - 2000 1980 - 2000
Robust standard errors. Control for Institution, Ethnic Diversity, Colonizer, Country area, Population, Urban population, Region
and Year dummies.  *** indicates 1% significance; ** 5%; and * 10%.
109Figure 4.1: E￿ect of ￿Strong￿ Ruler on Power Generation and Road Network
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110Figure 4.2: E￿ect of ￿Strong￿ Ruler on Literacy
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111Figure 4.3: E￿ect of ￿Strong￿ Ruler on Immunisation
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112Table 4.6: E￿ect of Resource Rent on Public Good Provision: Alternative Measure
Dependent Variable: Provision of Public Good
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Power Generation 
Capacity per Cap
Density Road 
Network
Literacy Immunization DPT
Immunization
Measles
Resources  0.014*** -0.013*** 0.339*** 0.042 0.145
[0.003] [0.002] [0.056] [0.086] [0.089]
Strong Executive 0.055 -0.058 3.637*** 3.239** -0.248
[0.051] [0.040] [1.084] [1.550] [1.554]
Resources*Strong Executive -0.026*** 0.002 -0.818*** -0.448*** -0.527***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.064] [0.097] [0.102]
Real GDP in log 0.641*** 0.352*** 8.049*** 7.878*** 7.465***
[0.047] [0.033] [0.829] [1.218] [1.253]
Population in log 0.02 0.535*** -0.536 -1.095 -0.861
[0.025] [0.023] [0.443] [0.706] [0.696]
Urban Population in % 0.030*** 0.003** 0.318*** -0.014 0.044
[0.001] [0.001] [0.032] [0.046] [0.046]
Constant -3.517*** -6.016*** 5.52 20.993 -7.677
[0.566] [0.402] [8.681] [13.914] [14.157]
Resources + Resources*Strong Executive -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.479*** -0.406*** -0.382***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.037] [0.056] [0.059]
Observations 1193 1192 1359 1029 1004
R-square 0.79 0.82 0.70 0.67 0.67
Number of Countries 56 45 54 55 55
Time Period 1970 - 1995 1970 - 2000 1970 - 1999 1980 - 2000 1980 - 2000
Robust standard errors. Control for Institution, Ethnic Diversity, Colonizer, Country area, Population, Urban population, Region
and Year dummies.  *** indicates 1% significance; ** 5%; and * 10%.
113Table 4.7: Di￿erence in Public Good Provision with a ￿strong￿ ruler: Alternative Measure
Dependent Variables  Differential Provision
Rent = 0 
Differential Provision
Rent = 11% (mean) 
Differential Provision 
Rent = 30%  
Power Generation in log  0.055  -0.234***  -0.733*** 
Road Network in log  -0.058  -0.037  -0.0002 
Literacy Rate in %  3.637***  -5.359***  -20.899*** 
Immunization DPT in %  3.239**  -1.693  -10.212*** 
Immunization MSL in %  -0.248  -6.045***  -16.058*** 
           
       
This table is obtained from Table 4.6 by setting Rent to 0, 11% (mean) and 30% (Nigeria)  
1144.6 Appendix A.1: Properties of function G(A)
Properties
1) If  <  then G is strictly increasing and strictly concave in A
2) If  >  then G is strictly decreasing in [0;A] and strictly increasing in (A;+1) where
A =


 + 1   
P1   cP2   P3
(1 + T)
 +1 
+1
Z
1
+1   1. G is also strictly convex everywhere.
Let G(A) = J(A) + [P1   cP2   P3]Z
1
+1 (1 + A)
  
+1  where J(A) = (1 + A)(1 + T).
It is straight forward to establish that:
@G
@A
= (1 + T)  

 + 1   
[P1   cP2   P3]Z
1
+1 (1 + A)
 
+1
+1 
@2G
@A2 =
( + 1)
( + 1   )2[P1   cP2   P3]Z
1
+1 (1 + A)
 
2+2 
+1 
lim
A!1
G(A)   J(A) = 0
Case 1:  < 
In this case, we established that P1 < 0, P2 > 0 and P3 > 0. As a consequence,
@G
@A
> 0 and
@2G
@A2 < 0 for any A, i.e. G is strictly increasing and strictly concave in A. In addition,
G(A) is below J(A) for any A, and converges asymptotically to J(A).
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Figure 4.4: G as a function of A when  < 
When  < , an increase in A has two reinforcing positive e￿ects on G: ￿rst, a direct posi-
tive e￿ect of increasing output (through J(A)), and second an additional (positive) e￿ect that
115is shrinking with A. Both e￿ects contribute to increase G.
Case 2:  > 
@G
@A
8
> > > <
> > > :
< 0 if A < A
= 0 if A = A
> 0 if A > A
, where A =


 + 1   
P1   cP2   P3
(1 + T)
 +1 
+1
Z
1
+1   1.
In addition,
@2G
@A2 > 0 for any A. So G(A) is strictly convex and decreases in the interval
[0;A], reaches the minimum at A and increases in the interval [A;+1). Note that as G(A)
is decreasing in the interval [0;A], min[G(A)] = G(A = A) < G(A = 0).
G(A) is also above J(A) for any A, and converges asymptotically to J(A).
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Figure 4.5: G as a function of A when  > 
When  > , an increase in A is associated with two opposite e￿ects: an increase in the output
level through J(A), and a decrease in the positive additional e￿ects. The latter e￿ect dominates
for low levels of productivity, so that G decreases in A. The former e￿ect dominates for high
levels of productivity resulting in the increase of G.
1164.7 Appendix A.2: Proof of the Lemma
According to (4.12), investment is optimal if and only if G(A)  I.
Case 1:  < 
Since lim
A!1
G(A) = +1, and I is ￿nite, the continuity of G(A) guarantees that G(A)
must cross I at least once if min[G(A)] = G(A = 0) < I (Existence).
If G(A = 0) < I , then uniqueness is guaranteed since G(A) is strictly increasing in
A whereas I is constant in A. Hence there exists a unique productivity level A such that
investment is optimal whenever A > A.
On the other hand if min[G(A)] = G(A = 0) > I, then G(A) > I for any A, that is
whatever the value of A, the ruler will always ￿nd it optimal to invest.
Case 2:  > 
Since lim
A!1
G(A) = +1, and I is ￿nite, the continuity of G(A) guarantees that G(A)
must cross I at least once if min[G(A)] = G(A = A) < I (Existence).
 If min[G(A)] < G(A = 0) < I, then uniqueness is guaranteed since G(A) is
strictly increasing in the interval (A;+1) and I is constant in A. Hence there exists a
unique productivity level A such that investment is optimal whenever A > A.
 If min[G(A)] < I < G(A = 0), then G(A) crosses I twice in A
low and in A
high.
Hence investment is optimal for any A < A
low and for any A > A
high.
Note that it is obvious that A
low < A and A
high > A.
This case is presented for completeness of the proof. However, we will assume that I is
large enough so that there exists at most only one threshold.
On the other hand if G(A = 0) > min[G(A)] > I, then G(A) > I for any A, that is
whatever the value of A, the ruler will always ￿nd it optimal to invest. 
1174.8 Appendix A.3: Characterization of A
Applying the implicit function theorem using equation (4.15) yields:
@A
@Z
=  
1
+1 

Z
 
+1 (1 + A)
 
+1  [P1   P2   P3]

(1 + T)   
+1 Z
1
+1 (1 + A)
  1
+1 [P1   P2   P3]
The denominator is equal to
@G(A)
@A
and the sign of the numerator depends on the sign of
   .
Case 1:  > 
We established in Appendix A.1 that in this case,
@G
@A
> 0 for any A so that by continuity
the denominator is positive at A = A. Moreover, since the numerator is negative we have
@A
@Z
> 0. An increase in resource abundance increases the threshold, reducing the incentive to
invest.
Case 2:  > 
The numerator is positive while the denominator is negative if A < A and positive if A > A
(see Appendix A.1). As a result,
 If min[G(A)] < G(A = 0) < I, then
@A
@Z
< 0 since A > A
 If min[G(A)] < I < G(A = 0) (there are two thresholds A
low and A
high), then
@A
low
@Z
> 0 since A
low < A and
@A
high
@Z
< 0 since A
high > A.
This case is presented for completeness of the proof. However, we will assume that I is
large enough so that there exists at most only one threshold. 
4.9 Appendix A.4: Proof Corollary
1) Case 1:  < 
We have established that in this case P1 < 0, P2 > 0 and P3 > 0, i.e. G(A) < J(A) for all
A.
118Therefore for any A, G(A)   I < J(A)   I. De￿ne A = A
n the productivity level such that
J(A
n)   I = 0. By continuity, for A = A
n, G(A
n)   I < J(A
n)   I, i.e. G(A
n)   I < 0.
At A = A
n, it is not optimal for the ruler to undertake an investment. As a result A
n < A.
This case is depicted in Figure 4.6.
2) Case 2:  > 
We have established that in this case P1 > 0, P2 < 0 and P3 < 0. i.e. G(A) > J(A) for all
A.
It follows that for any A, G(A) I > J(A) I. By continuity, for A = A
n, G(A
n) I > 0.
That is investment is optimal for a lower productivity level A < A
n. This case is depicted by
Figure 4.6
We have now established that :
 A > A
n if  < , in other words A(strong ruler) > A
n
 A < A
n if  > , in other words A(strong people) < A
n
Moreover, A
n is independent of Z by assumption. In proposition 3 we showed that A(strong ruler)
increases in Z and A(strong people) decreases in Z. It follows that for any Z, we have:
A(strong people) < A
n < A(strong ruler).
119Part II
North￿South Sequential Innovation
Problem
120￿Sometime in prehistory, in the part of the world that is now the country of Peru, a raging
storm felled a giant tree that came to rest in a pool of stagnant water. It lay there for some
time, the water leaching the various constituents￿tannins, glycosides, sugars, and
alkaloids￿from the bark of the tree. Eventually, a native passed that way. He was extremely
ill, burning with fever that Hippocrates called intermittent, which during the Middle Ages was
known as the ague, and which we today call malaria. His fever had caused intense thirst, and
he drank copiously from the pond. Shortly thereafter a miracle occurred, and his fever vanished.
The disease that proved fatal to such well-known victims as Alexander the Great had undergone
remission.￿ (Varro E. Tyler)
121Chapter 5
Intellectual Property Rights and
Sequential Innovation: Literature
Overview1
5.1 Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
5.1.1 What are Intellectual Property Rights?
General Characteristics Intellectual property rights refer to the legal protection conferred
to individuals or ￿rms over their creation￿scienti￿c and technological invention with industrial
application, artistic creation, etc. They give the creator an exclusive right over the use of his
creation. Traditional physical property di￿ers greatly from intellectual property (IP) in that
it refers to excludable tangible goods over which its owner can claim permanent ownership.
Intellectual property, on the other hand, is amorphous and ubiquitous in nature and takes the
form of intangible goods or products of the mind, that are by essence non excludable so that
the owner cannot easily exclude others from its use as he deems ￿t. For this reason, to provide
individuals the incentive to engage in creative activities despite the di￿culty to appropriate
its bene￿ts, society has created a surrogate property right in informational goods analogous to
property rights in tangible goods.
Thus intellectual property rights grant the right holder a temporary exclusive right of use and
marketing over his creation. They can be opposed against third parties in case of violation.
Intellectual property laws specify the scope of protection, the exclusive rights granted, the
1Section 5.4.1 and section 5.4.2 of this chapter draw from Sarr, et al. (2008).
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author plus 70 years for copyrights￿and the enforcement mechanism. After expiration of the
right, the product falls into the public domain and can be used freely.
The principle of territoriality is a major characteristic of intellectual property rights. It re￿ects
the idea that an IPR is valid only within the geographical territory (nation or a community
of nations like the EU) conferring it. In this sense, there is no such thing as an international
intellectual property right. However, there has been a need for harmonisation of IP laws on
the international level because the protection granted in a speci￿c jurisdiction often requires
cross-border recognition to be e￿ective. (Cullet et al., 2006) This issue was ￿rst addressed in
the 19th century with the signature of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property in 1883 driven by the industrial lobby. Its purpose was to protect more e￿ectively
the nascent mechanical and chemical industries against intense industrial espionage and gross
imitation which were believed to undermine genuine e￿ort of innovation. Further development
involved the Berne Convention on copyright, subsequent revisions of the Paris Convention and
￿nally the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) under
the auspice of the World Trade Organization (WTO). (Cullet et al., 2006) Each of these steps
constituted a move toward the strengthening of intellectual property rights regimes.
There exist various forms of IPRs: patents, copyrights, trade secrets, trademarks, etc. We de-
scribe below some of them.
Di￿erent Forms of IPRs
Patents: Patents are a set of exclusive rights granted to inventors to make, use and sell useful
innovations for a ￿xed period of time in exchange for disclosure into the public domain. Patents
are the single most commonly used intellectual property rights in the bio-science industries,
and arguably provide the most robust protection against imitation and unauthorised use. Our
discussion on IPRs will focus mainly on patents, which we will characterise in detail later in
this chapter.
Copyrights: A copyright grants the author of an expressive work the exclusive rights to control
its reproduction and distribution for a limited period of time in exchange for disclosure into
the public domain. Copyright law protects ￿original work of authorship￿ regardless whether the
author registers his work at the Copyright O￿ce. (Besen and Raskind, 1991) The protection
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works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, etc.
Copyright ownership grants ￿ve exclusive rights: reproduction, adaptation, distribution, public
performance and public display (see Section 106 of the US Copyright Act). Reproduction is
arguably the most important right. It entitles the right holder to make copies of his own work
and authorise others to do so.
Trade secret: Trade secret law protects an inventor’s information against discovery by ￿improper
means￿ and confers the right to exclusive use if 1) the information is secret; 2) if secrecy gives
the information a commercial value; and 3) if the owner has made reasonable e￿ort to keep
the information secret. However, a trade secret is not protected against independent discovery
or reverse engineering. Unlike patents or copyright, a trade secret law provides a legal means
to prevent disclosure. However, patent protection is usually stronger than protection via trade
secret. (Rodriguez-Stevenson, 2000)
Trademark: A trademark consists of any word, name, device, or other symbol that identi￿es a
unique source of a product or service. (Blair and Cotter, 1998) It gives the owner the right to
exclude others from using the same or similar mark susceptible to misleading consumers.
5.1.2 Economic Rationale: Innovation and the Internalisation of Information
Externalities
The economic rationale for granting property rights to innovations was ￿rst formally explained
by Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962). Their argument proceeds as follows. Because innovation or
knowledge is a public good (non rival and non-excludable), it is likely to be under-supplied as
its social value exceeds its private value. A mechanism ensuring that positive externalities are
internalized is therefore necessary. The implementation of an intellectual property rights regime
is one such mechanism. By granting a temporary monopoly over the use and exploitation of an
innovation, intellectual property regimes give the innovator the incentive to invest by ensuring
that he captures part of the social value he has generated. Intellectual property rights, as a
second best instrument, therefore aim at maximising social welfare by balancing the static inef-
￿ciency of monopoly distorsion with the dynamic e￿ciency of spurring innovation. (Nordhaus
1969)
1245.1.3 Patent Design with Stand-Alone Innovations
Requirements for Patentability Stringent requirements need to be satis￿ed for an inven-
tion to be granted protection under the patent system: usefulness, non-obviousness, and novelty.
An invention must be useful in the sense that it is susceptible of industrial application. Non-
obviousness or inventive step refers to the requirement of a leap of imagination or inspiration
for conferral of a patent. Simple discovery is not enough, but there must be some individual
contribution shown as well in the sense that the improvement should not be trivial for an expert
in the ￿eld. Novelty refers to the requirement that there is no pre-existing use or prior art
incorporating the innovation, i.e. it must be genuinely ￿new￿. Prior art comprises everything
made available to the public by means of a written or oral disclosure, by use, or in any other
way before the priority or ￿ling date of the patent application (European Patent Convention,
Art. 52). What constitutes prior art is however di￿erent in US patent law. There, prior art is
de￿ned under 35 USC 1022 which states: ￿A person shall be entitled to a patent unless known
or used by others in this country, or was patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country￿. Unlike in Europe, prior knowledge or use in a di￿erent country does
not prevent a patent application in the United States. However, a prior patent or a printed
publication anywhere in the world will bar an applicant for patent in the United States.
In addition to these requirements, the patentee must disclose critical information about his
invention to allow others to use it at the expiration of the patent￿i.e. 20 years from the date
of ￿ling. This information includes the ￿claims￿ 3 and the ￿best mode￿ or preferred embodiment
of the invention. (35 USC 112; Blair and Cotter, 1998)
In most countries patents are granted according to the so-called the ’￿rst-to-￿le’ principle. In
contrast, the United States reward innovators based on the ’￿rst-to-invent’ rule. The latter
system is relatively less e￿cient than the former for two reasons. First, administrative costs
are signi￿cantly reduced under the ￿rst-to-￿le system since priority depends only on the date
stamped on an application (Menell and Scotchmer, 2005), and so generates few disputes unlike
the ￿rst-to-invest system (Macedo, 1990). Second, the ￿rst-to-invent rule may provide incentives
to delay information di￿usion as the inventor wants to e￿ectively extend the expiration date of
a patent. (Scotchmer and Green, 1990)
2Title 35, United States Code, Section 102
3A patent claim is a statement that describes the structure of an invention in precise and exact terms. It
marks the boundaries of the patent and allows courts to determine whether a patent has been infringed.
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tal tradeo￿ between static and dynamic e￿ciency in designing patent policy, i.e. innovation can
be spurred only at the expense of competition. The creation of a monopoly is deemed a lesser
evil to circumvent the free riding problem inherent to the informational nature of innovation.
His aim is to determine what should be the optimal length of a patent, i.e. the number of years
that the patent is valid. He shows that an optimal patent monopoly should be temporary or
￿nite. The idea is that to provide the inventor enough incentives he should be able to reap
all the social bene￿t of his creation, so that the patent should last inde￿nitely. On the other
hand because the patent induces deadweight loss to society, it will be e￿cient to reduce its life
to zero. Hence, a temporary monopoly is a means to balance these two con￿icting objectives.
Thus, the length of a patent is the policy lever that determines how much pro￿t will be earned
by an innovator.
Optimal Design: Patent Breadth or Scope While the de￿nition of patent length is clear
and unambiguous, the notion of patent breadth, or patent scope has been somewhat slippery in
the literature. The breadth of the patent measures the extent of the patent protection. A broad
patent is one that is di￿cult to ‘invent around’ without infringing it whereas a narrow patent
provides only little protection against imitation so that it is fairly easy to imitate it without
infringement. Given this loose description, the de￿nition of patent breadth in the literature
varies from one author to another. (Menell and Scotchmer, 2005; Takalo, 2001) For instance,
Klemperer (1990) introduces a notion of patent breadth that re￿ects the distance in the product
space between the patented product and the nearest non-infringing substitute. Gallini (1992)
however, de￿nes the breadth technologically, as an increase in imitation costs caused by patent
protection while in Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) the breadth points to the innovator’s pro￿t when
the patent is still e￿ective.
These various interpretations of the breadth of a patent result in very di￿erent conclusions as
to the design of an optimal patent policy. For example, Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) ￿nd that
the optimal patent should be long and narrow. That is, it should have an in￿nite length while
its scope should be just broad enough to cover R&D sunk costs. By contrast, Gallini (1992)
concludes that an optimal patent should be short and broad, in other words, one that minimises
both the deadweight loss and imitation costs. In her model, the innovator’s pro￿t does not
strictly increase with patent life since longer patents make unwarranted imitation more likely
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innovator can reap the return on her investment and broad in order to deter wasteful imitation.
Denicolo (1996) reconciles these contradictory ￿ndings by demonstrating that these di￿erent
conclusions stem from the divergent in￿uence of patent breadth on post-innovation pro￿ts and
social welfare. In particular, he shows that the optimal patent has in￿nite breadth and minimum
length, when both the incentive to innovate and the post-innovation social welfare are convex
functions of the patent breadth, the reverse being true if they are concave.
5.2 The Issue of Sequential Innovation
Earlier economic analysis has considered R&D innovations as a stand alone process, i.e. in-
novations were not based to any important extent on pre-existing research. However, in many
instances information is passed down through a chain of innovators as it is processed toward mar-
ketability. For example, it is not uncommon for some entities to be specialised in basic research
while others are focused on the development of products based upon the primary knowledge
supplied by the former. Thus, the end product results from the accumulation of information
across both stages of these types of R&D industries.
An important problem noted in the sequential research literature is that, when innovation is
sequential, early innovators in a non-integrated vertical industry may lack the incentive to invest
if they do not hold a distinct property right. (Scotchmer, 1996) This point is fundamental in the
literature and indicative of the presumption in favour of primary property rights in sequential
R&D.
This raises another important issue regarding the e￿ciency of the governance structure. If both
innovators are granted patents and continue to operate independently, then the double monopoly
distortion within the vertical industry may induce a welfare loss. When successive monopolies
operate in the same vertical industry, the impact is to impose successive margins within the
chain of production. This implies distortions to e￿cient resource allocation, even greater than
those emanating from a single monopoly. (Vernon and Graham, 1971) This distortion would
create incentives for closer coordination or integration.
1275.2.1 Compensating Information Production: Length and Novelty Require-
ment
The issue of compensating information production is considered within the R&D literature
under the novelty requirement. This requirement for innovations is usually analysed in terms of
the delineation of the lines between successive, independent innovations. Information di￿usion
is a crucial issue in cumulative research because it has an important impact on both research
costs and the rate of discovery. Scotchmer and Green (1990) discuss the trade-o￿ between the
protection of the innovators’ pro￿t and the bene￿ts from the disclosure of information. These
two goals are served by di￿erent sorts of patent requirements: length and breadth. Length is
usually discussed in regard to the novelty requirement for successive patenting, while breadth
is usually discussed in regard to the distinctiveness required to avoid patent infringement￿not
just to acquire one’s own patent.
The pro￿t from an innovation is greater if the patent has a longer life, and this depends on
the timing of its replacement by the next ￿vintage￿ of technology. Green and Scotchmer (1995)
show that when innovation is cumulative, the ￿rst innovator’s patent should be longer than it
is with a stand alone innovation. This is because when the social value of the second innovation
is a joint product of both innovations, the ￿rst innovator cannot appropriate all the social value
he generates. Hence, unless the patent life is long enough to ensure him a su￿cient pro￿t to
cover his sunk costs, he will underinvest in R&D.
O’Donoghue, et al. (1998) however warn that the statutory patent life often falls short of the
￿e￿ective patent life￿￿de￿ned as the expected time until a patented product is supplanted￿
when innovation is sequential (for survey evidence see Mans￿eld, 1986; Schankerman and Pakes,
1986; Lanjouw, 1998). They argue that the e￿ective patent life mostly depends on the breadth
of the patent as the scope determines the extent to which a given product loses its incumbency.
In this regard, a ￿nite and broad patent is a means to extend the e￿ective patent life and ensure
that e￿ective and statutory patent life coincide. They show that such policy increases the rate
of innovation by ensuring that only substantial improvements are noninfringing.
Consistent with this analysis, Scotchmer and Green (1990) argue that a strong novelty require-
ment may be an important instrument for the management of patent-based pro￿t, by protecting
the length of a monopoly against insigni￿cant advances. However, the disclosure of informa-
tion within the public domain is socially bene￿cial because it accelerates the rate of discovery
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elty requirement encourages inventors to patent every small technological advance. Information
becomes common and can be used to develop new products.
The case for a weak novelty requirement must be balanced against the fact that ￿rst innovators
may prefer secrecy over disclosure to protect their pro￿t as opposed to what happens with a
strong novelty requirement. Besides, it is argued (Eswaran and Gallini, 1996) that a strong
novelty requirement makes ￿rms concentrate on the most socially valuable projects. For these
reasons, it is usually assumed that less-frequent but more substantial steps of innovation are
important for patent policy. All of this points to the need for courts to de￿ne ￿novelty￿ in a
way that recognises substantial contributions to successive research.
5.2.2 Patent Breadth and the Division of Pro￿ts
One of the major issues addressed in the literature of cumulative research is the question of
how the division of the rents between the ￿rst generation innovator and any subsequent ones
is determined (Scotchmer, 1991; Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Chang, 1995; Scotchmer, 1996;
Gallini and Scotchmer, 2002).
Patent breadth￿interpreted as the minimum improvement required to avoid infringement of the
￿rst generation product￿is a key determinant of the division of the pro￿t. Green and Scotchmer
(1995) argue that when the value and the costs of a project are certain, patents should be broad
so that they instruct courts to protect the ￿rst innovator from any innovations that represent
minor or relatively inconsequential improvements.
Scotchmer (1996) investigates whether the second patent should be granted or denied when the
￿rst patent is infringed. Based on the assumption that the second generation product always
infringes the original patent (i.e. the patent is assumed to be very broad), the author analyses
how the division of pro￿ts is a￿ected by the patentability of the second product. She shows that
provided ex ante licensing is feasible, there are su￿cient incentives for the second innovator to
invest, as an ex ante agreement allows ￿rms to share pro￿ts in a way that avoids ex post holdup
problem. So, denying patentability to the second generation product is a means to transfer
pro￿t to the ￿rst innovator.
The critical assumption here is that there is no impediment to ex ante licensing and such an
agreement induces no signi￿cant transaction costs. Given this assumption, granting a patent
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incentives. The decision to place the patent in the hands of the ￿rst innovator stems from the
fact that without his investment, no second generation product can be developed.
The possibility of contracting as well as the transaction costs will determine the extent to which
￿rms will be involved in an agreement. If ex ante licensing is feasible, the breadth of the patent
will determine the extent of infringement and thereby the division of pro￿ts. (Green and Scotch-
mer, 1995) In principle, ex post licensing￿where the licence is signed after the second innovator
decides to sink costs and the new product infringes the ￿rst generation product￿can also be
used. However, ex post licensing may not emerge in equilibrium because the second innovator
may lack the incentive to invest e￿ciently when it bears the full research costs upfront while
having to agree to share his ex post revenue with the licensor. In fact ex post licensing along
with the breadth of the patent are usually seen to serve as the threat points for the bargaining
over an ex ante license.
The review of the I/O literature on successive R&D makes clear that the issues relating to
patent rights and claims in these industries are important to the determination of the pro￿ts
and its division. When individual entities interact in the creation of related information and
innovations, it is the willingness of states to recognise these contributions and of courts to enforce
these rights that determines the share that each innovator receives.
5.3 Dispute Resolution and Mechanisms: Role of Courts in Se-
quential R&D
Intellectual property rights as such are not very useful as an incentive mechanism if they are
not enforced in case of infringement. By enforcing these protected rights, courts determine both
the e￿ciency of the outcome and the distribution between the parties.
5.3.1 Dispute Resolution in Patent Cases
Once a patent holder has detected the violation of his right by a third party, he may agree
to settle the issue by signing a licensing contract in which the infringer will be granted the
right to pursue his activity against the payment of a fee￿in the form of a royalty for example.
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of these outcomes is achieved, the patentee will sue the other party for infringement to obtain
an injunction relief￿and may potentially claim damages. The defendant may in turn challenge
the validity of the existing patent, or may argue that he committed no infringement based on
the patent claims. (Binenbaum, et al., 2003) In Europe, the validity of a patent is challenged
via an opposition procedure in the European Patent O￿ce (EPO).4 No similar procedure exists
in the US. There, the reexamination of a case is restricted to issues relating to the prior art
that were not considered during the patent application in the US Patent and Trademark O￿ce
(USPTO). (Binenbaum et al., 2003)
It is estimated that with the strengthening of the IPR system since the early eighties, the
number of litigations has risen by 70 percent especially in the industries relying heavily on
intellectual property like life sciences, electronics and computers. (Kortum and Lerner, 1997;
Menell and Scotchmer, 2005). Lerner (1995) estimates that 6 in 100 patents are subject to
litigations in the biotechnology industry against an overall average litigation rate of 2 in 100
patents. (Allison et al., 2004) There is strong evidence that litigation costs are considerable and
increasing: according to Lerner (1995), patent litigation within the USPTO and federal courts
amounted to $1 billion in 1991￿a considerable amount if compared to the $3.7 billion spent on
basic research.
5.3.2 Remedies
As we already mentioned the two most common remedies used by courts in infringement cases
are injunctions and damages, referred to as property rules and liability rules by Calabresi and
Melamed (1972). An injunction rule is a property rule that confers the holder of an entitlement
the right to enjoin infringing use of his entitlement. On the other hand, a damage rule is a liabil-
ity rule that aims at discouraging infringement by ordering the o￿ender to pay compensation for
unauthorised use. (Schankerman and Scotchmer, 2001) In principle, damages can be awarded
for two reasons: for ￿unjust enrichment￿ and for ￿lost pro￿t/reasonable royalty￿. The former is
based on the idea that the infringer should be punished for his wrongdoing by imposing him to
restitute his ill-gotten pro￿t to the patentholder. This doctrine is no longer used in the United
States. The latter means that the patentholder should be awarded a compensation equivalent
4The ￿neem tree￿ case was a recent, and high-pro￿le case that opposed a coalition of activists (the challengers)
to the US based ￿rm W.R. Grace in 2005. (Bullard, 2005)
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The existence of two remedies raises the question of their relative e￿cacy in deterring infringe-
ment. Calabresi and Melamed (1972) and Posner (1972) argue that property rules should be
preferred as long as transaction costs are low. Low transaction costs enable the opposing par-
ties to bargain ￿ la Coase￿a decentralised mechanism￿which yields e￿cient resolution of dis-
putes. However, when transaction costs are high, the dispute may be mediated via a centralised
mechanism￿courts. With high transaction costs, liability rules (damages) are deemed superior
to property rules (injunctions) especially when courts can determine perfectly the actual level
of damages resulting from the con￿ict.
In relation to intellectual property rights, Merges (1994) contends that an injunction relief should
be preferred considering that 1) there are only two parties in con￿ict; 2) the transaction costs
between the parties is a priori low; and 3) the court is unlikely to set the adequate damage
level. The logic of his argument is that one should not overly rely on compulsory licensing 5 as
a typical remedy in intellectual property cases.
However, even if injunction rules were the main remedy in resolving disputes regarding intellec-
tual property rights, damage rules would be still keep their relevance. In e￿ect, the right holder
may not detect infringement immediately so that there is a need for damage payment. (Blair
and Cotter, 1998)
In fact, much of the discussion above assumes that the Coase Theorem applies￿namely through
the assumption of low transaction costs. But whenever the Coase theorem breaks down, the
superiority of the property rule comes into question. This is namely the case in the presence of
nuisance. (Pitchford and Snyder, 2003)
5.3.3 E￿cient Investment and the Role of the Courts
The role of courts in inducing e￿cient behaviour has been analysed by Pitchford and Snyder
(2003) in the context of nuisance. Their analysis, as they claim, is also applicable to sequential
R&D. Suppose a ￿rm A (￿rst mover) decides to set up activities that generate negative externali-
ties (noise, bad smell, pollution, etc.). Suppose now that long after A is established, another ￿rm
B (second mover) settles nearby despite the nuisance caused by A. Because of the nuisance, ￿rm
5The payment of damages amounts in fact to compulsory licensing since the infringer is allowed to pursue his
activity provided compensation is paid.
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from the neighbourhood. The main issue addressed by Pitchford and Snyder (2003) is whether
or not courts should apply the ￿coming to the nuisance￿ rule from an e￿ciency point of view. In
other words whether courts should favour the ￿rst mover as they have in some important legal
cases (e.g. Spur Industries case). The problem facing the two parties here cannot be readily
solved with Coasean bargaining. Indeed, when the ￿rst mover chose its investment in capacity
to produce the externality-generating good, it was unable to identify what ￿rm￿among a large
set of possible ￿rms￿would eventually establish in the neighbourhood in the future. As a result
of this ￿ex ante anonymity￿, the Coase theorem breaks down as A and B are unable to sign an
contract over A’s ex ante investment￿leading to contract incompleteness. Given the failure of
Coasean e￿ciency, the authors investigate whether the court’s decision about speci￿c property
rights and remedies (injunction rule, damage rule and exclusion rule) will induce, ex ante, a
unilateral socially optimal investment by the ￿rst mover A. Pitchford and Snyder show that the
use of di￿erent remedies yields very di￿erent outcomes. Only when the ￿rst mover holds the
right to decide the externality level under the damage rule, is the ex ante unilateral investment
socially optimal. Intuitively, because A is made to pay damages to B to have the right to pol-
lute, it is forced to internalise the cost that pollution￿and therefore its investment￿imposes
upon B. This result indicates that the liability rule (damages) is essential to achieve e￿ciency.
By choosing a particular remedy, the court also a￿ects distribution between the parties.
5.3.4 Distribution and the Role of the Courts
One of the major issues addressed in the literature of cumulative research￿as we have seen
earlier￿is the question of how courts determine the division of the rents between the ￿rst gener-
ation innovator and any subsequent ones (Scotchmer, 1991; Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Gallini
and Scotchmer, 2002). The patent policy concerning the breadth of the patent￿interpreted as
the minimum improvement required to avoid infringement of the ￿rst generation product￿is a
key determinant of the division of the pro￿t.
The willingness of courts to enforce a patent against incursions from products with minor mod-
i￿cations generates important incentives for contracting. With a broad patent the second inno-
vator is more likely to infringe the earlier technology, and is therefore more likely to sign an ex
ante licensing contract￿where the license is signed on before the second innovator decides to
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5.4 Application: North/South Relations in Sequential R&D
The life sciences industry (pharmaceutical ￿rms and biotechnology) has the speci￿city that it
relies on natural compounds￿also called genetic resources￿for R&D purposes. We suggest that
R&D in this industry is best viewed as an example of information-production, in which the ￿rst
stage generates pure or primary information and the second stage develops this into a marketable
and patentable product. (Swanson and Goeschl, 2000) This manner of interaction between the
primary and secondary stages of an R&D industry is a good ￿t with the cumulative research
framework developed within the Industrial Organization (I/O) literature, in which abstract basic
research is built upon by developers to generate concrete innovations. (Scotchmer, 1991; Green
and Scotchmer, 1995) In this section we ￿rst present some evidence on the contribution and the
value of natural compounds in R&D process, and then we set out the general implications of
this I/O literature for the management of R&D in this bio-technology sector.
5.4.1 Importance of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge in R&D
Role of Genetic Resources. Human society has relied upon the diversity of genetic re-
sources6 for millennia, as a source of solutions to problems that arise in the biological arena.
When a crop has failed, the surviving strains have signaled the presence of a solution con-
cept, and this has guided plant breeders toward varieties that are successful in the existing
environment (Evans, 1993). When a pest, pathogen or plague has passed through the human
population, the primary source of remedy has been the set of chemicals found within the natural
world, identi￿ed ￿rst by those living in nearest proximity to them (Anderson and May, 1991).
These solution concepts have been identi￿ed and di￿used, and have formed the foundation of
the life sciences as we know them. The World Health Organization (WHO, 2003) estimates that
80 percent of the population in developing nations rely on traditional medicine and that nearly
85% of traditional medicine involves the use of plant extracts (Farnsworth, 1988 p. 91 cited by
Biber-Klemm and Szymura Berglas, 2006 p. 8) According to ten Kate and Laird (1999) around
40 percent of the 25 best selling drugs in the world are derived from natural compounds. It is
6The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) de￿nes ’genetic resources’ or ’biological resources’ as any
material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin, containing functional units of heredity, which has an actual
or potential value. (Article 2.7)
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50 percent worldwide are based on plants. (Principe, 1989) For instance, the use of compounds
such as the Malgash rosy periwinkle, the Paci￿c yew, the Ethiopian soap berry, or the Indian
Neem tree extracts have led to the development of products as diverse as anti-cancer drugs and
pesticides.
Despite technological progress, the reliance of the pharmaceutical and agro-chemical sector on
biological diversity7 to develop new products including pharmaceuticals, seeds, and cosmetics
has sustained the search for genetic materials through bioprospecting. 8 In this thesis, we will
focus on bioprospecting for the purpose of drug development. Bioprospecting companies orig-
inate mostly from high income countries￿the North￿and have the technology and capability
to produce innovations based on the biological information isolated and extracted from plants.
These natural compounds are found to a large extent in ’biodiversity hot spots’ 9 mostly lo-
cated in low income countries￿the South. Thus, the bioprospectors’ reliance on the South’s
biodiversity requires the two parties to cooperate. However, for decades, bioprospectors tapped
into the common heritage doctrine to freely access genetic resources and associated traditional
knowledge without compensating their providers. This among other factors, provides the South
little incentive to invest in preserving diversity given the opportunity o￿ered by alternative land
use towards more pro￿table activities such as agriculture or the timber trade.
Role of Traditional Knowledge Traditional knowledge (TK) refers here to the accumulated
stock of human capital and knowledge over the centuries about the properties of medicinal plants.
Within the R&D process, it may be particularly useful in the screening process for potential
inputs. It may help increase the rate of discovery while decreasing substantially the research
costs required to make it. (Balick, 1990; Sheldon and Balick, 1995). For example, in a study
testing the incremental impact of traditional human capital on success rates in bioprospecting,
Balick (1990) reports the results of screening for activity against the human immunode￿ciency
virus (HIV) where 25 percent of collections pre-screened by indigenous plant experts indicated
activity as opposed to 6 percent in the random sample. Similar results were obtained in related
7Biodiversity is de￿ned as the variability among living organisms (CBD, Article 2(1))
8Bioprospecting can be de￿ned as the exploration of biodiversity for commercially valuable genetic and bio-
chemical resources. (Reid et al., 1996 p. 142)
9￿70 percent of the world’s biodiversity is found in 12 ’mega-diverse’ countries￿Columbia, Ecuador, Peru,
Brazil, Zaire, Madagascar, China, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia and Mexico.￿ (Biber-Klemm and Szy-
mura Berglas, 2006 p. 6)
135studies (Cox, 1990; King, 1992). These studies underline the signi￿cant human capital base
accumulated at the primary R&D level and its contribution to the innovation process. (Evenson
and Gollin, 1998)
5.4.2 Bioprospecting & the Values of Biodiversity for R&D
The importance of genetic resource for R&D has often been presented as a rationale for conser-
vation in the face of an ever-dwindling supply of diversity mainly in the tropical regions of the
world where most of the biodiversity stock remains. Starting with Old￿eld (1989), the preser-
vation of biological diversity has repeatedly been cast as a problem of supplying the broadest
portfolio of biological options. In this sense, the value of genetic resources derives primarily from
the diversity of genetic or chemical information they represent. (Weitzman, 1998) This value is
then captured via a search process over information (Simpson, Sedjo and Reid, 1996￿SSR).
In an in￿uential contribution, SSR ground the value of biodiversity in the activity of bioprospect-
ing in an R&D intensive industry. They aim to quantify the marginal willingness to pay for
an additional sample by reference to the potential value of adding another member to the set
of genetic resources available for screening. Their approach is focused on the private objective
of ￿rms seeking patents through random searches in natural habitats assuming each sample
searched has an independent likelihood of providing the solution. The value of a marginal ge-
netic resource within such a habitat refers to its contribution to the anticipated royalties from
licensed sales after a successful search. Against this value is balanced the cost of undertaking
another search and the prospect that earlier searches have already resolved the problem. The
primary point of SSR is that, given a speci￿ed number of targets, the value of the marginal
genetic resource must be declining on account of the decreasing likelihood that the solution has
not previously been located and the increasing costliness of another search for the same (valued)
target.
SSR (1996) ￿nd that the maximum willingness to pay for bio-diverse lands in Western Ecuador,
one of the ’biodiversity hot spots’, does not exceed US$21 per hectare or $9,500 per marginal
species. This implies that most areas with even extraordinary biodiversity do not justify signif-
icant payments from the pharmaceutical industry for their preservation. This result contrasts
with the more optimistic estimates reported in the early valuation literature. For instance,
Farnsworth and Soejarto (1985) ￿nd that the foregone drugs revenue of extinction of ￿owering
136plants exceeds $1.5 million per species and Principe (1989) estimates that plant extinction will
result in $300,000 lost drugs revenue (see Artuso, 1997 p. 5￿7). These overestimations are
mostly due to the fact that these authors in fact estimate the average value of a species and
fail to factor in redundant species. The conclusion of SSR (1996) is that there is little reason
to expect that the industrial use of genetic resources will result in signi￿cant payments for the
conservation of marginal resources by private investors.
This analysis has been criticised on several grounds. First, using a privately motivated screening
process as an approximation of the social values of genetic resources may be problematic. (see
Craft and Simpson, 2001)
Second, the assumption of equal but independent likelihoods of success in sampling processes
may be both important and unlikely. Rausser and Small (2000) challenge SSR’s (1996) conclu-
sion of a low marginal value of bioprospecting. Based on the assumption that the probability
of a success di￿ers across leads, they argue that a prior knowledge about these probabilities
may help organise the search in an e￿cient manner. Their numerical simulations akin to SSR
(1996) suggest that an organised search yields a marginal value of $9177 per hectare in Western
Ecuador￿as opposed to $21 per hectare found by SSR (1996). Costello and Ward (2006), how-
ever, question the validity of the comparison made by Rausser and Small (2000). They show that
only 4% of the di￿erence between the two estimates can be explained by a more e￿cient search
as opposed to a random search. Most of the discrepancy is due to di￿erent parameter choices
about the number of species included in the search and ecological model parameters. These
results suggest that, the quality of information available to the bioprospector￿for example in-
digenous knowledge about what species are likely prospects￿may be a more important factor
in raising the marginal value of bioprospecting than the e￿cient organisation of the search.
Third, the casting of the problem as the search for the solutions to a pre-determined number
of problems is a highly simpli￿ed approach to technological innovation in the life sciences (see
Goeschl and Swanson, 2002a). It is known that pests and pathogens will continue to erode
the solutions that humans put into place in the life sciences (May and Dobson, 1986), but the
precise nature of the future problems that will be generated or the sequence in which they will
arrive is completely unknown. In both areas, it is very likely that searches that are unsuccessful
for one purpose (or problem) might be right on point for a future one. It is also the case that
any given solution will drive the likelihood of future types of problems down certain pathways
137where entirely new samples are generated and new problems created.
Fourth, Kassar and Lasserre (2004) argue that if irreversibility and uncertainty are taken into
account, redundancy among species will not be an obstacle to conservation as claimed by SSR
(1996) but will in fact provide an additional rationale for the conservation of biodiversity. Indeed
if the relative value of species used in addressing biological problems evolves across time in an
unpredictable fashion, the valuable species today may prove to be ’useless’ in the future and vice-
versa. As a result even with perfect substitutability of the species, there is reason for preserving
genetic diversity as an insurance against the evolution of the value of information over time.
This approach makes clear that the important issues concerning genetic resource conservation
values are the dynamic ones. The assumptions about how future paths evolve determine what
is valuable, and how these values change in the future.
5.4.3 North/South Aspects of R&D Governance
The industrial organisation literature has analysed the cumulative nature of innovation and its
implications for the design of intellectual property rights policy. Emphasis there is placed on
giving ￿rst-stage innovators adequate incentives to invest and innovate, because no inventions
or discovery would be possible without their contribution. It is therefore argued that ￿rst
innovators should be protected via patents while the second innovator can be even denied patent
protection if licensing can be relied upon. (Green and Scotchmer, 1995) It is striking that, in
practice in the biological sector, the opposite result has occurred. Only the secondary stage
of the research process is granted property rights protection in this sector while the primary
traditional stage is left unrewarded despite its crucial contribution to innovation. This raises
two problems, one of e￿ciency, and one of equity.
First, failure to protect genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge may result in
biodiversity loss￿as is currently the case￿and underinvestment in these indispensable infor-
mation ￿ows derived from genetic diversity.10 Secondly, in this particular area of R&D, there
is a North-South (or distributional) aspect to the I/O problem as well as an e￿ciency aspect.
This is because we can assume here that the R&D ￿rm will nearly always come from the stylised
North￿where the North has a unique technological capability as well as access to important
markets. In contrast, the stylised South can be assumed to be uniquely endowed with rich
10This particular issue is analysed in chapter 6
138stocks of genetic resources and accumulated traditional knowledge without access to technolog-
ical capability to develop patentable products. Because the patent system exclusively rewards
the North for its innovation, despite the South’s undeniable contribution, concern about a fair
division of bene￿ts has led some observers to make the case for protecting genetic resource
owners and/or traditional knowledge owners with intellectual property rights.
However, compensating the South’s information production via North-style intellectual property
rights￿namely via patents￿is a challenging endeavour. The stringent requirements to ensure
the patentability of informational goods may be di￿cult to satisfy. Non-obviousness is the
primary hurdle to the recognition of IPR in genetic resources, as naturally-occurring entities are
usually termed to be discoveries rather than innovations. And novelty is the primary hurdle to
the recognition of IPR in traditional knowledge, as many if not all traditional uses of genetic
resources may be shown to have existed at some other place or point in time. Hence, irrespective
of the usefulness of the genetic resource or the traditional knowledge in the production of
innovation, at present there is little prospect for the recognition of IPR in these stages of the
sequential research process.
5.4.4 Vertical 2-Stage Structure of R&D Industry
We model the R&D industry in the biological sector as a non-integrated vertical industry of two
stages. In the primary stage, a ￿ow of information￿originating within the natural environment
and requiring a diverse stock of natural capital, namely land￿is captured by virtue of investment
in traditional human capital￿traditional knowledge￿in settings where human populations in-
teract with the natural environment through observation and selection. The combination of the
two factors results in a primary sector output of pure information. In the next stage of this
vertical industry, the secondary stage biological R&D process collects these informational ￿ows
from the primary R&D stage, and invests in physical and human capital￿laboratory equipment
and scientists￿in order to produce innovations, i.e. new products designed to meet consumers’
wants and needs. The ￿gure below depicts such a vertical industry.
139Figure 5.1: R&D stages in the biological sector (adapted from Goeschl and Swanson, 2002b).
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147Chapter 6
North￿South Hold-up Problem in
Sequential R&D1
6.1 Introduction
In 1995, a coalition of NGOs challenged the patent awarded by the US Patent O￿ce to the
agro-chemical company, W.R. Grace & Co for its method of stabilising azadirachtin 2 in solution
and the stabilised solution itself. The challengers invoked the lack of novelty of the invention
on the basis that it was simply an extension of the traditional processes used for millennia for
making neem-based products in India. (Shiva, 1996) However, the US Patent O￿ce held that
the patent was valid under US legislation. Another patent held by W.R. Grace for a method
for controlling fungi on plants also derived from the neem tree was later challenged by a legal
opposition, this time in the European Patent O￿ce (EPO). The EPO eventually revoked that
patent on the fungicidal product due to its lack of novelty and ￿inventive step￿. (Bullard, 2005)
These two cases are illustrative of the inability of the North￿which is reliant on biodiversity
located in the South￿and the South to ￿nd a common ground to address the issue of owner-
ship of informational goods such as genetic resources. Yet, the coordination of each region’s
legal system to enforce rights in information-based genetic resources can potentially generate
e￿cient investment in R&D for health services. The lack of coordination results from a deeply
asymmetric situation where North￿technology rich and biodiversity poor￿and South￿gene
rich but technology poor￿assign property rights over informational goods according to their
respective comparative advantage. The North promotes an intellectual property system that
1This chapter is a joint work with Tim Swanson of University College London
2Azadirachtin is the active chemical compound contained in the neem tree found in India
148protects technology-based knowledge and invention at the expense of the discovery of naturally
occurring products. In contrast, the South promotes an intellectual property system that pro-
tects and rewards the discovery of useful information contained in natural products through a
process of observation, experimentation, and environmental stewardship.
The di￿culty in reconciling these two systems results in little or no recognition by the North
of the South’s property rights in genetic information. This situation creates an inherent uncer-
tainty about the enforcement of these rights in the North. In particular, given the sequential
nature of R&D in the life sciences industry (agriculture and pharmaceuticals), this absence of
coordination may result in underinvestment as predicted by Green and Scotchmer (1995) if the
￿rst innovator￿here the South￿is inadequately compensated for the information supplied to
the second innovator. What are the consequences of the uncertainty about the protection of
property rights upon investment in preserving genetic diversity, access to genetic resources and
drug R&D? What is the role of legal institutions in shaping the incentive to invest? Can an ex
post remedy yield e￿ciency given ex ante uncertainty of enforcing the South’s property rights?
Following Swanson and Goeschl (2000), we suppose that North-South bilateral relationship takes
place within a non-integrated vertical industry where the South provides necessary intermedi-
ate goods (genetic resources) to the North which subsequently use them as inputs to develop
patentable pharmaceuticals. We develop a model of North-South bargaining in a sequential R&D
framework to analyse how the problem of rent appropriation impacts the South’s investment in
preserving genetic diversity and the ￿ow of information generated within this vertical industry.
We shed light on the mechanism by which underinvestment in maintaining genetic diversity and
ine￿cient ￿ow of information in bioprospecting occurs. We show that even with the creation
of a property right protecting genetic resources, uncertainty ex ante about the enforceability
of the assigned right across jurisdictions may lead to a hold-up problem￿underinvestment in
environmental stewardship. As we will see, the bargaining process is subject to renegotiation
once uncertainty is resolved by courts’ ruling. This renegotiation is likely to dissipate investment
returns and prevents the investor from appropriating the full marginal bene￿t of his investment
while bearing all the costs. We also highlight the role that legal institutions play in shaping the
incentive to invest. Under some speci￿c conditions and legal remedies, we show that ex post the
enforcement of property rights across jurisdictions helps circumvent the hold up problem and
encourages socially optimal investments. But these conditions are not general.
149Section 6.2 presents stylised facts about the North-South bilateral relationship in the framework
of sequential investment. We then layout the model and discuss the results in Section 6.3.
Section 6.4 concludes the chapter.
6.2 North￿South relationship in Sequential R&D: Stylised facts
Agents. North (N ) and South (S ) refer to two distinct regions comprised of: (i) distinct
consumer groups CGN and CGS; (ii) distinct ￿rms FN and FS; and (iii) distinct legal institu-
tions or courts CtN and CtS. The two regions could realise joint bene￿ts by cooperating in the
production of R&D for health services, but must coordinate their individual legal systems to
generate these incentives toward cooperation. There are four crucial dimensions within which
North and South interact.
Separate R&D Contributions. Firms from the North and the South, FN and FS, can
cooperate for mutual bene￿t through coordination in the supply of inputs within a process
of sequential R&D. If they cooperate successfully, then a higher quality of health services is
available to consumers. The South is gene rich and technology poor. The ￿rms in the South FS
are specialised in the provision of genetic material g and the maintenance of genetic diversity
through investment in land use L. The North is technology rich and biodiversity poor. The
￿rms in the North FN use information contained in the genetic resources g and combine them
with technology in the North to search for new leads and develop new drugs d.
Separate Markets. North and South have distinct consumer groups CGN and CGS, and
therefore separate markets for medicinal products. Consumers in the South CGS have low
income and a low willingness to pay for medicines. By contrast, consumers in the North CGN
have high income and are willing to pay high prices for drugs developed by the pharmaceutical
industry.
Separate Property Rights Systems. In each region, there exists a property rights system
that attempts to generate incentives for innovation by ensuring appropriation of the returns on
investments in that region. Property rights in Land L and genetic resources g are conferred
to FS in the South. Likewise, the drug d developed by FN in the North has a property right
150declared in it. Property rights conferred by a given region exist automatically only within that
region’s boundaries, and must be adopted and implemented by the other region to be given
e￿ect there.
Separate Court Systems. Court systems exist in each region for enforcement of property
rights. There is ex ante uncertainty about whether any right conferred in a given jurisdiction￿
say the right in the genetic resources￿will be recognised and enforced by courts in the other
region. It is possible for courts to either recognise the property rights declared in the other
region and thus enforce them domestically, or to not recognise them at all. Both the Northern
and Southern courts, CtN and CtS, recognise FS’s property right in land L. The property right
in g is recognised in the South by CtS, i.e. the jurisdiction in which it has been conferred.
Similarly, the property right in d is recognised by CtN.
Table 6.1: Stylised Facts on North/South Interactions with Land Use Investment
South North
Vertical Industry  FS: Upstream  FN: Downstream
Separate R&D Contribu-
tions
 Biodiversity Rich (Land L and
Genetic Resources g)
 Technology Poor: no d
 Biodiversity Poor: no L and g
 Technology Rich: produces
drugs d
Separate Markets  Low income: CGS have low
willingness to pay
 Medicinal plants
 FS serves only CGS
 High income: CGN have high
willingness to pay
 Pharmaceuticals
 FN serves only CGN
Separate Property Rights
Systems
 FS has property rights in L and
g
 FN has a property right in d
Separate Courts Systems  CtS enforces rights in g  CtN enforces right in d. Ex ante
enforcement of right in g with
probability 
Both courts CtS and CtN recognise FS’s property right in land L
6.3 Sequential R&D and the Hold-up Problem
6.3.1 Background
Consider two risk-neutral agents FN (he) representative of the ￿rms from the North and FS
(she) representative of the ￿rms from the South. FS owns some genetic material g useful in
151producing medicines that treat conditions both in the North and the South. FN produces drugs
d using g an input.
Governments in these two regions aim at advancing social welfare by maximising both producers’
and consumers’ surplus. The challenge faced by each government domestically, is to create the
proper incentive for ￿rms FN and FS to invest in R&D for health services: investment in land
use L for the conservation of genetic diversity by FS, which allows the collection of natural
compounds g necessary to produce herbal medicines; and investment in pharmaceutical drug
development by FN. This challenge is addressed in each region by conferral of property rights.
The South grants FS exclusive rights in genetic resources g and L, while the North grants FN
exclusive rights in drug d. These statutory rights are enforced within each region by domestic
courts CtN and CtS.
We assume that there is no coordination between the two regions to harmonise their separate
property rights systems. As a result, there is no ex ante enforceability of the property rights
across jurisdictions. In the absence of ex ante enforceability, there is an inherent uncertainty
about the state of the world. This uncertainty is captured by the probability  2 [0;1] repre-
senting the ex ante common belief that the right will be enforced.
This chapter will focus on FS’s incentives to invest in L and to trade the genetic resources g
needed by FN as inputs for drug development. For this reason, we focus on the producers’
surplus as a social welfare criterion.
We now model North/South interaction as a bargaining game to investigate the implications of
the lack of coordination of the property rights systems on North/South cooperation to invest in
R&D in the life sciences sector. In particular, we will examine how the incentive to maintain
biodiversity and exchange genetic resources in the South, and the incentive to develop new drugs
based on natural inputs in the North, are a￿ected.
6.3.2 Bargaining process
FN wishes to sign an agreement with FS to be granted access to g in return for a transfer
payment T, in order to search for new leads. If an agreement is reached, FS will earn U =
u(g;L) + T   c(g)   c(L) and FN will receive V = v(g;d)   T   c(d), where the bene￿ts u and
v are strictly increasing and concave in their arguments and their cross derivatives are positive;
152c(g) is the cost of supply of g and c(L) is the investment cost in land use L incurred by FS; c(d)
is the cost of drug development to FN. All cost functions are increasing and convex in their
arguments. We also assume that investment in L is observable by FS and FN but not veri￿able
by a third party￿the court in the North CtN￿so that L cannot be contracted. For example,
we may think that investment in time and resources for environmental stewardship cannot be
observed by CtN.
If FS rejects the o￿er and denies FN access to the genetic resources, FN may nevertheless be
tempted to invest in drug development, using g without FS’s consent. This temptation exists
because of the absence of ex ante enforceability. If FN decides to invest in d then FS will ￿le
a legal case for infringement of her right in the Northern court. Once the court’s ruling has
resolved the uncertainty, the two parties are free to renegotiate if there are gains from trade.
Given the absence of ex ante enforceability, renegotiation is likely to cause the classical hold-up
problem much talked about in the literature. (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1979; and Gross-
man and Hart, 1986)
The sequence of decisions and payo￿s is described as follows:
( , ) ( ) ( )
a U u g L c g c L    
0
a V  
No Investment 
[  : Infringement 
( , ) ( ) ( )
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( , ) ( ) ( ) U u g L c g c L T     
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Figure 6.1: Decision Tree: North/South Hold-up Problem
153At time t0: FS decides whether or not to invest in conservation L to maintain a ￿ow of genetic
resources g.
At time t1: FN makes an o￿er to FS to be granted access to the genetic resources g against a
transfer payment. If the contract is accepted then we consider it will be enforced.
At time t2: If FS rejects the o￿er and denies FN access to g, then FN must decide whether to
use g without FS’s consent and develop a drug.
At time t3: If FN opts for drug development d then FS ￿les a case in the Northern court CtN.
At time t4: CtN makes a ruling.
At time t5: FN and FS are free to renegotiate ex post after the court’s ruling.
6.3.3 Benchmark outcomes
E￿cient Outcome Assume that the governments in both regions decide to coordinate their
legal systems by mutually recognising the property rights granted in both regions. Then there
is no more uncertainty about ex ante enforceability of the rights across borders. Under this
backdrop, if the two ￿rms FN and FS agree to cooperate, then they will choose g, d and L to
maximise the joint surplus:
max
g;d;L
U + V = max
g;d;L
u(g;L) + v(g;d)   c(g)   c(L)   c(d)
Note that when an agreement is signed we assume that the sequence of actions is as follows: FS
￿rst chooses L, and given L it also chooses g. Then observing these choices, FN will choose d.
Solving backward, FN invests optimally in development d = d(g) given the provision of genetic
material g:
@v
@d
(g;d(g)) = c0(d(g)) (6.1)
Then FS chooses the level of genetic resources g = g(L):
@u
@g
(g(L);L) +
@v
@g
(g(L);d(g(L))) = c0(g(L)) (6.2)
154Finally, the choice of investment in land use L is determined by:
@u
@L
(g;L) = c0(L) (6.3)
where g = g(L) and d = d(g). Thus, when property rights are universally recognised and
enforced, bargaining yields an e￿cient outcome from the industry perspective. This solution
sets the benchmark against which all comparisons will be made.
Autarky The autarky situation can be seen as the situation where FN and FS fail to reach an
agreement and FS can credibly commit to deny FN access to her resources or possibly prevent
unauthorised use (or biopiracy). The payo￿ functions in autarky are given by:
Ua = u(g;L)   c(g)   c(L)
V a = 0
The ￿rst expression indicates that FS bene￿ts from the medicine derived from the genetic
resources g to address diseases occurring in the South. The second expression represents FN’s
payo￿ when he is denied access to g and cannot develop a new patentable drug based on g. FS
will unilaterally choose the level of genetic resources ga and land use La to maximise her payo￿,
i.e.
@u
@g
(ga;La) = c0(ga) (6.4)
@u
@L
(ga;La) = c0(La) (6.5)
Comparing (6.4) and (6.5) to the optimal outcomes in (6.2) and (6.3), shows that autarky is
sub-optimal: ga < g and La < L. Equation (6.4) indicates that FS fails to internalise the
e￿ect g on FN. In addition, investment in L is smaller in autarky.3
We now wish to investigate how the uncertainty about the recognition of the right by courts
in the North a￿ects on the one hand, the incentive to invest in genetic diversity L and supply
3For any L,

@u
@L
(g
;L) >
@u
@L
(g
a;L)

as the cross derivative of u is positive by assumption. Then for L = L
a,

@u
@L
(g
;L
a) >
@u
@L
(g
a;L
a) = c
0(L
a)

. As the marginal cost is increasing in L and
@u
@L
(g
;L) is decreasing in
L then the equality between marginal cost and marginal bene￿t is re-established if and only if L increases.
Therefore, it must be the case that L
 > L
a.
155genetic resources g, and on the other hand, the incentive to develop drugs d derived from these
genetic resources.
6.3.4 Bargaining over genetic resources under uncertain ex ante enforceabil-
ity
At time t1, FN and FS bargain over the access to the genetic resources g according to the Nash
bargaining solution. The share of the surplus that FS will extract depends on her bargaining
position, which in turn depends FS’s outside option, i.e. her payo￿ if bargaining breaks down
permanently. Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) and Binmore, Shaked and Sutton
(1989) have shown that an outside option a￿ects the equilibrium outcome in Nash bargaining,
only if at least one of the parties prefers this outcome to an agreement in the absence of the
outside option. This is the outside option principle. They also clearly distinguish an outside
option from a threat point which is the status quo value that the two parties earn while they are
in disagreement but still bargaining. The threat point of the negotiation here is therefore given
by the autarky payo￿s (Ua;V a = 0). FN and FS solve the following bargaining problem:
max
U;V
(U   Ua)
 (V   V a)
1  s.t. U  Uos (6.6)
where Uos is FS’s outside option payo￿;  and 1    are FS’s and FN’s bargaining power.
The presence of the outside option a￿ects the equilibrium outcome only if FS prefers Uos to an
agreed payo￿ U characterising the equilibrium in the absence of the outside option. Any o￿er
below Uos will be rejected. Similarly, an o￿er exceeding Uos will be a waste for FN since FS
would accept the contract for less. In the equilibrium (subgame perfect equilibrium), FN will
o￿er at t1 a contract that provides FS no more than her outside option, U = Uos. Our task now
is to determine FS’s outside option depending on the ruling made by the court. If the court
holds that there is an infringement in FS’s right, the chosen remedy is either an injunction rule
or a damage rule. In contrast, if the court rules that there is no infringement then an open
access regime is legitimised. The corresponding payo￿s are formalised as Uos = fEU1;EU2g
where EU1 and EU2 are FS’s expected payo￿s when bargaining takes place respectively, under
the shadow of the injunction rule and the damage rule. The court’s decision has clearly a key
role in determining the distribution of the surplus.
1566.3.4.1 Outside Option 1: Bargaining under the shadow of injunction.
Choice of g and d before the court’s ruling. With probability , the court chooses to
enforce FS’s right. Under the injunction rule, FNis not allowed to produce and market a drug
derived from g. In the eventuality of infringement, court-induced payo￿s are 	I
S = u(g;L)  
c(g)   c(L) for FS and 	I
N =  c(d) for FN. With probability 1   ; there is no infringement,
which implies that FN bene￿ts from the open access to g and does not require FS’s prior consent.
The payo￿s are then 	OA
S = u(g;L)   c(g)   c(L) and 	OA
N = v(g;d)   c(d).
FS and FN choose the genetic resource level g and investment in d before the court in the North
makes its decision. Investment L is predetermined at the time these choices are made. The
expected payo￿s derived from the court’s ruling are:
U1 = u(g;L)   c(g)   c(L)
V 1 = (1   )v(g;d)   c(d)
We ￿rst determine the level of genetic resources g and drug development d chosen by FS and
FN. Given investment L, FS and FN will choose ^ g1 = g(L) and ^ d1 = d(^ g1) such that:
@u
@g
(^ g1;L) = c0(^ g1) (6.7)
(1   )
@v
@d
(^ g1; ^ d1) = c0( ^ d1) (6.8)
Comparing (6.2) with (6.7) suggests that ^ g1 is sub-optimal. The supply of g is ine￿cient, ^ g1 < g
because like in the autarky regime, FS fails to internalise the bene￿t from g that accrues to FN.
Investment in drug development is also sub-optimal, ^ d1 < d as FN discounts the uncertainty
about the court’s ruling. FN would like to choose an optimal level of d to fully take advantage
of the open access regime (free riding regime) but he refrains from such investment because ex
post the enforcement of the right would prevent him from marketing a drug derived from g.
157Finally, the low level of g also a￿ects investment in d.
Court enforces the right. Once these choices are made, the court’s ruling will resolve the
uncertainty about the enforceability of the right. If the court enforces the right, i.e.  = 1, and
enjoins FN to stop its activity, the two parties are free to renegotiate over g. FN now requires a
license from FS to use the genetic resources. Moreover, the ine￿ciency of ^ g1 makes renegotiation
mutually bene￿cial. The threat point or status quo of this renegotiation is determined by the
court-induced payo￿s de￿ned above. The threat point therefore shifts from the autarky position
to the point

 c( ^ d1);u(^ g1;L)   c(^ g1)   c(L)

where FN’s bargaining position is weakened as
his payo￿ decreases while FS’s payo￿ remains unchanged. The Nash bargaining outcome results
in the following division of the bene￿ts:
UI = u(^ g1;L)   c(^ g1)   c(L) + 
h
u(g;L) + v(g; ^ d1)   c(g)   u(^ g1;L) + c(^ g1)
i
V I =  c( ^ d1) + (1   )
h
u(g;L) + v(g; ^ d1)   c(g)   u(^ g1;L) + c(^ g1)
i
No enforcement of the right. If the Northern court does not enforce the property right
granted in the South, i.e.  = 0, FS cannot prevent FN from getting access to her genetic
resources and derive a new marketable drug from them. This situation is akin to an open
access regime. No license is required from FN so that he can use g as a free good without
compensating FS. Despite the ine￿ciency of ^ g1, renegotiation over g will not take place. In-
deed, with the certainty that FS is denied her right over g in the North, nothing prevents FN
from reneging on contractual obligations. The division of pro￿ts in the open access regime is:
UOA = 	OA
S (^ g1;L) = u(^ g1;L)   c(^ g1)   c(L) and V OA = 	OA
N (^ g1; ^ d1) = v(^ g1; ^ d1)   c( ^ d1).
Given these payo￿s, FN decides to engage in drug development if and only if EV1 = V I +(1 
)V OA  V a, that is:
(1   )
h
u(g;L) + v(g; ^ d1)   c(g)   u(^ g1;L) + c(^ g1)
i
+ (1   )v(^ g1; ^ d1)  c( ^ d1) (6.9)
When this condition is not satis￿ed (generally when  and  are large enough, e.g. if  = 1 and
 = 1) the autarky regime will ensue.
158FS’s investment decision. Foreseeing these outcomes, at time t0, FS unilaterally chooses
the level of L that maximises his expected payo￿ EU1 = UI + (1   )UOA:
EU1 = u(^ g1;L)   c(^ g1)   c(L) + 
h
u(g(L);L) + v(g(L); ^ d1)   c(g(L))   u(^ g1;L) + c(^ g1)
i
(6.10)
The ￿rst order condition with respect to L yields:

@u
@L
(g(^ L1); ^ L1) + (1   )
@u
@L
(^ g(^ L1); ^ L1) = c0(^ L1) (6.11)
Full e￿ciency of L requires FS to appropriate the marginal social bene￿t generated by the in-
vestment. Equation (6.11) indicates that FS’s marginal private bene￿t di￿ers from the marginal
social bene￿t as characterised in (6.3) so the investment level ^ L1 is not e￿cient (^ L1 < L). This
implies that g(^ L1) is not socially optimal either, even though the genetic resources g are sup-
plied e￿ciently given L. The ￿rst term on the LHS in equation (6.11) indicates the expected
share of the marginal social bene￿t from investment captured by FS through renegotiation.
The second term suggests that FS also weighs the e￿ect of his investment on the noncooper-
ative outcome although this outcome does not actually arise in the renegotiation equilibrium.
(Grossman and Hart 1986) In other words, FS cares about how her investment in L a￿ects the
court-induced status quo 	I
S(^ g1;L) in addition to the social bene￿t derived from the cooperative
outcome. Unlike the e￿cient outcome in (6.3), FS’s choice now depends on the the status quo
before renegotiation, the distribution of bargaining power and the probability of infringement.
FS faces a typical hold up problem: she underinvests because she is unable to appropriate en-
tirely the fruits of her investment while bearing the whole cost. Only when  = 1 and  = 1
can L be socially optimal. However, with these parameter values, condition (6.9) does not hold.
Thus, investment in maintaining genetic diversity is sub-optimal ( ^ L1 < L) when the two ￿rms
bargain under the shadow of injunction. The lower FS’s bargaining power, the more bene￿t is
captured by FN, and the lower the investment in conservation. In addition, the more unlikely FS
thinks the court will enforce her right, i.e. the smaller , the less investment will be undertaken.
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When the court in the North rules under the shadow of an injunction:
1) If (6.9) holds, FS faces a hold-up problem so that investment in L is sub-optimal ^ L1 < L.
Moreover, FN will free ride but will underinvest due to the uncertainty  about the enforceability
of FS’s property right in the North: ^ d1 < d.
2) If (6.9) does not hold, the autarky regime prevails as free riding is deterred. We then have:
^ L1 = La, ^ g1 = ga, and ^ d1 = 0.
6.3.4.2 Outside option 2: Bargaining under the shadow of the damage rule
Choice of g and d before the court’s ruling. With probability , the court in the North
enforces the right and we now assume that it relies on the damage rule. FN develops and sells
a new product derived from the genetic resources and receives v(g;d)   c(d). However, he is
ordered to pay D(g;d) in damages for using g without FS’s prior consent. The payo￿s induced
by the damage rule are 	D
S = u(g;L)+D(g;d) c(g) c(L) and 	D
N = v(g;d) D(g;d) c(d).
With probability 1   , the right is not enforced so that FN and FS receive the open access
payo￿s de￿ned in the previous section. The expected payo￿s induced by the court’s ruling are
then given by:
U2 = u(g;L) + D(g;d)   c(g)   c(L)
V 2 = v(g;d)   D(g;d)   c(d)
Assumption:
1) The damage D(g;d) is strictly positive, increasing and concave in g and d.
2) 	D
N = v(g;d)   D(g;d)   c(d)  0
The second assumption is a limited liability assumption as the damage cannot exceed FN’s net
earning.4 The rationale is that the court in the North may want FN to continue his activity
while giving FS enough incentive to invest and provide useful information. Damage payment
4This assumption implies that a condition equivalent to (6.9) for the damage rule, i.e. EV2 = V
D + (1  
)V
OA  0 is always satis￿ed.
160depends obviously on g but also on d. This is because we assume that FN is forced to compensate
FS based on the ill-gotten pro￿t that he has made, and not based on FS’s pro￿t loss, which is
irrelevant in this model. (see Schankerman and Scotchmer, 2001)
Given investment L, FS and FN choose unilaterally ^ g2 = g(L) and ^ d2 = d(^ g2) that maximise
U2 and V 2 such that:
@u
@g
(^ g2;L) + 
@D
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2) = c0(^ g2) (6.12)
@v
@d
(^ g2; ^ d2)   
@D
@d
(^ g2; ^ d2) = c0(^ d2) (6.13)
In the equilibrium, investment in d must equalise FN’s net private marginal bene￿t￿consisting
of his marginal bene￿t minus the expected marginal damage payment￿with the marginal cost.
Investment in drug development ^ d2 is generally not set optimally unless 
@D
@d
(^ g2; ^ d2) = 0. In
general, the existence of uncertainty about enforcement combined with the positive e￿ect of d
on damages lead FN to restrict his investment.
Besides, the equilibrium level of genetic resources ^ g2 must balance at the margin, the sum of FS’s
bene￿t and expected damage, with the cost of supply. The choice of a particular damage scheme
by the court has a major e￿ect on FS’s incentives to supply genetic resources. A necessary and
su￿cient condition for ^ g2 to be unilaterally optimal given L is that 
@D
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2) =
@v
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2),
i.e. the expected marginal damage is equal to FN’s marginal bene￿t from g. When this con-
dition holds, FS can fully internalise the external e￿ect of g on FN. The information required
for the court to set the right damage scheme may however be considerable. So, in general,
it is most likely that 
@D
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2) 6=
@v
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2), which implies a sub-optimal level of g. If

@D
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2) 7
@v
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2) then ^ g2 7 g. The smaller , the smaller the expected marginal
damage and therefore the more likely access will be restricted.
Case 1 ￿ General Case: 
@D
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2) 6=
@v
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2)
Court enforces the right. Uncertainty over the enforcement of the right is resolved once
the court has enjoined FN to pay damages to FS ( = 1). As ^ g2 is not set at the e￿cient
level, the two parties are free to renegotiate a licensing contract that allows FN to bene￿t
161from an optimal supply of genetic resources given L. The threat point or status quo in this
renegotiation shifts from the autarky position to the court-induced payo￿s determined above

v(^ g2; ^ d2)   D(^ g2; ^ d2)   c(^ d2);u(^ g2;L) + D(^ g2; ^ d2)   c(^ g2)

. Relative to autarky, both FS’s and
FN’s payo￿s increase in this new threat point. The renegotiation outcome will then be given
by:
UD = u(^ g2;L) + D(^ g2; ^ d2)   c(^ g2)   c(L) + 
h
u(g;L) + v(g; ^ d2)   c(g)   u(^ g2;L) + c(^ g2)   v(^ g2; ^ d2)
i
V D = v(^ g2; ^ d2)   D(^ g2; ^ d2)   c(^ d2) + (1   )
h
u(g;L) + v(g; ^ d2)   c(g)   u(^ g2;L) + c(^ g2)   v(^ g2; ^ d2)
i
Court does not enforce the right. If however, no damage payment is ordered to FN then
uncertainty is resolved with  = 0. That is, the property right is not recognised in the North
and open access of g ensues. No renegotiation over g will take place for the reason invoked
earlier in the case of injunction. The payo￿s of the open access regime are now given by:
UOA
2 = 	D
S (^ g2;L) = u(^ g2;L)   c(^ g2)   c(L) and V OA
2 = 	D
S (^ g2; ^ d2) = v(^ g2; ^ d2)   c( ^ d2).
FS’s investment decision. Anticipating these possible outcomes, at time t0, FS will choose
L to maximise her expected payo￿:
EU2 = u(^ g2;L) + D(^ g2; ^ d2)   c(^ g2)   c(L) (6.14)
+ 
h
u(g(L);L) + v(g(L); ^ d2)   c(g(L))   u(^ g2;L) + c(^ g2)   v(^ g2; ^ d2)
i
Investment in conservation L is derived from the ￿rst order condition:

@u
@L
(g(^ L2); ^ L2) + (1   )
@u
@L
(^ g2; ^ L2) = c0(^ L2) (6.15)
When 
@D
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2) <
@v
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2), the analysis is very similar to the one we made earlier under
the injunction rule and FS faces the same incentive problem. For the reasons invoked earlier,
FS faces a hold-up problem and underinvests in maintaining genetic diversity, ^ L2 < L.
When 
@D
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2) >
@v
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2), FS will overinvest in L, i.e. ^ L2 > L. The fact that FS values
the e￿ect of L on the threat point causes her to overinvest as ^ g2 > g. This case may be un-
likely as the court in the North may be unwilling to grant such favourable compensation to FS.
162Alternatively, this may suggest that FS preserves land that is not rich in biodiversity. This is
ine￿cient as such land could be put to better use, for example for farming. Finally, the lower
the common belief  about the infringement ruling, the less likely it is that this condition will
hold.
Case 2 ￿ Special Case: 
@D
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2) =
@v
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2)
A su￿cient condition for this equality to hold is for example D(g;d) = v(g;d) K(d), i.e. FN
is expected to disgorge part of his bene￿ts but retains the amount K(d)   c(d)￿where K(d) is
increasing and concave in d. In this case, the payo￿s are: UD = u(^ g2;L) + v(^ g2; ^ d2)   c(^ g2)  
K(^ d2)   c(L) and V D = K(^ d2)   c(^ d2). The supply of genetic resources is then e￿cient given
L so that ^ g2 = g(L). Therefore, no renegotiation will take place. Expecting this outcome, at
time t0, S will choose L to maximise her expected payo￿:
EU2 = UD = u(g(L);L)   c(g(L))   c(L) + v(g(L); ^ d2)   K(^ d2) (6.16)
The ￿rst order condition then yields the optimal investment L2 = L.
When 
@D
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2) =
@v
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2), the damage payment gives FS the proper incentive to fully
internalise the externality of g. In fact, the court makes FS the residual claimant of the surplus
created by her investment by allowing FN to retain K(^ d2)   c(^ d2) and allowing FS to receive
the residual bene￿t. As a result, FS will appropriate the entire return on her investment. If
the optimality of FS’s investment is the objective for the Northern court, the careful design of
the damage scheme is of particular importance. However, given the considerable information
required to achieve this goal, this outcome may prove a di￿cult target.
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The choice of the damage scheme a￿ects both parties’ incentive to invest:
1) If 
@D
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2) <
@v
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2), FS underinvests in the maintainance of genetic diversity, ^ L2 <
L.
2) If 
@D
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2) =
@v
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2), FS optimally invests in the maintainance of genetic diversity,
^ L2 = L.
3) If 
@D
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2) >
@v
@g
(^ g2; ^ d2), FS overinvests in the maintainance of genetic diversity, ^ L2 >
L.
4) Moreover, in all these cases, drug development is sub-optimal ^ d2 < d because the payment
of the damage prevents FN to appropriate the whole return on his investment.
6.3.5 Discussion
If FS’s right in g was recognised ex ante in the North and enforced, the optimal solution would
be achieved despite the non contractibility of investment L. This is because the contract over
g would channel all the bene￿t generated by FS via a transfer payment, providing FS enough
incentive to invest optimally in L. The problem here comes from the uncertainty about the ex
ante enforceability of the property right in the informational good g. The IPR system in the
North does not generally confer exclusive rights in products of nature unless they are distinct
enough from their forms in the wilderness. Invention rather than discovery is the basis for
appropriation in that system.5 This excludes much of the South own innovations or knowledge
because they are often hard to distinguish from the genetic resources as such. Absent the ex
ante enforceability of the right in g, FS may suspect that FN will free ride on her contribution
and use g as a free good to develop new drugs without any compensation. By rejecting FN’s
o￿er, FS has the power to hold up FN’s innovation. This allows her to establish a stronger
bargaining position in the negotiation and seek ex post recognition and enforcement of her
right in Northern courts. By doing so, FS faces the hold-up problem as the renegotiation after
5In Diamond vs. Chakrabarty (1980), the case that ￿rst allowed the patenting of microorganisms, the court
held that the microorganism in question, a human-made genetically engineered bacterium capable of breaking
down components of crude oil, which could not be done by any naturally occurring bacteria, was patentable.
(Rodriguez-Stevenson, 2000)
164uncertainty is resolved by the court’s decision allows FN to capture some of the bene￿ts created
by her investment in L.6 This problem of appropriation causes FS to restrict her investment in
maintaining genetic diversity.
The court in the North plays a key role both in inducing e￿ciency and shaping the division of
the pro￿t by altering the bargaining position of the two parties through its ruling. Enforcement
of the property right shifts the threat point away from the autarky position to a new status
quo induced by the court’s decision and dependent upon the chosen remedy. The choice of the
remedy￿injunction rule or damage rule￿matters as it leads to di￿erent incentives to invest in
preserving biodiversity and developing drugs.
The damage rule induces both a higher unilateral genetic resource supply and more investment
in the maintenance of genetic diversity. This is because unlike injunctions, damages allow FS
to partly internalise the bene￿t from g accruing to FN. The use of damages thus mitigates the
hold-up problem since the award of a compensation provides incentives for increased investment
compared to the award of an injunction, i.e. ^ L2  ^ L1. Under speci￿c conditions, damages
can lead to a socially optimal investment in genetic diversity. This is the case when the court
makes FS the residual claimant of the surplus created by her investment. Overinvestment in
L can even occur if the expected marginal damage is greater than FN’s marginal bene￿t from
g. This is ine￿cient and suggests that non-biodiverse land is being conserved at the expense of
more bene￿cial uses. The potentially high uncertainty about enforcement makes however this
outcome unlikely: the lower , the less likely overinvestment in L is.
Drug development is not optimal because of the ex ante uncertainty over enforcement. Given
this uncertainty, investment in drug development d depends on the choice of the remedy. When
the court seeks to encourage drug development, the choice of the remedy should depend on the
relative magnitude of the marginal bene￿t under the injunction rule (1   )
@v
@d
(^ g1; ^ d1) and the
marginal bene￿t under the damage rule
@v
@d
(^ g2; ^ d2)   
@D
@d
(^ g2; ^ d2). The choice of the remedy then
hinges upon the ex ante common belief about infringement  and the e￿ect of drug development
on the damage.
Our model suggests that despite the introduction of a property right in the genetic resources,
investment in maintaining biological diversity may be sub-optimal given the uncertainty about
6Both parties have incentive to renegotiate: FN, because 1) g is not unilaterally set e￿ciently by FS; and
2) he can no longer sell the new drug without a license under injunction; and FS, because she can increase her
payo￿ relative to autarky.
165the enforcement of the right across jurisdictions. Once investment costs are sunk and genetic
information di￿used, FN might opportunistically capture this information without FS’s consent
and exploit it for his own private bene￿t. This situation may eventually lead to renegotiation in
which FS’s rent is dissipated causing her to underinvest. The court can however under certain
conditions restore optimality by imposing a liability rule that makes FS the residual claimant
of the bene￿ts generated by her investment.
6.4 Conclusion
The literature on the use of biodiversity for the purpose of R&D and bioprospecting often focuses
on the issue of access to genetic materials and traditional knowledge. In this chapter, our analysis
insists primarily on the incentive problem for land conservation in the context of sequential
R&D. We believe that investment in environmental stewardship to maintain biodiversity is a
fundamental issue in this area. As genetic material and traditional knowledge (TK) are derived
from the observation and knowledge about biodiversity, the irreversible loss of biodiversity would
make discussion on access to genetic resources and TK meaningless. In this sense, investment
in maintaining diversity is a necessary condition for information to ￿ow across the sequential
R&D process in the life sciences.
In this respect, the main issue is the hold-up problem stemming from the absence of coordination
of the North and South legal systems to recognise and enforce property rights on informational
goods across jurisdictions. Legal institutions￿in particular the court in the Northern region￿
play a crucial role in this paper. The decision of the court￿injunction, damage or open access￿
has an impact both for the e￿ciency of investment and the distribution of the bene￿ts. In the
face of the uncertainty about the enforcement, by Northern courts, of the rights conferred in
the South, Southern ￿rms are likely to underinvest in maintaining genetic diversity as they
will bear all investment costs but will receive only part of the return. As a result, the genetic
information ￿owing from the primary to the secondary stage of the sequential R&D process is
generally ine￿cient. Uncertainty also prevents ￿rms in the North to undertake socially optimal
drug development.
Thus, in this paper we point to the necessity of coordinating the legal systems of the two regions
to create the basis for socially optimal investment in land conservation and e￿cient exchange of
information between North and South. Under such system, e￿ciency need not come from court’s
166intervention but rather from cooperation between the parties. Next chapter will investigate this
possibility and analyse the implications of the presence of traditional knowledge.
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169Chapter 7
Economics of Traditional Knowledge as
Private Information1
7.1 Introduction
Bioprospecting is the purposeful search for natural compounds undertaken by pharmaceutical
or biotechnology ￿rms to ￿nd leads necessary for the development of new drugs. It requires
cooperation between the bio-prospecting ￿rm￿the North￿and the country hosting the genetic
resources and/or traditional knowledge￿the South. The host country provides basic or pure
information on potential solution concepts, while the R&D ￿rm supplies the practical capabilities
for developing these solution concepts into marketable compounds and products. In this manner
primary biological information is generated and channelled through a secondary R&D sector to
become commercial products capable of addressing consumer needs.
Despite the South’s contribution in providing necessary primary information as inputs in the
R&D process, genetic information and traditional knowledge generally do not meet patentability
requirements￿novelty and non-obviousness￿and receive little or no compensation. The failure
to protect these contributions may result in a lack of investment in genetic diversity and tradi-
tional human capital, and in ine￿cient ￿ow of information across the sector. This sub-optimal
situation may end up in a permanent loss of both genetic diversity and traditional knowledge
and therefore a loss of valuable source of improvement of human health. Thus, to address this
problem, Gehl Sampath (2005) suggests that the South’s information should be protected in a
similar way as the basic information provided by small and medium sized biotechnology ￿rms
1This chapter is a joint work with Tim Swanson of University College London
170to larger ￿rms which use these inputs to process a ￿nal product. It is thought that in the face
of this incentive problem, the creation of ’informational property rights’ (Swanson, 1995) could
provide the South enough incentive to maintain genetic diversity and traditional knowledge, and
grant access to her genetic resources. However, unless the property rights assigned domestically
in the South are recognised across jurisdictions, the hold-up problem analysed in chapter 6 is
likely to persist. The real challenge is for North and South to coordinate their legal systems in
a way that allows the South to be properly compensated for investing in genetic diversity and
associated human capital, and in supplying genetic material.
Our purpose in this chapter is to analyse North/South interaction when such coordination is
achieved. In particular, our aim is to determine the number of property rights necessary to
induce an e￿cient ￿ow of information within this vertical industry, as well as their placement￿
in addition to the patent assigned to the North. Should these rights solely protect the genetic
resource-based information, or should traditional knowledge also be protected? To investigate
whether both types of contributions should warrant property rights protection, or whether a
single right is su￿cient, we propose a clear delineation between genetic resources and traditional
knowledge. Throughout this chapter, we de￿ne traditional knowledge as the information that
allows the North to truncate the search, i.e. to search over a smaller number of species. (Costello
and Ward, 2006) This information is assumed to be the South’s private information. The value of
this private information lies in its e￿cacy in guiding the North towards the genetic resources that
are most promising and useful for R&D. We explore the implications of the presence of traditional
knowledge as private information both from an e￿ciency and a distribution perspectives.
We assume that cooperation takes place via a contract in which the proposer has the ability
to make a take-it or leave-it o￿er. We will analyse the cases where each party in turn has this
ability and is therefore given all the bargaining power. In the presence of traditional knowledge
(i.e. private information) this assumption amounts to the North solving a screening problem￿
when he is the proposer￿and the South solving a signalling problem￿when she makes the
o￿er. We ￿nd that, under complete information￿absent traditional knowledge￿a property
right in the genetic information creates the basis for e￿cient contracting. When traditional
knowledge is present, the emergence of an e￿cient outcome depends on the magnitude of the
South’s outside option induced by the existence of an enforceable property right in the genetic
resources￿in the screening case. The division of pro￿ts improves in favour of the South even
171without assigning a particular property right in TK. This result is obtained with a distribution
assumption that is least favourable to the South since the North is given the right to make
a take-it or leave-it o￿er. This suggests that despite the extremely unfavourable distribution,
the South may capture some of the cooperative surplus even without a formal right in TK, so
long as her knowledge is kept secret. In the signalling case, the South as the proposer is the
residual claimant of the cooperative surplus and has therefore the proper incentive for e￿cient
information trade with the North. E￿ciency in this case hinges upon the assumption of risk
neutrality and the possibility for the South to o￿er an ex ante contract, i.e. before learning her
private information.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 7.2 provides a detailed presentation of the model.
In section 7.3, we solve the contracting problem under symmetric information when genetic
information is a￿orded property right protection and derive the e￿cient solution. In section 7.4,
we investigate how the contractual outcomes are altered in the presence of traditional knowledge
de￿ned as the South’s private information about the usefulness of the genetic resources. Finally
section 7.5 concludes the analysis.
7.2 The Model
7.2.1 Stylised Facts
Agents. North (N ) and South (S ) refer to two distinct regions comprised of: (i) distinct
consumer groups CGN and CGS; (ii) distinct ￿rms FN and FS; and (iii) distinct legal institu-
tions or courts CtN and CtS. The two regions could realise joint bene￿ts by cooperating in the
production of R&D for health services, but must coordinate their individual legal systems to
generate these incentives toward cooperation. There are four crucial dimensions within which
North and South interact.
Separate R&D Contributions. Firms from the North and the South, FN and FS, can
cooperate for mutual bene￿t through coordination in the supply of inputs within a process
of sequential R&D. If they cooperate successfully, then a higher quality of health services is
available to consumers. The South is gene rich and technology poor. The ￿rms in the South FS
are specialised in the provision of genetic material g and traditional knowledge (TK). The North
is technology rich and biodiversity poor. The ￿rms in the North FN use information contained
172in the genetic resources g and may combine them with traditional knowledge and technology in
the North to search for new leads and develop new drugs d.
Separate Markets. North and South have distinct consumer groups CGN and CGS, and
therefore separate markets for medicinal products. Consumers in the South CGS have low
income and a low willingness to pay for medicines. By contrast, consumers in the North CGN
have high income and are willing to pay high prices for drugs developed by the pharmaceutical
industry.
Separate Property Rights Systems. In each region, there exists a property rights system
that attempts to generate incentives for innovation by ensuring appropriation of the returns
on investments in that region. Genetic resources g and traditional knowledge are conferred
property rights in the South. Likewise, the drug d developed by FN in the North has a property
right declared in it. Property rights conferred by a given region exist automatically only within
that region’s boundaries, and must be adopted and implemented by the other region to be given
e￿ect there.
Separate Court Systems. Court systems exist in each region (CtS and CtN) for enforcement
of property rights. Any right conferred in a given jurisdiction will be recognised and enforced
by courts in the other region. As a consequence, the only issue that courts in the North have
to resolve in case of litigation is whether the drug d has enough distinctiveness relative to FS’s
genetic resources or traditional knowledge, to warrant property right protection.
173Table 7.1: Stylised Facts: North/South interaction in the presence of TK
South North
Vertical Industry  FS: Upstream  FN: Downstream
Separate R&D Contri-
butions
 Biodiversity Rich (Genetic Re-
sources g; Traditional Knowledge
TK)
 Technology Poor: no d
 Biodiversity Poor: no g, TK
 Technology Rich: drug develop-
ment d
Separate Markets  Low income: CGS have low will-
ingness to pay
 Herbal medicines
 FS serves both CGS and CGN
 High income: CGN have high
willingness to pay
 Pharmaceuticals
 FN serves only CGN
Separate Property
Rights Systems
 FS has property right in g and
TK
 FN has property right in d
Separate Courts Sys-
tems
 CtS enforce rights in g and TK  CtN enforce rights in d, g and in
TK
7.2.2 Description of the sequential innovation
We model the R&D industry (in the biological sector) as a non-integrated vertical industry
of two stages as described in chapter 5. In the primary stage of the process, the ￿rms from
the South FS generate a ￿ow of information originating from nature and accumulated human
capital. This information is collected by ￿rms from the North FN to produce some innovation
designed to meet consumers needs in the North.
Through observation of natural diversity, FS may identify some biological activity in a plant
variety and then use this knowledge to produce and market herbal medicines. Thus, by appli-
cation of her traditional human capital hS to the genetic capital endowment g, FS identi￿es
essential information e embodied within herbal medicines H. The genetic material g is assumed
to be present only in the South and, for purposes of this analysis, we assume that all innova-
tions in this industry are derived from the capital stock g. FN, as the second innovator in this
industry, is endowed with scienti￿c capital hN which he is able to combine with g (and e) to
produce a ￿ow of innovations d (disembodied information, e.g. identi￿cation and isolation of
active principles). This innovation d is then embodied within a pharmaceutical drug, which is
then amenable to IPR. This industry is depicted in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2.
1747.2.3 The Fundamentals of the Model
As in chapter 6, we assume that FN and FS are two risk neutral agents that bargain over
the access to genetic resources g. In this paper, we assume that courts in the North CtN
recognise any property right granted in the South to protect genetic information and traditional
knowledge.
Assume now that FN o￿ers FS a contract to be granted access to g in return for a transfer
payment t. If successful negotiation is achieved, then the two parties form a joint venture
within which FN can freely use the genetic information to develop a patentable product. The
two parties receive the following payo￿s:
S = t   ca
S(g) (7.1)
N = S(g) + N(g;d)   cN(d)   t (7.2)
where the bene￿ts S and N are continuous, increasing and concave in their arguments; d is
FN’s investment in drug development; ca
S(g) and cN(d) are respectively FS’s supply cost and
FN’s development cost. These costs are increasing and convex in g and d.
If no agreement is reached, FS considers placing derivatives of her herbal medicines directly
onto the market in the North. In response, FN might develop a new drug built around the
information contained in the herbal medicine. If FN does not invest in development, FS receives
a pro￿t of S(g)   cS(g)￿where cS(g) is the cost of developing the herbal medicine￿and FN
gets nothing. On the other hand, if FN decides to invest in drug development, then a court in
the North decides whether it has infringed FS’s right, in which case an ex post license is required.
Infringement happens with probability . If FN does not infringe then his innovation is patented
and marketed in the Northern market. In this case, the newly patented drug will compete￿
competition in di￿erentiated products￿in the Northern market with the herbal medicine. The
pro￿ts are then c
S(g) cS(g) and c
N(g;d) cN(d). We will assume that the drug produced by
FN based on FS’s information may or may not involve additional functions (due to value added
by FN). Hence, the court’s ruling hinges on how distinctive FN’s innovation is relative to the
FS’s.
The noncooperative expected payo￿s are therefore:
175nc
S = (S(^ g) + N(^ g; ^ d)) + (1   )c
S(^ g)   cS(^ g) (7.3)
nc
N = (1   )N(^ g; ^ d) + (1   )c
N(^ g; ^ d)   cN(^ d) (7.4)
where  is the share of FN’s pro￿t captured by FS through ex post licensing or equivalently the
damage paid by FN for infringement; and ^ g and ^ d result from the ￿rst order conditions￿which
are omitted here.
The sequence of the decisions is summarised as follows:
1. FS devotes resources to ￿nd genetic materials (e.g. plants) g containing useful information
protected by a property right.
2. FN o￿ers FS to grant her access to g and develop a new pharmaceutical in return for a
transfer payment t.
3. FS accepts or rejects the o￿er.
4. In case of rejection, FN may (or may not) decide to develop a new drug based on g.
5. If a drug is developed, the Court in the North decides whether FS’s exclusive right has
been violated.
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Figure 7.1: Decision tree
7.2.4 E￿ciency condition
We assume again that e￿ciency is framed in terms of the industry’s outcome. By cooperating,
FN and FS maximise the industry joint pro￿t:
max
g;d
S + N = S(g) + N(g;d)   ca
S(g)   cN(d) (7.5)
In equilibrium, the level of genetic resources g and investment in drug development d to
balance marginal revenues and marginal costs of both parts of the R&D industry:
0
S(g) +
@N
@g
(g;d) = ca0
S(g) (7.6)
@N
@d
(g;d) = c0
N(d) (7.7)
In equation (7.6), the genetic resource level satis￿es Bowen-Lindhal-Samuelson condition of op-
timal public good provision. Drug development is also undertaken optimally by FN at marginal
177cost.
We now establish the means by which the establishment of a property right protecting genetic in-
formation and/or associated traditional knowledge together with a procedure for its enforcement
determines the prospects for e￿cient contracting. The main idea is that a￿ording a property
right in the information produced by FS￿unlike the current IPR regime￿may trigger cooper-
ation and lead to an e￿cient outcome.2 Paradoxically, the property right may not be used by
FS, but may serve to determine her outside option when an agreement is being discussed. The
very existence of the property right ensures FS a stream of income that will be accounted for in
any negotiation.
7.3 Contracting genetic resources in the absence of traditional
knowledge
In this section, we commence with an R&D sector, depending solely upon genetic resources and
scienti￿c method. In the following section, we discuss the relevance of an R&D sector, in which
FS has both genetic resources and traditional knowledge.
7.3.1 Contract o￿ered by FN
We assume that FN has the ability to make a take-it or leave-it o￿er. This implies that FS
has no bargaining power. The problem faced by FN is to o￿er contractual terms to FS that
will cause her to accept the o￿er to grant access to g. We ￿rst characterise the contract o￿ered
by FN when the usefulness of g for R&D purposes is common knowledge. Later in section 7.4,
we analyse how asymmetric information about the usefulness of g￿interpreted as traditional
knowledge￿will a￿ect the contractual outcome.
Under symmetric information, FN proposes to FS a contract (g;t)￿access to FS’s resources g
in return for a transfer payment t￿that maximises his own pro￿t subject to FS’s participation
constraint, that is:
2Unlike in chapter 6 where FN and FS must rely on the court’s decision and renegotiation to reach an e￿cient
allocation of g, here the existence of an enforceable property right in the genetic resource-based information
enables the parties to reach e￿ciency without the court’s intervention. As we will discuss below, the court sole
contribution in this paper is to shape the division of pro￿ts.
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g;d;t
S(g) + N(g;d)   cN(d)   t
s.t. t   ca
S(g)  (S(^ g) + N(^ g; ^ d)) + (1   )c
S(^ g)   cS(^ g)
Proposition 1: In an industry where ￿rms FN and FS possess important information for the
production of successive innovations,
1) If the usefulness of g is common knowledge, then there is a unique (subgame perfect) equilib-
rium contract (g;t) o￿ered by FN. This contract is characterised by the e￿cient allocation of
genetic resources g and a transfer payment t as de￿ned in (7.6) and (7.8).
2) The equilibrium payment t increases in the likelihood of infringement and with the supply of
genetic material.
Proof: In the equilibrium, the participation constraint is binding. If that was not the case then
FNcould slightly decrease t, satisfy the constraint while increasing its pro￿t. This would con-
tradict the fact that we are in the equilibrium. FStherefore receives the value of her reservation
pro￿t so that: t = (S(^ g) + N(^ g; ^ d)) + (1   )c
S(^ g)   cS(^ g) + ca
S(g)
Plugging t into the objective function and deriving the ￿rst order conditions yields the e￿cient
outcomes obtained in (7.6) and (7.7).
So the optimal transfer payment is given by:
t = (S(^ g) + N(^ g; ^ d)) + (1   )c
S(^ g)   cS(^ g) + ca
S(g) (7.8)
Moreover it is straight forward to derive the comparative statics:
dt
d
= S(^ g) + N(^ g; ^ d)   c
S(^ g) > 0
dt
dg
= 

0
S(^ g) + 
@N
@g
(^ g; ^ d)

+ (1   )c
S(^ g)   c0
S(^ g) + c0a
S(g) > 0
When the quality of the information held by FS is common knowledge, FN enjoys an e￿cient
access to g. Because of the uniqueness of this equilibrium, FS’s informational rights can be
substantially protected without inducing any loss of e￿ciency. Therefore, the maximum share
179received by FS in this framework is when the probability of infringement  = 1. However, given
our assumption that FN holds all the bargaining power, a property right in g addresses the
distributional issues only to an extent since FS does not share in the cooperative surplus.
The courts in the North play an important role in the determination of the magnitude of the
transfer because they make decisions regarding infringement. It is their ruling that determines
the terms of the contract between the successive innovators. If FN makes minor amendments
to FS’s innovation, and the courts refuse to award a distinct property right, then FS is the sole
owner of all innovations in that stream. On the other hand, if the courts award rights to FN,
then FS will have to compete in the Northern market.
7.3.2 Contract o￿ered by FS
We now reverse the ordering of the ￿rm making the o￿er. We assume that FS proposes to FN
a contract (g;t) that maximises her own pro￿t subject to FN’s participation constraint, that is:
max
g;t
t   ca
S(g)
s.t. S(g) + N(g;d)   cN(d)   t  (1   )N(^ g; ^ d) + (1   )c
N(^ g; ^ d)   cN(^ d)
For the same reason invoked above, the participation constraint must be binding so that:
t = S(g) + N(g;d)   cN(d)   (1   )N(^ g; ^ d)   (1   )c
N(^ g; ^ d) + cN(^ d)
Replacing t into FS’s objective function and deriving the ￿rst order conditions, we obtain the
same results as in section 7.3.1. In addition, the optimal transfer becomes:
t = S(g) + N(g;d)   cN(d)   (1   )N(^ g; ^ d)   (1   )c
N(^ g; ^ d) + cN(^ d) (7.9)
The results obtained here are an application of the Coase theorem. E￿ciency is attained in-
dependently of the identity of the proposer. Only distribution changes via di￿erent transfer
payments: compare Equation (7.8) to Equation (7.9).
1807.4 Contracting genetic resources in the presence of traditional
knowledge
We now examine how the presence of traditional knowledge (TK) might in￿uence the contractual
terms between the parties. We assume that TK has the e￿ect of informing FN about the most
promising genetic resources for purposes of R&D. In this way, the quality of FS’s traditional
knowledge lies in her ability to truncate the search, i.e. to target the most promising genetic
resources, thus reducing considerably the number of resources to be searched. (Costello and
Ward, 2006) We investigate here the possibility of assigning a property right in TK, where the
knowledge about the genetic resources that are most useful for R&D, is FS’s private information
and can only be acquired by FN via contracting. We continue to assume that there is a property
right in genetic information. At this point we make no assumption regarding the need for
property rights in TK itself, and only examine how its existence impacts upon the contracts
described within the previous section.
We say that FS holds traditional knowledge when she possesses information on the prospects of
heterogeneous genetic resources in regard to their usefulness for R&D. For purposes of exposition,
suppose FS has two types of information on the prospect that the genetic resources deliver a
promising lead. There is a ￿high prospect￿ type  with probability p and a ￿low prospect￿ type
 with probability 1   p. High types are of higher value for two reasons: 1) they have a higher
average value for producing information within the R&D process; and 2) they have a lower
average cost when supplying information within the R&D process. 3 Thus, the usefulness of the
genetic resources for purposes of information generation is FS’s private information. Together
these assumptions constitute our de￿nition of the economic meaning of TK.
As we did in section 7.3, we ￿rst analyse the case where FN makes the o￿er and then proceed
to the case where FS has this ability.
7.4.1 TK as Private Information: The case of Screening by FN
We now specify the ways in which the existence of this private information will impact upon the
contracting process examined in section 7.3.1. FN speci￿es the o￿ered contract enabling direct
3For example, the knowledge that these are high prospect genetic resources might both contribute to a better
targeting of the resource-based information onto a speci￿c problem (higher value of information) and also do so
in a much reduced search process (lower cost of information).
181access to FS’s genetic resources. A contract consists of access to FS’s resource g in return for
monetary payment t. It is speci￿ed in terms of the di￿erent types of genetic resources available.
A direct revelation mechanism is a menu of two contracts f(g; t);(g;t)g, one for each type of
resource.
An agreement will be signed if transaction costs are small enough, and the participation and
incentive compatible constraints are satis￿ed for each type of resource. The participation con-
straints (or individual rationality constraints IR and IR) ensure that each type receives at least
her expected reservation pro￿t.
V =  t   cS(g)  
nc
S (7.10)
V = t   cS(g)  nc
S (7.11)
This is equivalent to
V  nc
S + V0 (7.12)
V  nc
S (7.13)
where 
nc
S = (S(^ g) + N(^ g;^ d)) + (1   )c
S(^ g)   cS(^ g); nc
S = (S(^ g) + N(^ g;^ d)) + (1  
)c
S(^ g)   cS(^ g); 
nc
S = nc
S +
 

nc
S   nc
S

= nc
S + V0. The term V0  
nc
S   nc
S represents
the pro￿t di￿erential between the high and low type (i.e. the di￿erential value of her outside
option when supplying each within the non-cooperative setting).
Note that the participation constraints IR and IR are type dependent implying that the high
type has better opportunities outside the proposed contract (larger expected reservation pro￿t)
than the low type. This speci￿city will lead to non-standard results.
The incentive compatible constraints respectively IC and IC ensure that each type is always
better o￿ revealing truthfully herself.
 t   ca
S(g;)  t   ca
S(g;) (7.14)
t   ca
S(g;)   t   ca
S(g;) (7.15)
182Assumption A1:
@ca
S
@g
> 0,
@2ca
S
@g2 > 0 and
@ca
S
@
< 0
Assumption A2 (Spence-Mirrlees condition):
@2ca
S
@@g
< 0
Assumption A1 says that the cost of supply is increasing and convex in the level of genetic
resources provided but decreasing in the type. The latter implies that the high quality type can
make transactions for access at a lower cost. This is because less search is required with high
type information. Assumption A2 conveys the idea that the marginal cost decreases in type:
the high type enjoys a lower marginal cost of supply.
The provider of information of low quality may misrepresent her type and obtain a payo￿:
 t   ca
S(g;) = V   (g). In addition, if the high type wants to mimic the low type, she would
receive: t   ca
S(g;) = V + (g); where (g)  ca
S(g;)   ca
S(g;) with  > 0 and 0 > 0 from
assumptions A1 and A2. The term  refers to the supply cost di￿erential of the two types for
a given level of supply g.
The incentive compatibility constraints respectively IC and IC can then be re-written as:
V  V + (g) (7.16)
V  V   (g) (7.17)
FN’s problem is then:
max
f(g; t);(g;t)g
p
 
S(g) + N(g;d)   cN(d)   t

+ (1   p)
 
S(g) + N(g;d)   cN(d)   t

subject to (7.10), (7.11), (7.14), (7.15)
The problem can be re-written as follows:
183max
f(g;V );(g;V )g
p
 
S(g) + N(g;d)   ca
S(g)   cN(d)

+ (1   p)
 
S(g) + N(g;d)   ca
S(g)   cN(d)

 [pV + (1   p)V ]
(7.18)
subject to (7.12), (7.13), (7.16), (7.17)
This analysis leads directly to the following proposition, detailing the e￿ects on contracting that
result from the existence of private information. Proposition 2 establishes once again that the
factor most important in determining the payo￿ to FS is the impact, if any, of any endowment
(genetic resources or traditional knowledge) upon her outside options.
Proposition 2:
When FS has private information about the most promising genetic resources for R&D purposes,
FN may seek cooperation by o￿ering a menu of self-selecting contracts f(g; t);(g;t)g to screen
among the types of genetic resources. These contracts are characterised by:
2.1 g  g (Monotonicity condition)
2.2 For V0 < (gSB), IR and IC are binding. The supply of genetic resources required by FN
is e￿cient for the high type gSB = g and distorted downwards for the low type gSB < g.
The level of gSB and the transfer payments t
SB and tSB are given by:
0
S(gSB) +
@N
@g
(gSB;dSB) = c0a
S(gSB) +
p
1   p
0(gSB) (7.19)
t
SB = (S(^ g) + N(^ g;^ d)) + (1   )c
S(^ g)   cS(^ g) + ca
S(g) + (gSB) (7.20)
tSB = (S(^ g) + N(^ g;^ d)) + (1   )c
S(^ g)   cS(^ g) + ca
S(gSB) (7.21)
2.3 For (gSB)  V0  (g), IR and IR are binding so that no information rent is given up
to any type. The supply of genetic resources is e￿cient for both types, i.e gSB = g and
gSB = g. The optimal transfer payments t
SB and tSB are given by:
184t
SB = (S(^ g) + N(^ g;^ d)) + (1   )c
S(^ g)   c(^ g) + ca
S(g) = t
 (7.22)
tSB = (S(^ g) + N(^ g;^ d)) + (1   )c
S(^ g)   c(^ g) + ca
S(g) = t (7.23)
2.4 For V0 > (g), there are countervailing incentives and IR and IC are binding. The
supply of genetic resources required by FN is distorted upwards for the high type gCI > g
and e￿cient for the low type gCI = g. The level of gCI and the transfer payments t
CI
and tCI are given by:
0
S(gCI) +
@N
@g
(gCI;d
CI
) = c0a
S(gCI)  
1   p
p
0(gCI) (7.24)
t
CI = (S(^ g) + N(^ g;^ d)) + (1   )c
S(^ g)   cS(^ g) + ca
S(gCI) (7.25)
tCI = (S(^ g) + N(^ g;^ d)) + (1   )c
S(^ g)   cS(^ g) + ca
S(gCI)   (gCI) (7.26)
Proof 2: See Appendix A.1.
As indicated above, the basic result is that the impact of TK (on contracting) depends primarily
on its impact on the value of the outside option. In parts 2.2 through 2.4 of Proposition 2, we
see that the determining factor is whether the incremental rent appropriable by the high type
(V0)￿by selling her herbal medicine in the Northern market, i.e. under non-cooperation￿is
less than or greater than the cost advantage appropriable via contracting, .
7.4.2 Discussion: TK and Information Rents
The importance of private information is that it might confer an information rent upon its
holder. Our model departs from the standard prediction (that informational advantage confers
a rent upon the promising type only) because the participation constraints are type-dependent.
Whether FN gives up information rent and to which type depends instead upon the value of
V0, i.e. the di￿erence between the outside option of the high type and that of the low type.
When the high type enjoys a highly pro￿table outside opportunity relative to the low type,
the contract must o￿er her a large transfer. This contract must also reward the low type to
prevent her from misrepresenting the quality of her information since the additional cost she
185incurs by lying, i.e. (g) is smaller than the pro￿t di￿erential V0. To ensure that incentive
compatibility is satis￿ed, FN will give her an information rent V = V   (g).4 In this case
FS’s informational advantage works more e￿ectively in competition with FN than it does in
cooperation, and therefore her threat not to cooperate is credible (as in case 2.4). Thus, FS’s
private information creates a bargaining advantage: the existence of TK confers a clear-cut
increase in FS’s share of the production surplus.
If FS’s primary informational advantage lies in her supply costs rather than in her outside
option￿that is, the di￿erential in reservation pro￿t V0 does not exceed the cost di￿erential
between the high type and the low type￿then the bene￿t conferred by private information
comes from the high type’s ability to mimic the low type, taking advantage of the supply costs
di￿erential (as in case 2.2). In this case, the high type is able to appropriate some informational
rent by reason of the asymmetric information whereas the low type is excluded from the sharing
of the surplus.5
If, however, FS’s informational advantage lies above the cost advantage for the high type re-
sources but below the cost of lying for the low type, then FN is able to screen e￿ectively between
the two types and eliminate all informational advantages (as in case 2.3). Indeed, the cost dif-
ferentials are su￿ciently di￿erent to enable screening between them. For intermediate values of
V0, FN can impose incentive compatible contracts where both types of genetic resources receive
their expected reservation pro￿t. This is because no agent has an incentive to misrepresent her
type so that the symmetric information outcome (see section 7.3.1) can be implemented.
In sum, the fact that there exists private information on the genetic resources that are most
promising may or may not alter the contractual terms o￿ered to FS. So long as the private
information does not impact the outside option in a substantial manner (as de￿ned above in
Proposition 2), the contract can replicate the complete information outcome. Then there are
no informational rents to be appropriated by FS. On the other hand, if the outside option is
signi￿cantly a￿ected by the private information, the contractual terms will be altered in one
of the ways described above, and this may result in additional rents for FS accruing to either
the low type or the high type information provider. These informational rents would create
4This informational rent is decreasing in g. Thus an upward distortion in the supply of high quality genetic
material would allow FN to minimise this informational rent.
5It is important to recognise that the rent given up to the high type increases in g, implying that a reduction
in g will help minimise this rent. Thus, there is an incentive for FN to distort its demand for low type downwards
away from the e￿cient level g
 in order to minimise rent-sharing.
186additional incentives for investment in the provision of these resources to the R&D process,
enhancing the e￿ciency of the R&D process.6
Given that FS uses her private information to extract some informational rent, it is important
to know whether this private information provides incentives to invest optimally in traditional
knowledge. The answer will depend on the source of the high type advantage, i.e. the access
cost advantage and the outside opportunity advantage.
When the high type’s advantage derives from the cost of access, then she has strong incentive
to invest in human capital to keep her edge and continue to capture informational rent. At the
same time, if the low type wants to improve her position by narrowing her cost disadvantage,
she too has to invest in TK. By contrast, if the high type’s advantage stems from the outside
opportunity di￿erential, whether she has incentive to invest in traditional knowledge, depends
on the source of the di￿erential. If the advantage in the reservation pro￿t comes from the quality
of the information, then this will certainly induce human capital investment. However, if this
di￿erential is only vaguely related to the quality of the information that enables to truncate
the search then the production of TK is unlikely to be incentivised. This would be the case if
for example the advantage in the reservation pro￿t lies in the high type’s marketing ability to
target e￿ectively consumers in the North.
7.4.3 TK as private information: the case of Signalling by FS
We now assume that FS, the informed agent, has the ability to make an o￿er to FN, the unin-
formed agent. Both high and low types would like to be seen as possessing valuable information.
To be convincing, the high type should signal herself to induce FN to accept the o￿er granting
him access to the genetic resources and traditional knowledge against a sizable payment. We
assume that FS o￿ers an ex ante contract (La￿ont and Martimort, 2002). In such a contract,
FS is uncertain about the prospect of her genetic resources to be useful for the purpose of FN’s
speci￿c R&D, when she makes an o￿er. She only knows the probability distribution p that her
information is useful to truncate the search (high type). With probability 1 p, her information
6Informational rents may contribute to their own types of ine￿ciencies, however, as e￿ciency is lost whenever
FS has an incentive to misrepresent herself to capture some information rent and appropriate some of the
cooperative surplus. This places FN in the situation in which he will move away from productive e￿ciency in
order to minimise rent-sharing. That is, to minimise rent-sharing, FN has to decrease g (in case of low V0), and
increase g (in case of large V0) away from the productively e￿cient levels, respectively g
 and g
.
187is of little use to FN (low type). There are two reasons for the assumption of ex ante con-
tracting. First, FS may simply be unfamiliar with some diseases common in the North, when
the contract is o￿ered, so that there is no certainty about how useful her information. Second,
this assumption simpli￿es the treatment of the signalling problem by yielding only a separating
equilibrium￿i.e. no pooling equilibrium will result from this contract. The timing is described
as follows:
>
t0
FS o￿ers
contract
t1
FN accepts or
rejects o￿er
t2
FS discovers
her type 
t3
Contract
executed
The problem faced by FS is to o￿er an incentive compatible contract in which FN is willing
to participate. By the revelation principle, FS can restrict, without loss of generality, to a
direct revelation mechanism of the form f(g;t);(g;t)g contingent on the usefulness (;) of her
information. An incentive compatible contract is one in which FS has always the incentive to
signal her true type.
Given such a contract, FS maximises her ex ante pro￿t subject to her incentive constraints and
FN’s ex ante participation constraint. We will neglect FS’s ex ante participation constraint
since she would not o￿er the contract if she were worse o￿ by doing so.
The incentive constraints require that whatever her type, FS is always better o￿ revealing
her type after she learns it. Formally this translates into: t   ca
S(g;)  t   ca
S(g;) and
t ca
S(g;)  t ca
S(g;). This can be re-written as in (7.16) and (7.17). Note that Assumptions
A1 and A2 still hold. Because participation is voluntary, the contract must induce FN to
participate. In other words, the payo￿ earned by accepting the o￿er should be greater than or
equal to his reservation pro￿t. By rejecting the o￿er, FN will receive the following expected
reservation payo￿:
0
N = p
nc
N + (1   p)nc
N
where 
nc
N = (1   )N(^ g;^ d) + (1   )c
N(^ g;^ d))   cN(^ d) and nc
N = (1   )N(^ g;^ d)) + (1  
)c
N(^ g;^ d)   cN(^ d).
FN’s participation constraint is therefore given by:
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 
S(g) + N(g;d)   cN(d)   t

+ (1   p)
 
S(g) + N(g;d)   cN(d)   t

 0
N
Or equivalently:
p
 
S(g) + N(g;d)   ca
S(g)   cN(d)   V

+(1 p)
 
S(g) + N(g;d)   ca
S(g)   cN(d)   V

 0
N
(7.27)
FS’s problem is then written as:
max
(g;V );(g;V )
pV + (1   p)V
subject to (7.16), (7.17), (7.27)
Proposition 3:
Given that FN is risk neutral, FS can o￿er an e￿cient ex ante contract that signals her type.
The contract is characterised by:
1) Monotonicity: g  g
2) E￿ciency: g = g and g = g
3) Transfer payment: t
 > t where t
 and t are de￿ned as:
t
 = p

S(g) + N(g;d

)   ca
S(g)   cN(d

)

+ (1   p)
 
S(g) + N(g;d
)   ca
S(g)   cN(d
)

  0
N
+ (1   p)(g) + ca
S(g) (7.28)
t = p

S(g) + N(g;d

)   ca
S(g)   cN(d

)

+ (1   p)
 
S(g) + N(g;d
)   ca
S(g)   cN(d
)

  0
N
  p(g) + ca
S(g) (7.29)
4) FN’s ex ante participation constraint is binding. Moreover the contract induces FN to invest
e￿ciently in drug development.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
189FS’s ability to make a take-it or leave-it o￿er makes her the residual claimant of the cooperative
surplus. Therefore, she has the proper incentive to engage in e￿cient information trade with
FN, which results in e￿cient drug development. The main issue for the high type is to convince
FN of the usefulness of her information so that she can claim a large compensation. She can
convincingly signal her type by exploiting her supply cost advantage relative to the low type.
By o￿ering a large level of access to the resources, the high type can di￿erentiate herself because
the high supply cost incurred by the low type in such case will act as a deterrence and prevent
the low type to imitate her.
It is important to note that the e￿cient and separating equilibrium results from the combination
of the risk neutrality of FN and ex ante contracting. In the context of the signalling problem,
an ex ante contract will circumvent the emergence of potentially ine￿cient equilibria such as
the pooling equilibria, where the same contractual terms are o￿ered whatever the usefulness of
FS’s information.
7.4.4 Role of Property Rights in TK
No property right in TK was necessary to achieve the results described in this section. The
fact that TK is private information is su￿cient to confer advantages upon FS, and alter the
bargaining environment which determines the level of FS’s share of the surplus. The existence of
a property right in genetic resource-based information retains its importance as the value of the
outside option remains dependent upon the enforcement of the right in the Northern market. If
the court holds that FN has not infringed FS’s right￿i.e. if the drug is distinctive enough from
the herbal medicine marketed in the Northern market￿then FS will receive little compensation
under cooperation. If however, the court rules that FN has infringed the right, then FS will
receive a substantial payo￿ based on her ability to license her right after the court’s decision. 7
In this way, the role of TK is likely to enhance the value of FS’s underlying genetic resources,
but only if there is a potentially recognisable claim in those genetic resources to begin with.
This indicates that it is not necessary for a property right to be conferred in everything of value
which FS contributes to. It is only important to create such a right in an output which FS is
able to market independent of cooperation (i.e. in competition with FN). Once that right is
7It is straight forward to show that FS’s compensation increases with  both in the screening and the signalling
cases.
190recognised, FS’s other contributions may be able to be channelled through the existing right in
terms of its impacts upon the outside option.
FS will be compensated according to the marginal contribution of g on the total bene￿t at
the industry level, i.e. 0
S(g) +
@N
@g
(g;d). This marginal contribution increases as valuable
traditional knowledge is used to improve FN’s success rate. Thus, FS’s private information acts
as a trade secret which is revealed to FN only against due compensation and the willingness to
pay for this secret increases with the usefulness of the information to FN.
Finally, private information works provides incentives for e￿cient investment in TK when the
high type’s advantage comes from the cost of access. In such case, the high type has the incentive
to invest in generating useful information in order to capture information rent. However, when
the high type’s advantage comes from the reservation pro￿t and the advantage is not directly
related to the quality of the traditional knowledge, then private information may not induce
e￿cient investment in traditional human capital.
7.5 Conclusion
This paper has analysed a simple model of the interaction between North and South in relation
to the establishment of property rights to protect genetic resources and traditional knowledge.
We have stylised the North as rich in human capital but in need of essential genetic resources
and traditional knowledge only available in the South to make innovations in the life sciences
industries. We examine the impacts upon the cumulative research setting of assigning a second
property right to the resources held by the ￿rms in South. In doing so, we investigate how this
can achieve e￿ciency and discuss the implications for the division of the pro￿t.
We ￿nd that under complete information (in the absence of TK), the creation of a second
property in genetic resources is conducive to e￿ciency in the industry. Crucial to the division
of the joint pro￿t is the allowance to the ￿rms in the South of an exclusive right recognised
by courts in the North. This right allows them to market their products￿derived from the
protected genetic resources￿in the North, which gives them an outside option. When such
right exists, the division of the pro￿t depends on whether the ￿rms in the North infringe this
right.
Traditional knowledge has been assumed to act as private information on the prospect of in-
191dividual genetic resources to yield a successful search. In the presence of TK, the ￿rms in the
South have three possible means of generating an additional return. Either they can misrepre-
sent the quality of their information￿and hence attempt to generate an information rent￿or
they can hope that the existence of promising resources increases the perceived value of their
outside option. Alternatively, they can actively signal the quality of their information to the
￿rms in the North. Any factor that increases the value of their outside option￿or reduces the
value of the Northern ￿rms’ outside option￿increases the credibility of the threat to compete
(rather than cooperate) and hence enhances their payo￿ under cooperation. It is not necessary
to establish a separate property right in TK in order to appropriate this enhanced return. The
granting of a single property right to the Southern ￿rms is probably su￿cient to establish a
channel whereby they are able to appropriate the value of their di￿erent types of contributions
to the industry.
In general, we show that the capacity of Southern ￿rms to share in the rents from the R&D
sector to which they contribute depends on the existence of an independent property right in
the genetic resources. This independent right (gives an outside option) establishes the baseline
upon which contracting occurs, and creates the basis upon which Southern ￿rms may demand
compensation in line with their contribution. Importantly, this right need not ever be exercised
independently, it needs only to exist in order for cooperation to occur.
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1967.6 A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The combination of the two incentive constraints implies that ( g)  (g). By Spence-Mirrless
condition, 0 > 0 and hence g  g (Monotonicity condition).
Because the participation constraints are type dependent, the search for equilibrium requires
to consider several cases. Let us ￿rst represent the four constraints (7.12), (7.13), (7.16), and
(7.17) in the space (V ;V ).
The analysis is restricted to the region delimited by the two participation constraints and located
above the 45 line because the boundaries of the two incentive constraints V = V + (g) and
V = V   (g) have positive intercepts in the space (V ;V ). Note that IC-line is always above
IC-line since (g)  ( g).
Let E
 
nc
S ;
nc
S

be the intersection between the two participation constraints lines and let
D =

(V ;V )jV = V + 
nc
S   nc
S = V + V0
	
be the line parallel to the two incentive constraints
lines passing through E. D represents the high type’s reservation pro￿t and shows the extent
to which she has a better outside opportunity than the low type.
Case 1: V0 < (gSB), i.e. IC-line is above D
Figure 7.2: Case 1: Low V0
O
V
V
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S V 3  
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197FN would like to compensate the high type vs the low type no more than the outside option
di￿erential V0. However, because V0 is so small, the high type can obtain a better compensation
by lying to FN. If this happens the high type can potentially generate a cost saving of (g) which
is greater than the outside opportunity V0. So, the high type has an incentive to misrepresent
herself and receive an information rent. It follows that IR is slack while IC must be binding:
V = V + (g).
Besides, by lying the low type would incur an extra cost of access of (g) that is greater than
V0 (since 0 > 0). Therefore, she has no incentive to lie, which implies that IC is irrelevant and
IR is binding: V = nc
S .
Plugging V and V in (7.18) and deriving the ￿rst order conditions yields:
max
f(g; V );(g;V)g
p
 
S(g) + N(g;d)   ca
S(g)   cN(d)

+ (1   p)
 
S(g) + N(g;d)   ca
S(g)   cN(d)

 [p(V + (g)) + (1   p)nc
S ]
(7.30)
@N+S
@g
(gSB;d
SB
) = 0
S(gSB) +
@N
@g
(gSB;d
SB
) = c0a
S(gSB) =
@N+S
@g
(g;d

) (7.31)
@N+S
@g
(gSB;dSB) = 0
S(gSB) +
@N
@g
(gSB;dSB) = c0a
S(gSB) +
p
1   p
0(gSB) >
@N+S
@g
(g;d)
(7.32)
By continuity and concavity of N+S(:) it follows that: gSB = g, gSB < g, and gSB < gSB.
There is no allocative distortion for the high type, but there is a downward distortion for the
low type: FN requires an optimal access to the genetic resources from the high type and a sub-
optimal access to the low type. These allocations give rise to the following transfer schemes:
t
SB = (S(^ g) + N(^ g;^ d)) + (1   )c
S(^ g)   cS(^ g) + ca
S(g) + (gSB) > t
 (7.33)
tSB = (S(^ g) + N(^ g;^ d)) + (1   )c
S(^ g)   cS(^ g) + ca
S(gSB) (7.34)
From the diagram, the pro￿t maximizing point for FN is S1 at which both the low type partic-
198ipation constraint IR and the high type incentive constraint IC are binding.
Case 2: (gSB)  V0  (g), i.e. IC-line is above D while IC-line is below D
Figure 7.3: Case 2: Intermediate V0
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We follow the same reasoning as in Case 1. The high type has no incentive to lie when V0
(di￿erential in outside option between the two types) is greater than the saving on access cost
she would get by mimicking the low type. Truthful revelation of her type will guarantee her to
receive V0￿that she would obtain by not cooperating. This implies that IR is binding and IC
is always satis￿ed. The low type, on the other hand faces the same situation as in Case 1, so
she has no incentive to lie. Again, her participation constraint IR is binding and her incentive
constraint IC always hold.
In this case, FN achieves the complete information outcome: V = 
nc
S and V = nc
S .
Plugging  V and V in (7.18) and deriving the ￿rst order conditions yields:
@N+S
@g
(gSB;d
SB
) = 0
S(gSB) +
@N
@g
(gSB;d
SB
) = c0a
S(gSB) =
@N+S
@g
(g;d

) (7.35)
@N+S
@g
(gSB;dSB) = 0
S(gSB) +
@N
@g
(gSB;dSB) = c0a
S(gSB) =
@N+S
@g
(g;d) (7.36)
199By continuity of i
N+S(:) it follows that: gSB = g, gSB = g, and monotonicity ensures that
g  g. Allocative e￿ciency is reached for both types: FN will have an optimal access to the
genetic resources from both types. These allocations give rise to the following transfer schemes
where no rent will be given up:
t
SB = (S(^ g) + N(^ g;^ d)) + (1   )c
S(^ g)   c(^ g) + ca
S(g) = t
 (7.37)
tSB = (S(^ g) + N(^ g;^ d)) + (1   )c
S(^ g)   c(^ g) + ca
S(g) = t (7.38)
Case 3: V0 > (g) , i.e. IC-line is below D
Figure 7.4: Case 3: High V0
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The high type faces the same situation as in Case 2 as V0 > (g) > (gSB), so that IR is
binding and IC holds. On the contrary, the low type now has incentive to misrepresent herself.
By doing so, she incurs an extra cost of access (g) that is smaller than the di￿erential in
reservation pro￿t in favour of the high type, V0. As a consequence, IR and IC are binding:
V = 
nc
S and V = 
nc
S   (g) . From a graphical point of view it is immediate to see that the
optimal point that maximizes FN pro￿t or equivalently minimizes the expected rent given to
the South [p V + (1   p)V] is S3 where IR and IC bind. The low type receives an information
rent (this is a case of countervailing incentives CI) whereas the high is o￿ered her expected
200reservation pro￿t.
Plugging  V and V in (7.18) and deriving the ￿rst order conditions yields:
@N+S
@g
(gCI;d
CI
) = 0
S(gCI) +
@N
@g
(gCI;d
CI
) = c0a
S(gCI)  
1   p
p
0(gCI) <
@N+S
@g
(g;d

)
(7.39)
@N+S
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(gCI;dCI) = 0
S(gCI) +
@N
@g
(gCI;dCI) = c0a
S(gCI) =
@N+S
@g
(g;d) (7.40)
By continuity and concavity of N+S(:) it follows that: gCI > g, gCI = g, and gCI < gCI
(Monotonicity). There is no allocative distortion for the low type, but there is an upward
distortion for the high type: The low type will supply the genetic resources optimally whereas
the high type will be required to supply an excessively high level of resources. These allocations
give rise to the following transfer schemes:
t
CI = (S(^ g) + N(^ g;^ d)) + (1   )c
S(^ g)   cS(^ g) + ca
S(gCI) > t

tCI = (S(^ g) + N(^ g;^ d)) + (1   )c
S(^ g)   cS(^ g) + ca
S(gCI)   (gCI)
In all these cases, it is easy to show that given g, drug development d is chosen optimally.
7.7 A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
As in the case of screening, the combination of (7.16), (7.17) and 0 > 0 implies that g  g.
The Lagrangian of the programme is given by:
L = pV + (1   p)V + 

V   V + (g)

+ 

p
 
S(g) + N(g;d)   c
a
S(g)   cN(d)   V

+ (1   p)
 
S(g) + N(g;d)   c
a
S(g)   cN(d)   V

  
0
N

where  and  are the Lagrange multipliers for (7.17), and (7.27). The ￿rst order conditions
are:
V :  +    =0
201V : (1   )      (1   ) = 0
For any probability p,  = 1 and  = 0 solve the system formed by the two ￿rst order conditions.
It means that FN’s participation constraint is binding and the low type’s incentive constraint
need not be. It follows that the e￿cient outcome can be implemented by the informed FS by
using an ex ante contracting. This is because the low type will tell the truth as IC is slack,
and FN receives exactly his outside option 0
N so that FS becomes the residual claimant of the
surplus. From the binding participation constraint, we obtain:
pV +(1 p)V = p
 
S(g) + N(g;d)   c
a
S(g)   cN(d)

+(1 p)
 
S(g) + N(g;d)   c
a
S(g)   cN(d)

 
0
N (7.41)
The ￿rst order conditions with respect to g and g will yield an e￿cient outcome for both types
g = g and g = g. Given this e￿cient outcome, FN also chooses d e￿ciently, i.e. d = d

and
d = d.
Given that V > V from the high type incentive constraint (7.16), FS can structure her payo￿
so that:
V

= p

S(g
) + N(g
;d

)   c
a
S(g
)   cN(d

)

+(1 p)
 
S(g
) + N(g
;d
)   c
a
S(g
)   cN(d
)

 
0
N+(1 p)(g
)
(7.42)
V
 = p

S(g
) + N(g
;d

)   c
a
S(g
)   cN(d

)

+(1 p)
 
S(g
) + N(g
;d
)   c
a
S(g
)   cN(d
)

 
0
N p(g
)
(7.43)
It can be easily veri￿ed that V
 and V  satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints (7.16)
and (7.17) as well as the ex ante participation constraint (7.27).8
We can therefore determine the optimal transfer payments:
t
 = V
 + ca
S(g) (7.44)
and
t = V  + ca
S(g) (7.45)
By monotonicity we know that g  g. Therefore, as ca
S is increasing, we have ca
S(g)  ca
S(g).
It follows that t
 > t.
8Subtracting (7.42) and (7.43) gives V

  V
 = (g
)  (g
) which satis￿es both incentive compatibility
constraints (7.16) and (7.17). Subtracting (7.42) to pV

+ (1   p)V
 + (1   p)(g
) and combining it with
V

  V
 = (g
), we show that the ex ante participation constraint (7.27) is also satis￿ed.
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